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ABSTRACT
This thesis represents an inquiry into aspects of the general theory
of linguistic markedness as applied to natural language quantification. It
seeks to develop a theory in which it is possible to distinguish, on the
basis of universal grammatical principles, the unmarked cases of natural
language quantification from the marked or idiosyncratic cases.
The central result is that the unmarked cases of quantification are
represented by just those quantified structures which are well-formed at
the linguistic level of Logical Form. We understand Logical Form to be
the interface between a highly restricted theory of linguistic form and
a more general theory of natural language semantics and pragmatics. It is
argued that Logical Form is constructed by rules mapping from Surface
Structure, which are formulated, as are the rules mapping from Deep to
Surface Structure, with respect to restrictive parameters fixed by Universal
Grammar. In particular, we propose a rule, QR, which generates representa-
tions at Logical Form for sentences containing quantifiers. Well-formedness
of representations at this level is determined by universal principles on
the output of the rules of core grammars; specifically, the Predication
Condition, the Condition on Quantifier Binding and the Subjacency Condition
are all argued to be general conditions on well-formed representations at
Logical Form.
In Chapter One we develop the theory of grammar which we assume for
the duration, and formulate QR within that theory. The functioning of this
rule in single clause sentences containing quantifiers is discussed. Chapter
Two is devoted to investigating the range of possible interpretations for
sentences containing complex quantified noun phrases, e.g., PP-complements,
relative clauses, partitives, nominalizations, etc. Chapter Three examines
the range of possible interpretations of complex sentential structures. It
is shown that it follows from the Subjacency Condition that quantification
is clause bounded, in the unmarked case. The final chapter sketches a number
of suggestions for an account of the marked cases of quantification.
Thesis Supervisor: Noam Chomsky
Title: Institute Professor
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INTRODUCTION
Linguistics, as it is currently conceived, is fundamentally an
epistemological inquiry. Its goal is to provide a formal characterization
of our knowledge of language, which can play a part in explaining how
children can learn language within a limited amount of time, from degen-
erate data. The goal of linguistic theory, then, is not simply to provide
a characterization of our linguistic knowledge, i.e., to attain descriptive
adequacy, but to provide one which helps explain how we come to have that
knowledge, i.e., to attain explanatory adequacy. In order to accomplish
this goal, a theory of grammar provides a set of universal principles,
Universal Grammar, which characterizes that knowledge which the child brings
to the language learning task as part of his natural human endowment. The
central empirical task facing the linguist, then, is to correctly formulate
Universal Gratmmar so that it is possible to distinguish, in any natural
language, those grammatical phenomena which follow from universal princi-
ples from these which are idiosyncratic to particular languages.
In this thesis, the approach to be taken to this issue is essen-
tially that of a theory of "markedness". In line with this approach, we
assume that Universal Grammar specifies a (finite) set of general grammat-
ical principles, and fixes a number of formal parameters limiting the
range of possible rules available for grammars of particular languages.
These principles, and those rules of particular languages which may be
formulated within these parameters constitute the "core" grammars of these
languages. Those structures which are generable by the core grammars of
9particular languages are the "unmarked" cases; they are the structures
generable in accordance with the principles of Universal Grammar.
Structures whose generation lies beyond the scope of core grammars are the
"marked" cases; they represent the idiosyncratic, or accidental, aspects
of particular languages. Thus, the distinction between the unmarked and
marked cases in a language is ultimately the distinction between our
universal linguistic knowledge and our particular linguistic knowledge.
It is the difference between what we know of a language by virtue of being
Homo sapiens, and what we know by virtue of being native speakers of one
language rather than another.
The central hypothesis to be explored in this thesis is that the
principles of Universal Grammar which characterize our universal knowledge
of linguistic structure, determine not only what are possible syntactic
forms of a language, but also what are possible "iogical forms", in a
technical sense of this term which will be developed below. We will argue
that the same principles which determine the unmarked cases in syntax also
determine the unmarked cases in semantics. That level of linguistic
representation at which these principles are defined we shall call Logical
Form, which we interpret as the interface of a more comprehensive theory of
the semantics and pragmatics of natural language (Cf. Chomsky (1975a),
(1977b)). Our main empirical interest, then, is in the nature of possible
structures at this level, i.e., those structures which are generable by
core grammars.
The particular structures at this level which will be our primary
concern are those associated with sentences containing quantifiers; i.e.,
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words like 'every', 'all', 'some', 'a', 'each', 'the', 'no', 'three',
'many', 'few', 'more', etc. What we will be endeavoring to show here is
that the unmarked interpretation of sentences containing quantifiers (i.e.,
those interpretations which are universally present in quantified sentences
of a given contstruction) are represented by just those (quantified)
structures which are well-formed at the level of Logical Form, as deter-
mined by the principles of Universal Grammar. Thus, we wish to distinguish
here what we know of the logical structure of sentences containing quanti-
fiers by virtue of our universal linguistic knowledge, from that which
we know by virtue of our knowledge of the particular language we happen
to speak.
In investigating the issues just raised, we will essentially be
assuming the organization of grammar depicted in (1):
(1) DS - SS - LF
An organization of grammar along these lines has been assumed in a number
of recent studies, for example Chomsky (1976), Fiengo (1977), Gueron (1977),
Rouveret (1977), Sag (1976) and Williams (1977). Under this conception,
rules which generate base (i.e., deep) structures, along with those rules
which map from Deep Structure to Surface Structure, and from Surface
Structure to Logical Form, constitute the rules of sentence grammar. Where
we differ from others subscribing to this view of grammar is that we assume
that all rules of sentence grammar (aside from base rules) are to be
formulated as transformations. These rules, in conjunction with the
11
principles which determine the well-formedness of the structures which
are the output of the rules of sentence grammar, constitute the core
grammar of a language. It is the structures which are generated by the
core grammars of languages which represent the unmarked cases. In Chapter
One, we will examine the properties of the core grammar of English, and
formulate a rule of sentence grammar which generates logical forms for
sentences containing quantifiers. We will also begin to examine the
properties of structures which are generated at the level of Logical Form,
in particular, those associated with single clause sentences containing
simple noun phrases. In Chapter Two, we extend the analysis to a range
of sentences containing complex nominal constructions, such as PP-
complement constructions, relative clauses, possessive noun phrases,
nominalizations and partitives containing quantifiers. Chapter Three
focuses on the structures associated with complex sentential constructions.
In the final chapter, we sketch an account of the marked interpretations
of quantified sentences.
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Chapter One: ON THE FORM AND FUNCTIONING OF QR
1.1 The range of grammatical theory. As was noted in the Introduction,
the central hypothesis to be explored here is that the transformational
rules of sentence grammar map not only deep structures onto surface
structures, but also surface structures onto representations, as phrase
markers, at the level of Logical Form. The purpose of this section is
to make clear the notion of transformation we are employing in making this
claim, in order that we may formulate a specific rule of sentence grammar
generating representations at Logical Form for sentences containing
quantifiers.
The rules of core grammar are of essentially two types: base
rules and transformational rules. We assume that the base rules are given
as a context-free rewriting grammar. In formulating transformational rules,
we will follow suggestions in Chomsky (1976), (1977a) and Chomsky and
Lasnik (1977), that Universal Grammar fixes a number of formal parameters,
which have the effect of severely limiting the expressive power of the
theory of transformations. In particular, it has been suggested that
transformational rules be limited to mentioning only the type of
operation they perform, perhaps limited to adjunction, movement and sub-
stitution, and the element which is affected by the rule. In general, this
element can either be a phrase, e.g., NP, AP, etc., or a specifier of one
of these phrase types, e.g., wh. These restrictive parameters have the
effect of only permitting transformations to be stated in a maximally
simple fashion, e.g., as "Nove NP" or "Move wh". Notice, that excluded
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from transformational formalism under these assumptions are such common
formal devices as labelled brackets, essential syntactic variables and
context elements. (For an explicit formalism incorporating a number of
these restrictions, see Lasnik and Kupin (1976)).
One of the significant aspects of these restrictions on the formal
expressive power of transformations is that they only allow the formulation
of a finite class of rules from which the rules of core grammars of
particular languages may be chosen. In this respect, Universal Grammar
only provides a finite set of possible core grammars. Thus, in order to
determine the core grammar of his or her language, the child need only
consider a finite class of possibilities. Notice, that this theory, which
distinguishes the universal, or unmarked cases in a language, from the
idiosyncratic, or marked cases, on the basis of a core grammar allowed
by this theory, provides a more structured evaluation metric than theories,
such as that in Chomsky (1955), or more recently, Peters and Ritchie (1973),
which place no formal bound on the length of structural descriptions.
These latter theories, therefore, allow for the construction of an
infinite class of possible grammars, with no principled dichotomy of
unmarked-marked. The key empirical issue, then, is whether the theory of
core grammar conforming to our restricted assumptions can correctly
distinguish the unmarked from the marked case.
At first blush, this approach to the formulation of transformational
rules may seem woefully impoverished. Consider the rule of wh-movement,
stated in this theory as "Move wh". If taken literally, this would mean
that only the wh-word is affected by the rule. It is a general property
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of transformational rules, though, that they affect major lexical phrases;
they never affect simply the specifier of those phrases. 1 Thus, wh-
movement must be interpreted as affecting a phrase containing the
specifier element. In order to guarantee that rules like wh-movement
apply correctly, we will assume the following condition on the interpre-
tation of rules mentioning specifier elements:2
Condition on Analyzability
If a rule 4 mentions SPEC, then 4 applies
to the minimal [+N]-phrase dominating
SPEC, which is not immediately dominated
by another [+N]-phrase.
This condition, which is basically that proposed in Woisetschlaeger (1976),
incorporates insights originally due to Ross (1967), (1974) concerning
immediate domination. It also incorporates an insight due to Bresnan
(1976a) that the key to accounting for the "left-branch" phenomena first
discussed in Ross (1967), lies in the possibility of formulating, in the
X-theory of phrase structure proposed in Chomsky (1970), natural classes
of syntactic categories. Under this theory, the major lexical and phrasal
categories are projected from the universal set of category features,
{+N, +V}. The phrases which have the value [+N] as part of their feature
specification are noun phrases and adjective phrases. Therefore, under
the provisos of the Condition on Analyzability, if SPEC is wh, then wh-
movement affects the minimal noun or adjective phrase, which is not im-
mediately dominated by another noun or adjective phrase. Given this cross-
categorial property of the Condition on Analyzability, consider the
15
examples in (1.1):
(1.l)a How good a lawyer is Belli?
b *How good is Belli a lawyer?
c *How is Belli good a lawyer?
In the structure which underlies the examples in (1.1), which is
essentially (1.2), the wh-word 'how' is dominated by an
(1.2) [SBelli is [NP[APhoW good] a lawyer]]
AP, which is itself inummediately dominated by an NP. By the Condition on
Analyzability, wh-movement may only affect the dominating NP, since,
while both it and the AP are [+N]-phrases, the NP is the only one which
is not immediately dominated by another [+N]-phrase. The Condition on
Analyzability, therefore, permits the generation of (l.1)a, but not of
(1.1)b or (C1.1)c.
Besides assuming that all transformational rules of sentence
grammar are of the form just specified, we will also hold that they apply
freely. By this is meant not only that transformations apply optionally,
but that they are not subject to any constraints which would "block"
their functioning in certain structures. Rather, we will hold that there
is a limited set of conditions, specified by Universal Grammar, which
determine whether the structures which are the output of the rules of
sentence grammar are well-formed. This approach is made possible by
assuming that movement rules function in accordance with the "trace theory
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of movement rules", as discussed in Wasow (1972), Selkirk (1972), Fiengo
(1974), (1977), Chomsky (1973), (1975a), (1976), (1977a) and Chomsky
and Lasnik (1977). Under the tenets of this theory of movement rules, a
moved phrase binds a "trace" at its extraction site, each phrase binding
a distinct trace. The relationship of a phrase and the trace which it
binds may be viewed as an instance of the bound anaphor-antecedent
relationship, or, in the particular case which will interest us, the
relationship between a quantifier and a bound variable.3 Given this
parallelism, it is possible to treat the conditions which determine when
the relationship between a phrase and its trace is well-formed as sub-
cases of the universal conditions determing the general properties of
anaphoric control. The particular conditions we have in mind have all
been proposed in a number of places in the recent literature: The
Predication Condition (Chomsky (1977b), Freidin (1977)), The Condition
on Proper Binding (Fiengo (1974), (1977)), The Subjacency Condition
(Chomsky (1971), (1973), (1975a), (1976), (1977a)) and The Tensed-S and
Specified Subject Condition (Chomsky (1971), (1973), (197Sa), (1976),
(1977a), Kayne (1975), Quicoli (1977a), (1977b)).
While each of these conditions will, in turn, be discussed in
greater detail, what is important to note here is that they are all con-
strued as well-formedness conditions on the output of the rules of sentence
grammar (Cf. Chomsky (1977a), Freidin (1977)). Since we are holding that
the rules of sentence grammar encompass not only those rules, like wh-
movement and NP-movement, which determine the syntactic structure of a
sentence, but also those rules which determine its logical structure, it
is natural to construe the conditions just enumerated as conditions on
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well-formed representations at the level of Logical Form. Indeed, we may
consider these conditions as part of the definition of the level of Logical
Form. On our extended notion of sentence grammar, this result is a con-
sequence of holding that the rules of sentence grammar carrying base
structures into Logical Form are transformations, subject to a uniform
set of conditions determining whether the structures derived by these
rules are well-formed.
What we wish to show, then, is that under the assumptions we are
making here, a set of rather diverse properties concerning the range of
possible interpretations open to sentences containing quantifiers follow
from independently motivated, universal conditions on the nature of
possible structures generable by sentence grammar. Before beginning to
examine this claim, though, let us summarize the assumptions presented in
this section. First, it is being held that representations at Logical
Form are phrase markers. Second, it is being held that the rules which
map from Surface Structure to Logical Form are identical in form and
functioning to rules mapping from Deep to Surface Structure. Finally,
the structures derived by these rules are subject to a set of well-
formedness conditions, stated at the level of Logical Form. Given these
basic assumptions, what we will see is that the properties of the un-
marked cases in semantics, i.e., those properties of a sentence's inter-
pretation which are determinable solely from structural criteria, follow
from the same set of universal conditions as unmarked cases in syntax.
It is to examining the empirical content of the claim that the bulk of
what follows is devoted.
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1.2 QR. Given the conception of grammar just outlined, we are now in a
position to formulate a rule of sentence grammar, mapping from Surface
Structure to Logical Form, which generates logical forms for sentences
containing quantifiers. This rule, which will henceforth be referred to
as QR, may be formulated as in (1.3):
(1.3) Adjoin Q (to S)
In order to fully understand the functioning of this rule, there are a
number of preliminary matters which need clarification. First of all,
what is the status of the term Q in QR? We are assuming that there
exists a phrase structure rule NP + SPEC(N) - N, where 'SPEC(N)' may be
realized either as Q, which ranges over quantifier elements such as
'every', 'some', 'a', 'many', 'three', etc., or as DET, which ranges over
the definite determiner, demonstrative and reflexive pronouns, possessive
noun phrases, etc.4 It may also be null, as in the case of proper names
and personal pronouns. Thus, we are taking Q and DET to be category
symbols, just as N, V, A, etc., are category symbols.5  QR applies only
in those structures in which SPEC(N) is realized as Q, in accordance with
the provisions of the Condition on Analyzability.
Given this formulation of the nominal specifier system, we may
distinguish between quantified expressions, i.e., where the specifier is
a quantifier, and what we shall call "referring expressions", i.e., where
the specifier is either a determiner or null. This distinction roughly
mirrors the traditional logical distinction between terms and quantified
19
expressions.
We presume that QR, since it effects a movement of a noun phrase,
obeys the trace theory of movement rules. In this case, we will construe
the trace which arises from the functioning of QR as a variable bound
by the moved quantifier.
As an example, consider the functioning of QR in a structure such
as (1.4):
(1.4) [SiCecil played [Np[Q every] scale]]
By virtue of the Condition on Analyzability, QR affects the noun phrase
'every scale', since it is the minimal [+N]-phrase dominating the
quantifier 'every', adjoining it to S. This generates (1.5), as a
representation at the level of Logical Form:
(1.5) [S[NP[Qevery] scale]. [SiCecil played a]]
The occurence of the variable 'a' in Si represents the variable bound
by the quantifier; the other occurence is simply an index, indicating
the variable which is bound by this phrase. If a quantified noun phrase
appears in subject position in surface structure, QR functions in quite
parallel fashion: (1.7) is the structure at Logical Form which is
generated by QR from the surface structure (1.6):6
(1.6) [Si[NP[Qsome] body] saw Dexter]
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(1.7) [S[NP[Qsome] body]a [S. a saw Dexter]]
1
In what follows, we will refer to structures like (1.5) and (1.7),
which are representations at the level of Logical Form, as "logical
forms". Thus, we will be using this term in an ambiguous manner, to refer
to both types and tokens. On the one hand, we will speak of a type of
construction being related to a type of logical form. On the other, we
will speak of a sentence, (i.e., an instance of a type of construction),
being associated with a "logical form", (i.e., an instance of a type of
logical form). As a further piece of nomenclature, we will refer to the
"open" sentence which is most deeply embedded in a logical form as the
"main predicate". Thus, in (1.5) and (1.7), the main predicate is Si.
1.3 The conditions on Logical Form. Under the conception of the
functioning of movement rules being assumed here, i.e., that they apply
freely, in accordance with the trace theory of movement rules, it is
necessary to distinguish the notion of a variable being "properly bound"
from the simple notion of a variable being bound. This is because under
trace theory every movement of a [+N]-phrase generates a structure con-
taining a bound variable. Only certain of these structures, though, are
well-formed. It is of central empirical importance, therefore, to be able
to distinguish, on general principled grounds, those structures which
represent the result of legitimate movements, (i.e., where a trace is
properly bound), from those structures which represent the result of
illegitimate movements, (i.e., where the trace is not properly bound). It
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has been suggested, primarily in Fiengo (1974), (cE. also Chomsky (1975a)),
that the appropriate fashion in which to characterize the conditions under
which a phrase properly binds a variable is a generalization of the
conditions governing anaphora. We assume, following Reinhart (1976),
that these conditions are stated in terms of the notion "c-command",
defined as follows:
A node c-commands a node iff the first
branching node dominating also dominates
' and q does not dominate P.
The chief insight afforded by the notion c-corunand is that it allows us
to determine when a variable is properly bound solely from hierarchical
sentential structure. Thus, taking the notion "variable" in a rather
general sense, as including not only those variables which arise by
virtue of the trace theory of movement rules (i.e., traces which arise from
the functioning of rules like QR, NP-movement and wh-movement), but also
anaphoric pronouns, reciprocals and the PRO element in structures of
obligatory control, it is possible to formulate the notion of proper
binding of variables as follows:
(1.8) A variable is properly bound by a binding
phrase q iffit is c-commanded by 0.
The notion of proper binding, in turn, allows vs to formulate the
following general principle on well-formed representations at the level
of Logical Form:
22
Predication Condition
Every argument position of a predi-
cate must either be a referring ex-
pression or a properly bound variable.
Where, in general, the argument positions of a predicate are its subject,
and any other noun phrase for which it is subcategorized.7 (Cf. Chomsky
(1977b), p. 10-11 and Freidin (1977) for discussion of conditions which
are essentially the same as the Predication Condition.) Our particular
interest in the Predication Condition will1 in the main center around a
corollary of this condition, The Condition on Proper Binding,
Condition on Proper Binding
Every variable in an argument position
of a predicate must be properly bound.
as well as with another, closely related condition, which we shall call
The Condition on Quantifier Binding:
Condition on Quantifier Binding
Every quantified phrase must pro-
perly bind a variable.
The effect of the Condition on Proper Binding is to mandate that in order
for a logical form to be well-formed, every occurence of a variable which
it contains must be c-commanded by the phrase which binds it. This
condition must be stated as a condition on well-formed logical forms, if
23
we wish it to generally characterize when a variable is properly bound.
This is because Logical Form is the only level of linguistic representation
at which all of the types of variables enumerated above are present.
(Notice that we differ here from Fiengo (1974), who holds that proper
binding is defined over representations at the level of Surface Structure.)
The Condition on Quantifier Binding pertains only to those cases in which
the binding phrase contains a quantifier. This condition must also be a
condition on Logical Form, since, given the functioning of QR as a rule
mapping from Surface Structure to Logical Form, the latter level is the
only level at which all quantified noun phrases can bind variables. At
this level, then, every quantifier must c-command all occurences of the
variable which it binds.
The significance of the Predication Condition, the Condition on
Proper Binding and the Condition on Quantifier Binding is that they
determine, in part, what sorts of structures at Logical Form are inter-
pretable by the rules of quantifier interpretation for natural languages.
They are by no means to be construed as necessary condition on the
interpretability of logical systems, per se; rather, they are conditions
only on the interpretability of logical representations of natural
language sentences. The status of these conditions, then, is an
empirical matter. They are of interest only insofar as they contribute
to the correct determination of the range of possible interpretations of
the differing types of natural language constructions.
In formulating QR, we did not specify what type of adjunction
operation the rule effects. Indeed, we may assume that QR performs any
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type of adjunction which results in a structure which satisfies the
Condition on Quantifier Binding, i.e., where every quantifier in a
sentence c-commands all occurences of the variable which it binds. We
will hold, though, for reasons which will be discussed momentarily, that
QR Chomsky-adjoins phrases to S. Thus, consider (1.9), which is (1.5)
in tree form:
(1.9) S
NP VP
VflP
[every scale] Cecil played a
In (1.9), the quantified noun phrase 'every scale' has been Chomsky-
adjoined to Si, binding the variable 'a'. In this structure the phrase
'every scale' c-commands the variable which it binds, since the first
branching node dominating it is Sj, which also dominates 'a'. Therefore,
(1.9) satisfies both the Condition on Proper Binding and the Condition on
Quantifier Binding, as the variable 'a' is properly bound by the
quantified phrase 'every scale'. 9
The central reason for holding that QR functions to Chomsky-
adjoin a phrase to S is that under this assumption it is possible to give
a clear and concise characterization of the notion of a quantifier's
"scope" in terms of the hierarchical constituent structure of logical
forms, as follows:
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The scope of a quantified phrase 4 is
everything which it c-commands
For example, in the logical form (1.9), the quantified phrase 'every
scale' c-commands Si, and hence it c-commands every node which S. dominates.I 1
The scope of this phrase, then, is S..
Given this definition, we may further define wide or narrow scope
for logical forms containing more than a single quantifier:
A quantified phrase ý has wide scope with
respect to a distinct quantified phrase i
iff 4 is included in the scope of , and not
vice versa.
A quantified phrase has narrow scope with
respect to a distinct quantified phrase *
iff is included in the scope of I and not
vice versa.
Thus, consider the structure in (1.10), which contains two quantified
phrases to which QR has applied:
(1.10)
[[some
cn(MP%J vi •
[ever:
26
In (1.10), the scope of 'every man' is Sj, and the scope of 'some woman'
is Sk . Since the latter phrase is a constituent of S. in this structure,
itis included within the scope of the phrase 'every man'. Thus, given the
above definitions, we may say that 'every man' has wider scope than 'some
woman', and that 'some woman' has scope narrower than 'every man'. 10
From the definitions developed above of proper binding and scope,
it follows that for a variable to be properly bound, it must fall within
the scope of the binding quantified phrase. Thus, it is essentially the
linguistic notion of proper binding which corresponds to the notion of a
bound variable employed in quantification theory.
At bottom, the notions of proper binding and scope are intimately
related to the form and functioning of the "rules of interpretation" for
sentences containing quantifiers. We shall assume in what follows that
these rules essentially constitute the recursive clauses of a Tarskian
truth-condition theory for natural language quantification. While we will
not broach the question of the exact nature of this theory here, (see
Cushing (1976) for some interesting suggestions along these lines), we
are concerned with the issue of the appropriate level of representation
over which the clauses of the theory are defined. Given our conception
of grammar, it is apparent that this level could not be Logical Form,
since at this level only structures corresponding to the unmarked inter-
pretation of a sentence exist. We will assume, therefore, that there is
a distinct level of representation, LF', at which structures corresponding
to both the marked and unmarked interpretations exist. Representations at
LF' are derived by rules applying to the output of the rules of sentence
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grammar; i.e., by rules applying to representations at the level of
Logical Form, as illustrated in (1.11):
(1.11) DS - SS + LF - LF'
core grammar
(LF' is what Chomsky (1975a), (1976) has called SR.) Since the rules
mapping from Logical Form to LF' are not rules of core grammar, they
are not constrained by the restrictions limiting the expressive power of
rules of core grammar. 1 1  For example, the structural descriptions of
these rules may mention labelled brackets, essential syntactic variables,
specific lexical items, and, furthermore, their functioning may be governed, in
some cases, by non-grammatical factors. We will also assume that they
may effect a.wider range of structural changes. This enrichment in
expressive power for rules mapping from LF onto LF' allows for the
formulation of rules which we shall call "conversion rules". The con-
version rules which interest us are those which, so to speak, convert
natural language quantifiers into logical quantifiers. We may think of
them, for instance, as mapping representations like (1.5) and (1.7), at
Logical Form, into representations at LF'. While there are many factors
(1.5) [S[every scale]a [SCecil played a]]
[S[somebody]a [Sa saw Dexter]](1.7)
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weighing on the issue of the correct notation for representations at
this level, for the sake of clarity we will assume a notation along the
lines illustrated by the structures in (1.12) and (1.13), derived from
(1.5) and (1.7), respectively:
(1.12) [SVa[S[Sa is a scale] + [SCecil played c]]]
(1.13) [SHa[Sr a is a person] a [Sa saw Dexter]]]
Structures such as (1.12) and (1.13), at the level ofLF', we will refer
to as "converted forms".
We may think of LF' as one of a number of "interpretive" levels
of the grammar, along with, for example, levels of phonological inter-
pretation, (PI) and morphological interpretation (MI). We assume that
the general characteristics of these levels is determined by general
linguistic theory, and that Universal Grammar determines the nature of
the rules mapping onto these interpretive levels. In particular, we will
hold that Universal Grammar specifies that these rules map from some level
of core grammatical representation onto an interpretive level. For
example, while LF' is constructed by rules mapping from Logical Form,
the rules mapping onto PI map from Surface Structure. The basic picture
of grammatical organization which arises, then, is (1.14):
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(1.14) {DS - SS + LF}
PI L, '
The nature of the rules mapping from LF into LF' will be discussed in
some detail in Chapter Four.
1.4 Simple sentential constructions. In much of what follows in this
thesis, we will be concerned with sentences which display quantifier
scope ambiguities. In common with most other analyses of quantifiers
in natural language, we will hold that such ambiguities should be
captured by being able to associate a sentence which is n-ways ambiguous
with ndistinct logical forms. We wish, therefore, that the translation function
mapping from sentences into their logical forms be disambiguating, i.e.,
that representations at the level of Logical Form be unambiguous. A
classic example of the sort of ambiguity we have in mind is displayed by
(1.15):
(1.15) [S [NP[Qever y ] man] loves [Np[Qsome] woman]]
(1.15) is ambiguous between a reading under which it is being asserted
that for each man, there is some woman or other that he loves, and a
reading where it is being asserted that there is a woman, such that she
is loved by every man. That sentences with this structure should be
ambiguous in this way is explained by the fact that, given our assumptions,
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there are two distinct (i.e., non-equivalent), well-formed logical forms
which may be generated from its surface structure. Thus, note that in
(1.15), there are two noun phrases which satisfy the structural description
of QR: 'every man' and 'some woman'. QR mandates that each of these
quantified noun phrases be adjoined to an S. There are two possible
structures satisfying the Condition on Proper Binding and Quantifier
Binding, which can be generated in this manner. These structures are
illustrated in (1.16) and (1.17):
(1.16) [S.[every man] [S.[some woman] 8 [S loves 8]]]
1 3 k
(1.17) [S. [some woman] 8 [S.[every man]a K[ loves ll]]
Both (1.16) and (1.17) are well-formed logical forms, since both
quantified phrases, 'every man' and 'some woman' c-command, and hence,
properly bind, the variables. 'a' and '8', which they bind. In (1.16),
the quantifier 'every' has wider scope than the quantifier 'some', since
the noun phrase 'every man' c-commands the noun phrase 'some woman',
while in (1.17), the reverse scope order obtains; here, 'some woman'
has scope wider than 'every man'. These structures represent, at Logical
Form, the two readings described for (1.15) above.
It is appropriate at this point to introduce a bit more nomenclature.
Both of the logical forms in (1.16) and (1.17) are of the type that we will
refer to as "non-linked", since all of the quantifiers in the sentence
bind variables in the main predicate. This is in contrast to "linked"
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logical forms, in which only one of the quantified phases in a multiply
quantified logical form binds a variable in the main predicate. We will
discuss this latter type of logical form in detail in Chapters Two and
Three. We will also speak of logical forms being either "natural" or
"inverse" vis-a-vis the surface structures from which they are derived.
Thus, (1.16) is a naturally non-linked logical form, since the scope
order of the quantifiers is the same as their order in (1.15); (1.17), on
the other hand, is inversely non-linked, since the order of the quantifiers
is the mirror image of their order in (1.15). We shall see below that
linked logical forms may be natural or inverse as well.
Since the earliest investigations into constraints on transforma-
tional rules (e.g., in Chomsky (1962) and (1964)), and especially since
Ross (1967), it has been held by most linguists that there exist formal
constraints on the functioning of the transformational rules of sentence
grammar. An application of a rule in the derivation of a sentence, which
violated one of these constraints, would result in an ill-formed sentence.
Given this mode of explanation, the actual derivation of a sentence is
of central importance, in order to detect whether any constraint had been
violated by an application of somie rule. In the conception of sentence
grammar being assumed here, though, the derivation of a structure does
not serve this central explanatory role. Rather, explanation resides in
whether a structure (at the level of Logical Form) satisfies a general
set of well-formedness conditions. We are interested in a derivation
only insofar as we wish to prove that a given structure, which satisfies
the well-formedness conditions, is in fact, generable. 1 3 For example,
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with respect to the logical forms (1.16) and (1.17), all that is significant
is that there are only two distinct structures generable from (1.15) which
satisfy the well-formedness conditions of logical forms. The significance
of examining the possible derivations of these structures is to show that,
given our assumptions about the nature of QR, these are, in fact, the only
structures generated which satisfy the well-formedness conditions. In
showing this, it need not be the case that a structure has a unique deriva-
tion; there may exist, for any given structure, n equivalent derivations
of structures satisfying the well-formedness conditions. This is, in fact,
the case with regard to (1.16) and (1.17). In the derivation of (1.16),
QR could have applied to either of the quantified noun phrases in (1.15),
since they both satisfy the structural description of the rule. If it
applies first to the noun phrase 'every man', (1.18) is derived:
(1.18) [S [every man] S. a loves[Np[Qsome] woman]l]
j 1
QR would then reapply in this structure, to 'some woman', adjoining it to
S.. This would derive (1.16). Alternatively, QR could have applied first
to the noun phrase 'some woman', deriving (1.19):
(1.19) [Sj[some woman]f [S [NP[Qevery] man] loves ll]]
To derive (1.16), QR would then apply to 'every man', Chomsky-adjoining
it to S.. Similarly, the logical form (1.17), where 'some' takes wider
scope, could also have been derived in two different ways. Either QR first
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applies to 'every man', deriving (1.18), and then adjoins 'some woman' to
Sj, or it applies to 'some woman' first, deriving (1.19), and then to
'every man', adjoining it to Si. Either way, only a single logical form,
(1.17), will be generated. This shows, then, that (1.16) and (1.17)
are the only logical forms generable from (1.15) which satisfy the well-
formedness conditions of logical forms, i.e., which satisfy the Condition
on Proper Binding and the Condition on Quantifier Binding.
Given our assumptions to this point, then, it is possible to
account for the range of possible logical forms which can be associated with
sentences of a single clause, as a function of their structure. This
function is factorial: For any given clause S which contains n quantified
noun phrases, there are n! possible formally distinct well-formed logical
forms which may be associated with it.14  We have already seen that
sentences like (1.4) and (1.6), which are unambiguous, can only be
associated with a single logical form. We have also seen that subject-
verb-direct object constructions containing two quantified noun phrases
are ambiguous. This is a general property of single clause sentences
containing two quantifiers; for example, (1.20) and (1.21) are also
ambigucus.
(1.20)a Everyone gave to some cause
b Some politican ran on every ticket
(1.21) John gave a present to everyone
Sentences containing three quantified noun phrases, such as (1.22), are
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predictably six ways ambiguous.
(1.22) Everyone brought a present for many of my friends
I leave it as a task for the reader to discern the different readings.
1.5 The marked case. Recall the goal of this thesis: To distinguish
those interpretations of sentences which represent the unmarked, or
universal cases, from the marked cases, which represent idiosyncratic
properties of a language. Up to this point, we have been concerned with
the unmarked interpretation of simple transitive and intransitive con-
structions, i.e., those interpretations which are represented by logical
forms which are directly generable by the rules of sentence grammar.
Thus, we have seen that asentence like (1.23), which contains a quantified
object noun phrase, can only be associated with a single well-formed
logical form, (1.24):
(1.23) Earl played a beautiful song
(1.24) [S[a beautiful song]a [SEarl played a]]
There do exist sentences, for example those in (1.25), which are of the
(1.25)a John wants a lilliputian for his birthday
b Harry is seeking a unicorn
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same structure as (1.23), containing a single quantifier, but which are
ambiguous. As has been noted, for example by Quine (1960), as well as
many others, sentences like (1.25) may either have a transparent (or
referential), reading, parallel to the interpretation of a sentence like
(1.23), or an opaque (non-referential) reading. Under the latter inter-
pretation, asserting the sentences in (1.25) does not commit the speaker
either to the existence of lilliputians or unicorns, respectively. On
the transparent interpretations, though, the existence of lilliputians
and unicorns is being asserted.
The existence of the ambiguity displayed by sentences like (1.25)
is by no means a general property of simple transitive sentences. Rather,
the existence of the opaque interpretation in this type of structure is
quite idiosyncratic. For instance, its occurrence is dependent, in part,
upon the nature of the verb. It is only a small subset of transitive
verbs which allow the opaque interpretation, among them 'want', 'seek',
'look for', 'desire', etc. This class of predicates is not co-extensive
with the class of predicates which induce opacity when they occur in
matrix-complement constructions. For example, sentence (1.26),
(1.26) John believed a unicorn
containing 'believe' is unambiguous, only having the somewhat odd trans-
parent interpretation. Furthermore, in sentences containing predicates
like 'look for' or 'want', the marked opaque reading is only possible
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if the quantified noun phrase is the object of the verb; if it is the
subject, then only the transparent reading is possible. Thus, (1.26)
only has the odd transparent reading, asserting the existence of unicorns.
(Opacity, though, is not limited to object position in simple sentential
construction; certain predicates also seemingly allow an opaque reading
when a quantified noun phrase occurs in subject position, as for example
in (1.27):
(1.27) A unicorn is desirable to Lois
In contrast, a transparent interpretation is possible in simple trans-
itive and intransitive constructions regardless of whether a quantified
noun phrase appears in subject or object position.
In general then, we may say that in simple sentential con-
structions, both transitive and intransitive, a transparent, or (or refer-
ential) interpretation is always available. This is regardless of the particular
predicates and noun phrases which a sentence contains. Some transitive
sentences though also allow an opaque interpretation, whose existence is
governed, at least partially, by semantic properties of the predicate
of the sentence. Thus, in simple transitives, the transparent inter-
pretation is the unmarked case, while the opaque interpretation is
marked in sentences of this type. 1 5
It is just this distribution of interpretations which is predicted
by the theory being presented here. Thus, given the formulation of QR,
and the Conditions on Proper Binding and Quantifier Binding, the only
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logical form generable for simple transitives with object quantified
phrases is as in (1.24). Therefore, the only logical forms directly
generable from the surface structures of the sentences in (1.25) are
those in (1.28), which represent their transparent interpretation.
(1.28)a [S[a lilliputian]a [SJohn wants ar for his birthday]]
b [S[a unicorn]a [SJohn is seeking a]]
Given the expressive power of sentence grammar, then, it is only
possible to determine what sentences like (1.25) have in common with
other sentences of the same construction, i.e., that they have a trans-
parent interpretation. It is this aspect of the interpretation of these
sentences which is determinable solely from their structure. In
accounting for the existence of the marked opaque interpretation in this
structure, on the other hand, it is also necessary to take into account
idiosyncratic properties of the verbs and nouns acutally occuring in a
particular sentence. Since this information is not available to govern
the functioning of rules of sentence grammar, we must account for the
opaque reading of sentences (1.25)a and (1.25)b in a manner which is
distinct from sentence grammar. In Chapter Four we will return to some
suggestions for the analysis of these marked cases.
1.6 On the insufficiency of surface structure. The success of the analysis
of scope presented here, where this notion is defined in terms of c-
command relations in Logical Form, is in contrast to the difficulties
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facing a theory which attempts to define scope relations from c-command
relations in surface structure.16 A theory of the latter type is presented
in Reinhart (1976), which postulates the following principle for determining
the scope of quantifiers from their surface structure positions:
A logical structure in which a quantifier
binding a variable x has wide scope over a
quantifier binding a (distinct) variable y
is a possible interpretation for a given
structure S just in case in the surface
structure of S the quantified expression
corresponding to y is in the (c-command)
domain of the quantified expression cor-
responding to x.
(Reinhart (1976), p. 191)
(The c-command domain of a node A is A itself, and all of those nodes
which it c-commands.) In effect, what chis condition states is that if a
quantifier Qi c-commands another quantifier Qj in surface structure, then
there is a possible logical form in which Qi has wider scope than Qj.
There are two significant problems which arise from this theory, both
of which Reinhart points out. First, it predicts that transitive
sentences in which both the subject and object noun phrases contain
quantifiers are unambiguous, with the subject quantifier taking wider scope.
For example, consider (1.29), which is the surface structure of sentence
(1.15):
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(1.29)
In (1.29), since NP. c-commands NPj, but not vice versa, Reinhart's condition
predicts that it is only possible to associate (1. 29) with a logical form in
which the subject quantifier takes wider scope. But, as we saw in the
discussion above, sentences with a structure as in (1.29) are, in fact,
ambiguous. Either of the quantifiers may be interpreted as having wider
scope. Thus, Reinhart's condition incorrectly predicts the range of possible
interpretations for sentences like (1.29).17 On the other hand, the fact
that sentences like (1.29) may be ambiguous follows from defining scope,
in terms of c-command, over representations at the level of Logical Form,
rather than over surface structures. This result, in turn, follows from
assuming that logical forms are generated by QR, construed as a rule of
sentence grammar, mapping from Surface Structure to Logical Form.
The second problem which Reinhart acknowledges concerns the inter-
pretation of PP-complement structures like (1.30), whose surface structure
is (1.31).
(1.30) Everybody in some city voted for Debs
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r I py *(I..51)
ev ebs
The problem here is that NP. c-commands NPk, and not vice versa. Thus,
Reinhart's condition predicts that the only logical form which it is
possible to associate with (1.30) is one in which the quantifier 'every'
has wider scope than 'some'. But, in fact, (1.30) does not have an
interpretation where 'every' has wider scope. Rather, it only has a
reading where the embedded quantifier, 'some', has wider scope; (1.30)
could be roughly paraphrased as 'There is a city, such that everybody in
it voted for Debs'. In other words, Reinhart's condition incorrectly
predicts the possible interpretation of sentence (1.30).18 This problem
does not arise, though, under the theory being proposed here. In Chapter
Two, we will see that the explanation of the range of interpretation of
sentences like (1.30) follows from the same principles as the explanation
of the range of interpretation of sentences like (1.29), i.e., from QR,
and the Conditions on Proper Binding and Quantifier Binding.
eV
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FOOTNOTES
Chapter One
1 This formalism precludes the formulation, as a rule of sentence grammar
per se, of rules such as Q-float. Under the approach to linguistic
markedness being assumed here, in which the rules of sentence grammar
account for the unmarked, or general, cases, this is not an unin-
teresting result, since this rule exhibits a great deal of idiosyn-
cratic behavior. For an indication of the complexity involved, see
Lasnik and Fiengo (1974), Postal (1976) and Fiengo and Lasnik (1976).
2 Notice, that rather than including an immediate domination clause
in the Condition on Analyzability, we could alternatively impose the
following filter condition (in the sense of Chomsky and Lasnik (1977))
on the output of the rules of sentence grammar at Logical Form:
(i) *...x[At At].]..., where A is [+N]
This condition has the effect of marking as ill-formed any structure
wi.ich contains a [+N]-phrase which immedi_ r ly dominates another
[+N]-phrase, which in turn immediately dominates a trace. If we
formulate the immediate domination condition in this manner, as a
local filter, then it is not a condition on how structures may be
analyzed so as to satisfy the structural descriptions of transforma-
tional rules; rather, in common with the conditions to be discussed
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below, it is a well-formedness conditions on representations at
the level of Logical Form.
Given (i), we may reformulate the Condition on Analyzability
as in (ii):
(ii) Condition on Analyzability
If a rule 4 mentions SPEC, then 4 applies
to any [+N]-phrase dominating SPEC
3 While we will informally represent traces bound by quantified noun
phrases by Greek letters, we will assume that in common with other
trace elements, they are to be represented as indexed empty nodes,
i.e., as [NP.e], (or as [AP.e]), where 'i' is an index, as suggested
i 1
in Chomsky and Lasnik (1977). A trace is bound, then, if it is
co-indexed with another noun phrase (or adjective phrase). We will
represent the binding phrase as [NP" ']i (or [AP" ]i). We may think
of these indices as part of the labelling on the bracket of [+N]-phrases.
If there is more than one empty phrase with a given index, they are all
to be construed as occurences of the same variable; e.g., traces which
arise from successive movements of a single phrase will count as
occurrences of the same variable. In what follows, we will generally
speak of those indices which arise as the result of the functioning
of rules mapping from Deep to Surface Structure as traces, and those
arising from QR as variables, although these terms are interchangeable.
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4 While we have mentioned the term 'SPEC(N)' as a term of the phrase
structure rules expanding the category NP, we do not mean to say that
'SPEC(N)' is itself a categorial symbol. The notion of "specifier"
is a functional notion of the grammar, comparable to the notions
"subject" or "object". Thus, the value of SPEC(N) may either be the
category Q or the category DET, (or it may be null). It would,there-
fore,be more proper to state the phrase structure rule we have in
mind as (i):
Q -
(i) NP {DT NDET
N is not the only category for which the notion specifier is defined.
For example, we can think of the auxiliary system as the specifiers
of verbs, and the complementizers as the specifiers of sentences.
For more discussion of the significance of this notion, see Chomsky
(1970) and Jackendoff (1974), (1977).
S This category may display quite a bit of internal complexity. For
example, Jackendoff (1977) has pointed out examples in which
quantifiers themselves have determiners, as in 'a few', 'those many',
'the most', 'John's several', etc. The class of quantifiers which
allow determiners, however, is quite limited, viz., *'a every',
*'those all', *'the some', etc. Quantifiers may also be compounded,
as in 'a few too many', 'many too many', etc. In these cases, it is
normally the case that the entire compound is construed as a single
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quantifier. Another sort of complexity has been noted in Bresnan
(1973), Akmajian and Lehrer (1976) and Selkirk (1977). They point
out the existence of phrases which overtly have noun phrase structure, but
which semantically behave as quantifiers. Thnese are measure phrases,
such as 'a bunch' or 'a number'. We can account for this fact, under
our assumptions regarding the functioning of QR, if we assume that
measure phrases have the structure in (i):
(i) NP
Q N
I
NP
DE N
I I
a bunch (of) flowers
(Notice the formal similarity of this structure to the structure of
possessive noun phrases, the only significant difference being that
the possessive structure has a DET node rather than a Q node.) (i)
represents the fact that measure phrases are quantifiers. Hence, QR
applies to this noun phrase in the same manner as it does to a
simple noun phrase such as 'some flowers', i.e., it would affect the
entire noun phrase 'a bunch of flowers', where the phrase 'a bunch'
is taken as satisfying the term Q of QR.
These brief remarks show that the category Q allows internal
recursion. For a more detailed discussion of the range of the
recursion, see Jackendoff (1977) and Bresnan (1973), who postulates
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the existence of a QP node.
6 Representations like (1.5) and (1.7) are given in a shorthand
notation; more correctly, they should be stated as in (i) and
(ii):
(i) [S NP[Qever y ] scale]a S[.Cecil played [NPa e]]
(ii) [S[Np[some] body]a [S.NP e] saw Dexter]]
1 cI
In what follows, we will adopt a number of other shorthand con-
ventions for the sake of convenience. Thus, while the constituency
of surface structures is carried over in logical forms generated by
QR, as (i) and (ii) show, we will not, in general, explicitly note
this fact; for expository purposes we will eliminate, in many cases,
the brackets around the quantifier, as well as the phrasal label of
quantified phrases in logical forms, where it is inconsequential to
the argument at hand.
7 We are also taking the object of a preposition as an argument position.
As Emonds (1976) points out, prepositions subcategorize for a nominal
object; there exist both transitive and intransitive prepositions.
Since we are assuming that all subcategorized noun phrase positions
are argument positions, it follows that the object of a preposition
is also an argument position.
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Notice, that with respect to the Predication Condition, pronouns
which are not construable as bound variables, as for example 'he'
in 'He left', are not to be taken as "free" variables. Rather they
function, in this case, essentially as referring expressions, having
deictic reference. Pronouns serving other semantic roles, (such as
pronouns of laziness), will also be taken as satisfying the Predication
Condition.
8 The condition on Quantifier Binding should be taken as asserting that,
in natural languages, there is nothing comparable to the sort of
"vacuous" quantification exhibited by logical formulae such as
'Vx (2+2=4)'. Such formulae are generally taken to be true, by
convention, even though they contain a qvtntifier which does not bind
a variable. Consider, in contrast, the natural language paraphrase
of this formula:
(i) Everything is such that two plus two equals four
Given that this is a sentence of English, QR applies to the quantified
phrase 'everything', generating (ii) as the logical form of (i):
(ii) [S[everything] [S c is such that two plus two equals
Sfour]]
(ii) does satisfy the Condition on Quantifier Binding, since the
quantifier 'every' properly binds the variable 'a'. Thus, the
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quantification in (i) is, in actuality, non-vacuous. The Condition
on Proper Binding, therefore, distinguishes a significant difference in
quantification in natural languages from quantification in conventional
formal languages, such as first-order predicate logic.
9 Notice that since we have employed the notion c-command, which is
defined over hierarchical structure, the linear sequence of the
noun phrase and the sentence from which it was extracted in logical
form is irrelevant. Thus, we could just have well represented the
logical form associated with.sentence (1.5) as (i):
(i)
scale]
This is because the c-command relations in (i) are identical to those
in (1.9); 'every scale' still c-commands 'a', so (i) satisfies the
Condition on Proper Binding and the Condition on Quantifier Binding.
In what follows we will represent quantified phrases in logical forms
as standing to the left of the sentences from which they have been
extracted, in order to maintain the graphic similarity of logical
forms (in our sense) and standard logical representation.
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10 It is worth noting here that there are a number of other structures
which could conceivably be the structure derived by QR besides what
we have assumed here, in which quantified noun phrases are Chomsky-
adjoined to S. One possibility is that the quantified noun phrase
is moved into the COMP position, as are wh-phrases, deriving the
structure pictured in (i):
(i) s
COMP S
NP
Holding this position amounts to assuming that COMP is not a
categorial node, but rather is the pre-sentential adjunction site.
This position has been argued for recently by Bowers (1976). A
second possibility is that the quantified noun phrase is daughter-
adjoined to S, as a sister to S. This is illustrated in (ii):
(ii)
COMP NP S
This structure is consistent with taking COMP to be the specifier
of S, ranging over the complementizer elements 'that', 'for',
'whether', 'which', etc., rather than being a general adjunction site.
This position, that COMP is the specifier of S, has recently been
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elaborated, along somewhat different lines, in Chomsky and Lasnik
(1977).
The significant difference in opting for one of these two
structures over what we are assuming above, becomes apparent when
we examine the properties of structures containing more than a single
quantifier. (iii) is the type of structure derived on the assumption
that QR moves a phrase into COMP, while (iv) is the structure genera-
ted by assuming that the quantified noun phrase is daughter-adjoined
to S.
(iii) S
COMP S
NP NP a
(iv) S
COMP NP NP S
In these two structures, in order to define notions of scope, it
would be necessary to invoke some other notion than c-command, since
in both (iii) and (iv) NPa and NP c-command each other. A plausible
additional notion to invoke here is a linear notion, such as "prece-
dence". The scope of a quantified phrase would then essentially
be defined as all those elements which it precedes, with the notions
of wide and narrow scope being defined with respect to this definition.
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While there are a number of empirical reasons arguing against
these two structures, (cf. Section 2.4, esp. fn. 7), the primary
methodological grounds for preferring a theory in which QR functions
to Chomsky-adjoin a noun phrase to S is that it allows us to stay
within a framework of anaphora in which we need only invoke the
hierarchical notion c-command. Thus, assuming Chomsky-adjunction
permits the statement, in terms of c-command, not only of the definition
of proper binding, but of scope as well. If we assume, on the other
hand, that QR either moves a quantified noun phrase into COMP, or
daughter-adjoins it to S, then, an extra linear notion need be
employed, that of "precedence". This is in addition to the c-
command condition on hierarchical structure, which is still needed
for the definition of proper binding. Thus, if we assume either
structure (iii) or (iv), it is seemingly not possible to provide
a uniform and general account of the closely related notions of scope
and proper binding. The chief methodological advantage, then, of
holding that QR is a Chomsky-adjunction is that this assumption is
consistent with a theory which is of greater generality than a theory
which is consistent with either of the other structures described in
this footnote.
11 Notice that since rulesmapping from LF to LF' are not rules of
sentence grammar, their functioning may also be determined by
properties of discourses. For a discussion of discourse rules, which
may be construed as rules mapping to the ultimate converted form of
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a sentence, see Williams (1977).
12 This was pointed out to me by Robert Freidin, who has recently argued
(Freidin (1977)) that derivational notions like the strict cycle
should not be taken as theoretical primitives. Rather, he argues,
the explanatory role attributed to the strict cycle follows as a
consequence of deeper universal grammatical principles, in particular
the Predication Condition, The Subjacency Condition and the Tensed-S
and Specified Subject Conditions, conceived as well-formedness con-
ditions on the output of sentence granmmar.
13 Given this conception of derivation, as an existence proof of a
structure, the rules of sentence grammar could be conceived of as
analogous to rules of inference, and the cycle as a valid proof
procedure, i.e., a method for proving, by the rules of sentence
grammar, that a particular structure is, in fact, generable. This
view of the cycle is consistent with the remarks in fn. 12, since the
cycle is not being construed as having explanatory significance,
only as having descriptive significance, in that it provides a
procedure for describing the derivation of a structure.
14 It should be noted here that we wish to be able to account for the
set of distinct possible well-formed logical forms which are generable
from a given type of surface structure. There may be factors,
though, independent of structural considerations, which conspire,
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in particular instances of a type of structure, to make one of the
possible interpretations the "natural" or "preferred" one. These
factors include morpho-lexical, intonational and pragmatic properties
of sentences, which lay beyond the scope of grammatical theory, per
se. For example, lexical properties of the different quantifiers may
be a factor. It is often held that the quantifier 'each' has a
propensity to take wider scope, while 'all' is more comfortably con-
strued as taking narrow scope. (It should not be thought that these
are, in any sense, absolute prescriptions. As example (i) shows,
'each' may be construed as taking narrow scope, and, as (ii) shows,
'all' may be construed as taking wide scope:
(i) Each of my brothers loves a woman from France
(ii) A Democrat won all of the important positions
(These examples are from Kroch (1975)). Also, quantifiers which appear
in subject position are often more naturally construed as taking wider
scope than other quantifiers in the sentence. This property is
presumably a function of the subject normally being the "topic"
position in the sentence. Futhermore, other intonationally-based
notions like "focus" may be involved in determining the preferred
interpretation, as well as factors like contrastive stress. Finally,
it may be the case that one of the logical forms which may be
associated with a sentence simply describes a pragmatically odd state
of affairs, as for example in sentence (iii), (pointed out by K. Van
Lehn):
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(iii) A solution was found to all of Hilbert's problems
Here, it is simply odd to hold that a single solution was found for
all the problems; rather, (iii) seems more naturally understood as
asserting that each of Hilbert's problems received its own solution.
These observations barely touch the sorts of phenomena involved
in determining preferential interpretation. For a more in-depth and
detailed discussion, the reader is referred to Ioup (1975).
It should be kept well in mind that the distinction between
preferred and non-preferred readings does not correspond in any way
to the distinction between unmarked and marked cases. Thus, it may
be the case, in a given sentence, that the marked reading is more
highly preferred than the unmarked reading, or it may be that the un-
marked case is more highly preferred. The distinction of unmarked
and marked cases is not an issue of which reading of a sentence is,
in some sense, more accessible to the speaker or hearer, rather it
demarcates those phenomena which are reflections of our universal
linguistic knowledge from those which reflect the knowledge we have
of the particular language of which we are native speakers. There is
no reason to think, though, that the former type of linguistic
knowledge is any more accessible than the latter type. Presumably,
our intuitions are equally strong in either case. Thus, while the
marked/unmarked distinction is a linguistic distinction, the question
of the preferred, (or more accessible) reading is a pragmatic, (or,
if you will, a psychological) issue, which should not be confused with
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this distinction.
15 The distinction between the opaque and transparent interpretations
of sentences like (1.25) should not be confused with the specific/non-
specific distinction in simple transitive structures. There are a
number of differences between these phenomena. First, while the
opaque/transparent distinction arises with any quantifier, the
specific/non-specific distinction occurs only with indefinite noun
phrases, i.e., those whose specifier element is either 'a' or 'some'.
A second difference is that the opaque interpretation arises onlywhen
a noun phrase is the object of a transitive verb like 'want' or 'seek'.
The possibility of a specific/non-specific ambiguity is much more
general. It occurs in either subject of object position of any trans-
itive verb, including those which do not allow an opaque interpretation
in object position. Thus, in the sentences in (i), the noun phrase 'a
car' can be interpreted as specific or non-specific in either case:
(i)a John brought a car
b A car broke the window
It may be the case that the specific/non-specific ambiguity
in this case is a result of the vagueness of the quantifier 'a'
This is borne out by noting that the specific/non-specific distinction
is dependent on pragmatic factors. For example, in the case of
sentence (i)a, suppose that I am talking to Virginia, who receives
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a phone call from John. After speaking on the phone, she says to me
'John bought a car', to convey the message she received on the phone.
Now, whether (i)a is taken as specific or non-specific depends upon
what Virginia intended to convey about what she heard on the tele-
phone. If John had told her that he had bought the '57 Edsel that they
had seen the other day in the used car lot, then Virginia uttered
(i)a specifically. But, if John had simply said he bought a car,
out of the blue, and would tell her the details later, then Virginia
would have been uttering (i)a with non-specific intent, since she had
no particular car in mind when uttering that sentence.
Notice, though, that in either of these contexts, the logical
form associated with (i)a, which is (ii), would be true, since (ii)
(ii) [S[a car]a [SJohn bought x]]
only asserts that there is a car which John bought. This indicates
that the specific/non-specific distinction in simple transitive
structures is not simply a matter of the logical forms associated with
these structures, but rather arises from a vagueness in the inter-
pretation of quantifiers such as 'a' and 'some', which are ultimately
realized as existential quantifiers.
For a detailed discussion of the specific/non-specific distinction
in English, see Kasher and Gabbay (1976).
16 The criticisms which follow hold not only for a theory in which scope
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is determined from surface structure c-command relations, but also
theories such as that in Hintikka (1974), (1975), (1976), which determine
scope from surface structure precede-and-command relations, as well
as for those, as in Fitch (1973), which determine these relations
solely from precedence. The reason for this is that, in examples
like (1.29) in the text, since the subject quantifier precedes (as
well as commands) the object quantifier, these theories make the
identical predictions as Reinhart's, which is stated in terms of the
more generally adequate notion of c-command (cf. fn. 10).
17 Reinhart (1976, pp. 193-4), presents two arguments attempting to
minimize the significance of this problem. First, she argues that
"most putative examples of such ambiguities which are discussed in
the literature are ones where one interpretation entails the other"
(p. 193). In these cases, the seeming ambiguity are actually cases
of vagueness of interpretation. Second, she argues that in those
examples which do display the ambiguity, and therefore violate her
principle, "the violation is highly restricted with respect to the
NP pairs which tolerate it." (p. 194). She then cites an observation
of Ioup (1975), that judgements of ambiguity are more difficult to
elicit if a quantified noun phrase in a verb phrase is the
object of a preposition, rather than the object of the verb.
There are significant problems with both of these arguments,
however. The problem with the first argument is that it predicts that
an ambiguous sentence like (i) should be unambiguous, only having a
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(i) Everyone convinced someone
reading in which the quantifier 'every' is construed as having wider
scope. This is because 'everyone' c-commands 'someone' in surface
structure, and the logical form associated with (i), which is (ii),
does not entail (iii), which is the logical form which represents the
(ii) [S[everyone]a [S[someone]B [S a convinced S]]]
(iii) [S[someone]a [S[everyone]a [Sa convinced 8]]]
other interpretation of (i). But since Reinhart's principle only
allows for (ii) to be directly associated with (i), sentences like
(i) cast grave doubt on the validity of Reinhart's first argument.
As for her second argument, there simply seems to be numerous
counter-examples, for example the sentences (1.20), repeated here:
(1.20)a Everyone gave to some cause
b Some politician ran on every ticket
Both of these sentences are clearly ambiguous, each having an inter-
pretation where the quantified phrase which is the object of the
preposition has wider scope than the subject quantifier.
18 Reinhart (p. 195; Cf. also her fn. 11), points out that if we construe
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the PP 'in some city' in (1.30) as a quantified expression it is at
least possible to account for the scope properties of the quantifiersin
this sentence. This is because the prepositional phrase c-conmnands the
noun phrase 'everybody' in (1.31). Notice, though, that this account
is dependent upon independent evidence that (1.31) is the correct
structure of (1.30); if the structure is as in (i), then the
prepositional phrase does not c-command the 'everybody', since the
(i)
ev
first branching node dominating PP is N, which does not dominate
'every'. (For further discussion of the relation of noun phrase
structures to the interpretation of sentences containing them, see
Chapter Two.)
Reinhart points out, though, that this account seems untenable
on other grounds, since the same inverse scope relations hold in more
complex structures like (ii):
(ii) Some exits from every freeway to a large California
city are badly constructed
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Here, there is no structure in which the most deeply embedded PP, 'to
a large California city' c-commands 'some exits'. Therefore,
given Reinhart's condition, a reading of (ii) where 'a' is construed
as having wider scope than 'some' should not be possible. But, indeed,
the natural interpretation of (ii) is where the most deeply embedded
quantifier has widest scope.
Examples like (1.30) and (ii) also pose problems for theories
in which the relative scope of quantifiers is determined from surface
structure precede-and-command relations, since the quantifier in these
sentences which is construed as having wider scope in Logical Form
is in surface structure preceded and commanded by the quantifiers
which have narrower scope in Logical Form. Thus, a theory incorpora-
ting these notions also makes the incorrect predication concerning
the range of possible interpretations of sentences containing PP-
complements like (1.30) and (ii).
It has been held, for example by Hintikka (1975), that a precede-and-
command condition is not to be taken as an absolute conditions, but
rather as a principle of preferential scope oider. Under this inter-
pretation, the condition would assert that a reading of (1.30), in which
'every' is construed as having wider scope than 'some', is preferred, but
not that other scope orderings are impossible. Presumably, this formulation
allows for an inverse interpretation of sentences like (1.50),and (ii)). The
problem, though, is that a reading of (1.30) where 'some' has wider
scope is not the preferred reading of this sentence. In fact, this
sentence seemingly does not have a reading in which 'some' is
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understood as having wider scope. Thus, conceiving of precede-and-
command conditions as preference conditions is of little help in
this case, since the predicted preferred reading of (1.30) does not
exist.
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Chapter Two: QUANTIFIERS AND NOUN PHRASES
In the previous chapter, we began our examination into the types
of logical forms associated with different constructions in English by
examining single clause sentences containing simple noun phrases. What
we saw there was that sentences of this construction are associated with
non-linked logical forms. In this chapter, we will be discussing those
constructions which are associated with "linked" logical forms, i.e.,
those logical forms, containing two or more quantifiers, where only one
of the quantifiers binds a variable in the main predicate. The structures
which are associated with logical forms of this type are sentences con-
taining PP-complement and relative clause constructions. In the first
part of this chapter, we will discuss the former constructions, and see that
they are associated with inversely linked logical forms, in which only the
quantifier having narrowest scope binds a variable in the main predicate.
The second part will be devoted to a partial discussion of sentences con-
taining restrictive relative clauses. Their logical forms, as we shall
see, are naturally linked, with only the widest scope quantifier binding
a variable in the main predicate.
2.1 PP-complement Constructions. It has been noted in the literature,
(e.g., in Reinhart (1976), Hintikka (1974) and Gabbay and Moravscik (1974)),
that sentences like those in (2.1), which contain PP-complement constructions
in subject position, each have a reading in which the quantified phrase
embedded as the object of the preposition is construed as having scope
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(2.1)a Everybody in some Italian city met John
b Some people from every walk of life like jazz
c All the gifts to some woman who was admitted
yesterday are on the counter
d Each of the members of a key congressional
committee voted for the amendment
e Every entrance to a large downtown store
was smashed in the riot
f Some houses near all of the nuclear plants
in New Mexico will be contaminated within five
minutes of meltdown,
wider than the head quantifier; i.e., the scope order of the quantifiers
in these sentences is understood as being the inverse of their surface order.
For example, sentence (2.1)ais logically paraphrasable as 'There is an
Italian city, such that all of the people in that city met John'. This in-
verse property of sentences containing PP-complements holds generally in
sentences of this construction, regardless of which prepositions or
quantifier words appear in the sentence, as is apparent from the examples
in (2.1). Furthermore, as the examples in (2.2) illustrate, this general-
ization, that sentences containing PP-complement constructions have an
inverse reading, also holds regardless of the depth of prepositional phrase
embedding:
(2.2)a Some exits from every freeway to a large
California city are badly constructed
b Some exits from every freeway to some
cities in every county south of L.A. are
badly constructed
(These examples are adapted from similar examples pointed out by Gabbay
and Moravscik (1974)). In these examples, the most deeply embedded
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quantifier is understood as having widest scope, with the next most deeply
embedded quantifier having next widest scope, etc. The head quantifier in
these cases is understood, as it is in the examples in (2.1), as having
narrowest scope. Thus, (2.2)a for example, can be logically paraphrased
as 'There is a large California city, such that for all of the freeways to
it, there are exits from those freeways which are badly constructed.'
What we wish to show in this section is that the logical forms
characteristically associated with sentences like those in (2.1) and (2.2)
which contain PP-complements are not only inverse, but that they are
inversely linked. Thus, as we shall see shortly, the logical form associ-
ated with a sentence like (2.1)a, for instance, is (2.3), where only the
most deeply embedded quantified phrase binds a variable in the main
(2.3) [S[some Italian city]a [Severybody in a]8 [S met John]]]
predicate. This is in contrast to the non-linked logical forms which were
discussed in Chapter One. In these latter structures, all of the
quantified phrases bind variables in the main predicate, as can be seen
by comparing (2.3) with (2.4):
(2.4) [S [some politician]a [S[everybody], [S, met 8]]
In order to gain a better grasp of the significance of the notion of linking,
as applied to logical forms, consider (2.5) and (2.6), which we may
reasonably assume to be essentially the representations associated with
64
(2.2) and (2.3) at LF', respectively:
(2.5) [S3! a [ S Sa is an Italian city] & [S[~[SS is a person
in a] + [SB met John]]]]]
(2.6) [SJ!a[[S[Sa is a politician] & [SVB[S[SB is a person] +
[Sa met 8]]]]]
(where 3! is understood as meaning 'There is a particular...'). The
difference between (2.5) and (2.6) is that in the former case the
antecedent of the conditional which is within the scope of the universal
quantifier is a dyadic predicate, while in the latter case it is a monadic
predicate. This difference is reflected in the interpretation of (2.5)
and (2.6). In (2.6), the universal quantifier ranges over the set of
people. In (2.5), though, the universal quantifier ranges over a subset
of the domain of the universal quantifier in (2.6); thus, the individuals
who may serve as values of the variables bound by the universal quantifier
in this latter case are those in a particular city in Italy.
The semantic effect of linking in logical forms, then, is that the domain
of entities which may serve as the values of the variables bound by the
non-initial quantifiers is more restricted than in comparable non-linked
logical forms.
This property of sentences containing NP-PP sequences, i.e., that
they are associated with inversely linked logical forms, is not entirely
universal. Compare the sentences in (2.7):
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(2.7)a Everybody in some Italian city met John
b John met everybody in some Italian city
(2.7)a is unambiguous, only having an interpretation, captured by the logical
form (2.2), where 'some' is understood as having wider scope than 'every'.
(2.7)b, on the other hand, is triply ambiguous. One interpretation parallels
that of (2.7)a. On this interpretation, (2.7)b is true just in case
John met all of the inhabitants of a particular Italian city, for example,
Florence. Here 'some' is understood as having wider scope than
'every'. (2.7)b also has another reading where 'some' is understood
as having wider scope. In this case, (2.7)b is true just in case John
met all of a group of people in a particular Italian city, none of whom
need have been inhabitants of that city. (2.7)b has in addition a reading in
which 'every' is construed as having wider scope. On this interpretation,
(2.7)b is true in a situation where John met Mary in Rome, Jack in
Venice, Edward in Florence, etc. What these examples show is that
there is an asymmetry in the range of possible interpretations for
sentences containing NP-PP sequences, dependent upon whether the sequence occurs
in subject or verb-complement position. If it occurs in the former
position, the sentence is unambiguous, but if it occurs in the latter
position, then the sentence is triply ambiguous.
How then, are these differences in the range of interpretations
of NP-PP sequences to be explained? It is to answering this question
that we now turn.
2.2 Nominal structure and linked logical forms. As was pointed out
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above, sentences like those in (2.1) are associated with logical forms
which are inversely linked, i.e., where only the quantified phrase with
narrowest scope binds a variable in the main predicate. Thus, for example,
sentence (2.1)a has associated with it the logical form (2.3), which is
repeated here, in tree form, as (2.9):
(2.9)
NP
[some Italian city] [everybody in a] met John
(2.9) is a well-formed logical form, since it satisfies both the Condition
on Proper Binding and the Condition on Quantifier Binding. The former
condition is satisfied because the variable 'a' is c-commanded by the
quantified phrase 'some Italian city', and the variable '5' is commanded
by the quantified phrase 'everybody in a'. Since both of the variables
in (2.9) are properly bound, the Condition on Proper Binding is satisfied.
Furthermore, since the two quantified phrases binding these variables
are the only quantified expressions in (2.9), it also satisfies the
Condition on Quantifier Binding.
Structures like (2.9), in which the quantifiers are inversely
linked, represent the unmarked case for PP-complement constructions. That
is, inversely linked logical forms are the only structures generable, by
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QR, from the surface structures of sentences like (2.1) and-which satisfy
the well-formedness conditions on logical forms. The remainder of this
section will be devoted to proving this, by examining the derivation of
logical forms for PP-complement structures.
To my knowledge essentially three different structures have been
proposed as constituting the surface structure of PP-complement con-
structions. In (2.10),which has been advocated by Chomsky (1955), Emonds
(2.10) NP.
NP P
Q N P NPk
Q A N
every body in some Italian city
(1976) and Reinhart (1976) among others, the initial quantifier and noun
form a constituent noun phrase. This is in contrast to the other two
structures which have been proposed, where the quantifier and the noun
do not form a single constituent. (2.11) has been argued for by Wells
(1945) and Chomsky (1970), and has been assumed as the structure of PP-
complements in a number of recent studies, among them Jackendoff (1971),
(1976), Akmajian (1975), Akmajian and Lehrer (1976) and Selkirk (1976).
The third structure is (2.12), whose supporters have included Chomsky
(1955), Jackendoff (1969), Selkirk (1970) and Akmajian and Heny (1975).
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(2.11)
(2.12)
NP.
Q N
N PP
P NP.
Q N
each member of a key congressional committee
NP.
Q N PP
N P NP.
Q N
some people from every walk of life
While there may be any number of arguments weighing on the possible
existence of each of these structures,I what we shall see here is that
regardless of which structure is assumed to be the surface structure of
PP-complement constructions, the identical logical form is generated,
(insofar as quantifier scope is concerned), from each of these structures.
This result is of great interest, since it shows that in the case of
quantification, questions of the form of noun phrases are independent of
questions of their interpretation.
Let us consider first the structures in (2.11) and (2.12). Given
the Condition on Analyzability, formulated in Chapter One,
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Condition on Analyzability
If a rule P mentions SPEC, then €
applies to the minimal [+N]-phrase
dominating SPEC, which is not im-
mediately dominated by another [+N]-
phrase.
these structure are equivalent as far as the functioning of QR is
concerned. This is because the Condition on Analyzability mandates that
QR affect the minimal noun phrases in (2.11) and (2.12) which dominate
the quantifiers, i.e., that it affect NP. and NP. in both cases. Given
this identity in the functioning of QR in these two structures, we will
continue the discussion of the derivation of the logical forms associated
with these structures in terms of the N-structure in (2.11).
Just as in the case of the simple transitive constructions studied
in Chapter One, there is more than one way to derive a well-formed logical
form from (2.11). One of these derivations is illustrated in (2.13), the
other in (2.14):
(2.13) [S. [NP[Qeach][Niihember [pp of [Np[Qa][iNkey coLg. comm.]]]]] voted
for the amendment]
[S[a key cong. comm.]a [S.[NP[Oeach] [~nember [ppof l]]] voted for
the amendment]] 1
[S[a key cong. comm.]a [S[each member of a]S [S. B voted for the
amendment]]]
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(2.14) [Si [NP Qeach][Nmember [pp of [NP[Q a][Rkey cong. comm.]]]]] voted
for the amendment] ÷
s[each member of [NP[Q a][N-key cong. comm.]]] [S B voted for the
amendment]] i
[S[a key cong. comm.]a [s[each member of a]B [S. voted for the
amendment]]] ]
Notice that the logical forms derived by QR in (2.13) and (2.14)
are identical. While these derivations show that inversely linked logical
forms are generable from an N-structure by QR, which, as was pointed out
above, satisfy the well-formedness conditions on logical forms, it is
posssible to establish an even stronger result: That these are the only
logical forms derivable from a structure like (2.11) which satisfies these
conditions. To see this, consider (2.15) and (2.16), which are the other
derivations possible, via QR, from (2.11):
(2.15) [SiNP[Qeach][Kiember [pp of [NP[Q a][N-key con. comm.]]]]] voted
for the amendment] +
[S[a key cong. comm.] [S.[ NP[Q each][kmember [pp of a]]] voted
for the amendmeni]]
*[s[each member of ]B [S[a key cong. comm.] [S.B voted for the
amendment]]
(2.16) [Si[NP[Qeach][r member [pp of [ NP[Q a][N-key cong. comm.]]]]] voted
for the amendment]
[S[each memner of [NP[Q a][rkey cong. comm.] ]] [S. voted for the
amendment]] ] +
*[s[each member of a]B [S[a key cong. comm.]a [S.B voted for the
amendment]]]
Once again, the structures generated under both of these derivations
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are identical, but, in this case, the scope order of the quantifiers is
reversed, as compared to the structure derived in (2.13) and (2.14).
Thus, in the structure generated in the derivations (2.15) and (2.16),
'each' has wider scope than 'a'. The structure generated by these
derivations, though, is not a well-formed logical form, since it contains
a variable which is not properly bound. This is because the variable 'a'
is not c-commanded by the noun phrase 'a key congressional committee'
which binds it; rather, the binding noun phrase is itself c-commanded by
the variable. This means that 'a' is not properly bound, thus violating
the Conditon on Proper Binding.
The deviance of the structure generated by the derivations (2.15)
and (2.16) shows, then, that the only logical form which it is possible
to generate, by QR, from a structure such as (2.11) is one which is
inversely linked. The other structure which is derivable, in which the
quantifier which is embedded in surface structure has narrower scope, is
not a logical form, since it does not satisfy the Condition on Proper
Binding.
The third structure for PP-complement constructions that we
mentioned above is (2.10), repeated here:
(2.10) NP.
NP. PP
Q N P NP
Q A NI 1 I
every body in some Italian city
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This structure differs from those in (2.11) and (2.12) in that the
initial quantifier and noun, here 'every' and 'body' form a constituent
noun phrase. However, this does not alter the characteristic interpretation
of the construction, as far as scope of quantification is concerned. That
is, just as the structures (2.11) and (2.12) are associated with inversely
linked logical forms, so is the structure (2.10). The reason for this
lies in the Condition on Analyzability, which, as was noted in Chapter One,
is independently motivated. Recall that this condition mandates that QR
affect the minimal NP dominating SPEC, which is not itself immediately dominated
by another NP. In (2.10), where 'every' satisfied the term Q of QR, the NP
satisfying this description is NPi., which immediately dominates NPj.
Since NP. is also the noun phrase affected by QR in the derivations from
1
(2.11) and (2.12), the identical structure is derived from (2.10)
as from (2.11) or (2.12). As an illustration, consider the
derivation in (2.17), which is parallel to the derivation in (2.14). The
(2.17) [S. NP[NP[Qevery] body][pp in [Np[Qsome] Italian city]]] met John] +
[S[some Italian city[ [S.[NP[NP[Qevery] body][pp in a]] met John]] +
1
[S[some Italian city] [S[everybody in a]B [S . met John]]]
1
structure which is derived in (2.17) is a well-formed logical form, since
it satisfies both the Condition on Proper Binding and the Condition on
Quantifier Binding.
It is clear from the derivation in (2.17), that the logical form
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generated from structure (2.10) has the same formal properties as the
logical forms generated from (2.11) and (2.12); they are all inversely
linked logical forms, in which the narrower scope quantifier binds a
variable in the main predicate. What this result shows is that in the case of
case of PP-complement constructions containing quantifiers, matters
of noun phrase structure are independent of matters of noun phrase inter-
pretation, since the same logical form is generated, regardless of which
structure is assumed to be the appropriate surface structure for this
construction. The wider ramifications of this result will be discussed
in section 2.6 of this chapter, in the context of determining the nature of
the logical form associated with relative clause constructions.
Before concluding this discussion of the logical properties of PP-
complement constructions in subject position, recall that we noted that
these constructions are associated with inversely linked logical forms,
regardless of the depth of prepositional phrase embeddings. Thus, just
as the sentences in (2.1) were unambiguous, so are those in (2.2).
Associated with sentence (2.2)a is the logical form (2.18):
(2.2)a Some exits from every freeway to a large
California city are badly constructed
(2.18) [S[a large California city]a [S[every freeway to a]I
[[some exits from ]y [SY are badly constructed]]]]
The only difference between the derivation of the logical form of (2.2)a,
from the surface structure in (2.19), and the derivations of logical forms
74
for sentences like those in (2.1) is that there exist more equivalent
derivations of the logical form associated with the more complex sentence. Thus,
(2.19) NP.
1.
Q N
N PP
P NP.
Q N
N PP
P NP
Q N
some exits from every freeway to a large Cal. city
while there were two equivalent derivations for sentences such as (2.1),
which contain two quantifiers, there are six (three factorial) equivalent
derivations of (2.2), which contains three quantifiers. In (2.20), we
give one of the derivations of (2.2). It is left to the reader to
distinguish the other five, and to see that the result of any other
derivation does not satisfy the well-formedness conditions on logical
forms.
(2.20) [S. [NP[Qsome ] [nexits [ppfrom: [Np[Qevery] [Nfreeway [pp to [Np[Qa]
[-large Cal. city]]]]]j]]] are badly constructed] +
[S[some exits [ppfrom [Np[Qevery][Nfreeway [pptO [Np[Qa]
[Nlarge Cal. city]]]]]]]v [S.Y are badly constructed]] +
1
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[S[every freeway to [Np[Qa][-large Cal. city]]a [s[some
exits from 8]y [S.Y are badly constructed]]] +
1
[S[a large Cal. city]a [S[every freeway to c]8 [S[some
exits from 8]y [SiY are badly constructed]]]]
In this section, then, we have seen that the fact that sentences
containing PP-complements, of any depth of embedding, are always associated
with an inversely linked logical form, is explained on the basis of our
assumptions about the functioning of QR and the nature of the universal
well-formedness conditions on logical forms. As such, the inversely
linked logical structure represents the unmarked case in the interpretation
of sentences containing PP-complement structures.
2.3 Post-verbal NP-PP constructions. At the beginning of this chapter,
it was noted that sentence (2.7)b, repeated here, is triply ambiguous,
in marked contrast to the unambiguity of (2.7)a. Recall that while
(2.7)a Everybody in some Italian city met John
b John met everybody in some Italian city
(2.7)a asserts that there is an Italian city, such that all of the people
in it met John, (2.7)b may be taken as asserting (i) that John met all of
the inhabitants of a particular Italian city; (ii) that John met all of
the members of some group, say, in a particular city in Italy, none of
whom need have been inhabitants of that city; or (iii) that each of the
members of a group were met by John in a city in Italy, where the city
may be different for each individual; John may have met Harry in Rome,
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Jack in Venice, Edward in Florence, etc. Readings (i) and (ii) are
related, in that in both cases the quantifier 'some' is construed as
taking wider scope than 'every', while in reading (iii) 'every' is con-
strued as having wider scope than 'some'. The (ii) and (iii) readings are
also related, in that they are represented by non-linked logical forms,
while the (i) reading is represented by an inversely linked logical form.
How then, are these differences in the range of interpretations of (2.7)b,
as opposed to (2.7)a, to be explained?
At first blush, the only apparent difference between (2.7)a and
(2.7)b is that the pre- and post-verbal strings have been inverted. This
difference, though, belies a deeper structural difference between the two
sentences. If an NP-PP sequence occurs in subject position, as in (2.7)a,
then it must be a PP-complement construction. This is because the
subject position always consists of a single noun phrase constituent, and
as we have just seen, it is only possible to generate an inversely linked
logical form from PP-complement structures. IWhen an NP-PP sequence appears in
object position though, they need not form a constituent; verb phrases of
the form in (2.21) are well-formed:
(2.21) [VP[V...][NP'I" PP""0]]
In verb phrases of this structure, the prepositional phrase complement
is always optional: compare 'John bought a book' vs. 'John bought a book
for Mary', 'John met Harry' vs. 'John met Harry in the bar', etc. Thus,
any verb which is subcategorized to appear in a structure of the form
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(2.21) may also appear in (2.22):
(2.22) [VP[V...][NP" '
But, given the existence of this structure, the structure in (2.23) also
represents a possible verb phrase, because of the independent necessity
(2.23) [p[V '... ][NP[Q "' ' ] [N[N"] [PP'"' ] ] ]] 2
of a phrase structure rule for NP, generating PP-complement constructions.
Therefore, any verb which may be followed by a noun phrase and a prepo-
sitional phrase which do not form a constituent, as in (2.21), may also
occur in a structure in which the noun phrase and the prepositional phrase
do form a constituent, as in (2.23) (but cf. discussion of dative con-
structions below). Sentences such as (2.7)b, where an NP-PP sequence follows
the verb are thus systematically ambiguous with regard to their surface
structures: (2.24) and (2.25) are the possible surface structures of (2.7)b:
(2.24) S
NP VP
V NP. PP
Q N P NP.
N Q N
John met every body in some Italian city
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(2.25) S
NP VP
V NP
Q N
N PP
P NP.
Q N
John met every body in some Italian city
The existence of these two distinct structures as surface structures of
(2.7)b, is attested to by the possibility of associating two passive
sentences with the active (2.7)b:
(2.26)a Everybody in some Italian city was met by John
b Everybody was met in some Italian city by John
Interestingly, neither (2.26)a nor (2.26)b exhibits the same range of
ambiguity as (2.27)b. (2.26)b only has a reading corresponding to the
(i) reading of (2.7)b described above, while (2.26)b is ambiguous, having
readings which correspond to the (ii) and (iii) readings of (2.7)b. The
reason for this will become apparent momentarily.
These two structures have much in common with the types of
structures we have discussed up to this point. (2.25) contains a PP-
complement, from which it is only possible to derive a single logical
form, in which the quantifiers are inversely linked. Thus, the logical
form generable by QR from (2.25) is (2.27):
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(2.27) [ISsome Italian city] [S[everybody in a]B
[SJohn met 8]]]
Notice that (2.27) is the only well-formed representation at Logical Form
which can be derived from (2.25); a logical form which corresponds to a
reading in which 'every' is understood as having scope wider than 'some'
is excluded, since it would violate the Condition on Proper Binding, as
shown in (2.28):
(2.28) *[S[everybody in a]I [S[some Italian city]
[SJohn met 1]]]
In (2.28) the variable 'a', which is the object of the preposition,is not
properly bound, since it is not c-commanded by the 'some' phrase. Thus,
just as in the cases discussed in section 2.2, it is not possible to
associate a structure containing a PP-complement, here in object position,
with a logical form which is naturally linked; it is only possible to
associate them with inversely linked logical forms.
(2.24), on the other hand, is essentially the type of structure
discussed in Chapter One, where two simple quantified noun phrases which
do not form a single NP constituent occur in a single clause sentence.
The only difference is that, while in the constructions discussed in
Chapter One one of the noun phrases was the subject, and the other an
object, here both noun phrases are verbal complements. QR functions in
quite the same way as it did for the simple transitive structures in
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generating logical forms from (2.24), allowing for the generation of two
distinct non-linked logical forms. One of these, in which the quantifiers
are inverted, vis-a-vis (2.24), is illustrated in (2.29), and the other,
in which the quantifiers are in natural order, is shown in (2.30).
(2.29) [S[some Italian city]a [S[everybodylI
[SJJohn met B in a]]]
(2.30) [S[everybody] [IS[some Italian city]
[SJohn met a in a]]]
A derivation of (2.29) from (2.24) is illustrated in (2.31), while a
derivation of (2.30) is illustrated in (2.32):
(2.31) [SJohn [VPmet [NP[Qevery] body][pp in [NP[ Qsome]
Italian city]]]] -
[S[everybody]I [SJohn [vpmet B[ppin [Np[Qsome] Italian
city]]]]] +
[S[some Italian city], [S[everybody]Ka [SJohn met 8 in
(2.32) [SJohn [Vpmet [NP[Qevery] body][ppin [NP Qsome]
Italian city]]]] +
[S[everybody]8 [SJ ohn [Vpmet 8[ppin [Np[Qsome]
Italian city]]]]] 
-+
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[S[everybody]$ [S[some Italian city]a [SJohn met S in a]]]
It is clear that the three logical forms (2.27), (2.29) and (2.30)
correspond to the (i), (ii) and (iii) readings described above for sentence
(2.7)b, respectively. The ambiguities of sentences containing post-
verbal NP-PP sequences follows, therefore, from being able to generate,
from the surface structures like (2.24) and (2.25), three distinct well-
formed logical forms.
Returning to the passive constructions, (2.26), their relationship
to their active counterpart, (2.7)b, is a function of whether it is a
passive of (2.24) or (2.25). In (2.26)a, the passive subject is the PP-
complement which is the active object in (2.25). Therefore, just as it is
only possible to generate an inversely linked logical form from (2.25),
it is also only possible to generate this type of logical form from the
surface structure of (2.26)a. In (2.26)b, though, the two noun phrases
do not form a single noun phrase constituent, since this is the passive
of the structure in (2.24). This makes it possible to generate two
logical forms from the surface structure of (2.26)b, which are equivalent
to the logical forms generated from (2.24).
Besides the passives in (2.26), there are other passive constructions
which are similar to (2.7)b. In particular, consider sentence (2.33),
where 'by everybody in some Italian city' forms a single constituent, and,
(2.33) John was met by everybody in some Italian city
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like (2.7)a,is unambiguous. This means that the NP-PP sequence in
(2.33) is a PP-complement construction, from which it is only possible
to generate the loaical form in (2.34), which is equivalent to (2.3).3
(2.34) [S[some Italian city]a [S[everybody in a]
[S John was met by 8]]]
Not all sentences containing post-verbal NP-PP sequences exhibit
the surface structure ambiguities of (2.7)b. The dative construction,
illustrated in (2.35), is a case in which the noun phrase and the pre-
positional phrase do not form a constituent, having a surface structure
(2.35)a Elvis bought a Cadillac for everyone
b Sam gave some lessons to all of the students
as in (2.24). This is shown by the fact that the sentences in (2.35) only
have, as their passive counterparts, the sentences in (2.36), and not those
(2.36)a A Cadillac was bought for everyone by Elvis
b Some lessons were given to all of the students by Sam
in (2.37):4
(2.37)a *A Cadillac for everyone was bought by Elvis
b *Some lessons to all of the students were given by Sam
The sentences in (2.35), as opposed to (2.7)b, are two, rather
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than three,ways ambiguous. (2.35)a may be taken as asserting either
(i) that there is a single Cadillac, such that Elvis bought it for
everyone, or (ii), that for each person, Elvis bought them their own
Cadillac. Similarly, in (2.35)b, it is being asserted either (i) that
there are lessons, such that Sam gave them to all of the students, as
a group, or (ii), that Sam gave each of the students some private lessons.
The fact that the sentences in (2.35) are two ways ambiguous
follows from the dative construction only having a surface structure,
illustrated in (2.38) for (2.35)a, in which NP and PP do not form a
(2.38) S
NP VP
V NP. PP
Q N P NP.
Q N
I I
Elvis bought a Cadillac for every one
constituent. This means that QR may generate two logical forms for (2.35)a:
(2.39)a in which 'a' takes a wider scope, and (2.39)b, in which 'every'
takes wider scope:
(2.39)a [S[a Cadillac]8 [S[everyone] [SElvis bought B for e]]]
b [S[everyone]a [S[a Cadillac]B [sElvis bought 8 for a]]]
These two logical forms correspond to the scope ambiguities described
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above as accruing to (2.35)a. The reading which this sentence lacks, as
compared to (2.7)b, is the linked reading. This is because dative con-
structions do not have surface structures in which the NP-PP sequence is
a PP-complement construction, as witnessed by the deviance of the passives
in (2.37).
This ambiguity is maintained in the double-object dative construction,
illustrated by the sentences in (2.40):
(2.40)a Elvis bought everyone a Cadillac
b Sam gave all of the students some lessons
These sentences have asurface structure, shown in (2.41) for (2.40)a, in
which the two post-verbal noun phrases do not form a noun phrase constituent.
(2.41) [sElvis [Vpbought [Npeveryonej[NP.a Cadillac]]]
This makes it possible to generate, by QR, two distinct, well-formed non-
linked logical forms from this structure. They are illustrated in (2.42):
(2.42)a [S[a Cadillac]I [S[everyone]a ISElvis bought a 8]]]
b [S[everyone] [s[a Cadillac]8 [SElvis bought a 8 ]]]
In (2.42)a, the quantifier 'a' takes wider scope than the quantifier
'every'; in (2.42)b, the scope relations are reversed. These logical
forms are equivalent to (2.39)aand (2.39)b,respectively.
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2.4 Wh-constructions. Up to this point we have seen that on the basis of our
assumptions about the functioning of QR, and the nature of the well-
formedness conditions on logical forms, it is possible to explain the
range of interpretation open to sentences containing NP-PP sequences. In
particular, it has been pointed out that there are distinct differences
between whether the NP-PP sequence appears either pre- or post-verbally,
in subject or verb complement position. There is another position, though,
in which PP-complement constructions can occur in surface structure;
namely in the pre-clausal COMP position. These structures, as for
example in (2.42), arise from applications of the rule of wh-movement.
(2.43) Which men in Cleveland did you meet?
The interesting property of PP-complement constructions occurring in COMP
position is that a quantified noun phrase may not occur as the object of
the preposition; e.g., the deviance of (2.44) as compared to (2.43).
(2.44) *Which men in some city did you meet?
On the usual assumptions concerning the nature of wh-movement, there is
no way to account for the difference between these two sentences. This
is because wh-movement functions identically in both cases, affecting the
entire PP-complement construction headed by the wh-words, and moving it
into COMP position. How then, is the difference in acceptability between
(2.43) and (2.44) to be explained? In this section, it will be argued that
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the explanation lies in the functioning of QR in structures to which wh-
movement has applied. This interaction will also explain a number of other
gaps in the distribution of wh-constructions, which are not explicable
on the basis of our assumptions about the generation of their surface
structures.
In what follows, we will be assuming an analysis of wh-constructions
along the lines proposed in Chomsky (1973), (1977a). Under this theory,
wh-constructions such as direct and indirect questions and relative clauses,
are generated by a rule of wh-movement, stated as:
Move wh
whose functioning is governed, as is QR's, by the Condition on Analyzability,
repeated here:
Condition on Analyzability
If a rule 4 mentions SPEC, then 4
applies to the minimal [+N]-phrase
dominating SPEC, which is not im-
mediately dominated by another [+N]
phrase
The particular aspects of the analysis of wh-constructions which will
concern us here are (i), that wh-movement is subject to the trace theory
of movement rules, and (ii),that this rule functions to move a wh-phrase
into COMP position. As an example of the sort of structure generated by
whi-movement, consider (2.45):
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(2.45) [S[COMPWhich instrument]t [Sdoes Cecil play t]]
(2.45) is a representation not only at the level of Surface Structure, but
also at Logical Form, since the relationship of a wh-phrase and the
trace which it binds is, in general, unaltered by rules mapping from
Surface Structure to Logical Form. This structure, therefore, must
satisfy the well-formedness conditions on representations at Logical
Form, in particular, the Condition on Proper Binding. (2.45), for instance,
satisfies this condition, as the first branching node dominating COMP,
which is S, also dominates 't'. Since this variable is c-commanded by
the phrase which binds it, it is properly bound. Notice that it is not
always the case that the surface structures generated by wh-movement
are identical to their logical forms. If a surface structure contains
other quantified noun phrases in addition to the wh-phrase, then QR will
apply in generating the logical form with which it is associated. It
should be kept in mind that in such cases, to which we will turn shortly,
applications of wh-movement to a structure will always precede applications
of QR. This is simply a consequence of wh-movement being a rule which
maps from Deep Structure to Surface Structure, while QR maps from Surface
Structure to Logical Form.
Our main concern in examining the relationship of wh-movement and
QR will center around direct question constructions. In these structures,
it has often been held, (for example, by Hii (1962) ; Belnap (1963); Chomsky
(1976) and Sag (1976)), that the wh-word functions as a quantifier. When
this assumption is taken in conjunction with the properties of QR, it
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follows that the wh-quantifier is the maximally wide scope quantifier, with
respect to other "normal" quantifiers, like 'every', 'some', 'many', etc.,
in a sentence. To see this, consider (2.45):
(2.46) [S[COMPe][SJohn recorded [NPone song][ppon [Npevery album]fJ
('e' signifies that the category COMP is lexically empty in this structure.)
(2.46) is ambiguous,5 having a reading in which it is asserted that there
is a particular song, perhaps John's theme song, which he recorded on all
of the albums he made, and a reading where it is asserted that each of his
albums contains but a single song, encompassing both sides of the disc.
This ambiguity is a function of the fact that it is possible to associate
a structure such as (2.46) with two distinct logical forms, as we have
seen in the previous section. The logical form in (2.47) corresponds to
the former reading, the logical form in (2.48) to the latter reading:
(2.47) [S[one song]a [S[every albumn] [SJohn recorded a on 8]]]
(2.48) [S[every album]I [S[one song]a [SJohn recorded a on fl]]
From the structure of (2.46), it is possible to generate two wh-structures.
(2.49)a arises from wh-mnovement affecting the direct object in (2.46),
(2.49)b from this rule affecting the object of the preposition:
(2.49)a [1[COMPwhich song]t [Sdid John record t on every album]]
b [S[COMP which album]t [Sdid John record one song on t]]
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Both of these sentences are unambiguous, each representing a questioning
of one of the readings of (2.46). Thus, to (2.49)a, which corresponds
to the reading of (2.46) captured by (2.47), an appropriate reply must
provide information about a song which appears on all of John' albums. For
example, one could felicitiously reply to (2.49)a 'his theme song', or
'Giant Steps'. (2.49)b corresponds to the reading of (2.46) which is
expressed by (2.48). Therefore, answers to it must convey information
about those albums on which John only recorded a single song. In this
case, replies like 'his latest release', or 'everyone of them', would
be appropriate.6 The questions in (2.49), then, are each questioning one
of the readings of (2.46): (2.49)a the reading expressed by (2.47), and
(2.49)b, the reading expressed by (2.48).
The unambiguous nature of the direct questions in (2.49), is a
reflection of the fact that it is only possible to associate them with one
logical form each. The reason for this lies in the functioning of QR. Recall
that QR functions to adjoin quantified noun phrases to S (and not to S).
Therefore, in structureZ like those in (2.49), which only contain a single
S node, there is only one possible site for QR to adjoin a noun phrase.
Thus, the logical form generable from (2.49)a and (2.49)b are (2.50)a and
(2.50)b, respectively:
(2.50)a [S COMPwhich song]t S[every album]8 [Sdid John record t
on 8]]
b [ES[COMPWhich album]t [S[one song]a [Sdid John record a on
t]]]
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The relationship of each of the questions in (2.49) to the ambiguities
of (2.46) is immediately apparent from comparing (2.50)a to (2.47) and
(2.50)b to (2.48). Given the formal identity of these pairs of logical
forms, it is clear why (2.49)a is the questioning of the reading of
(2.46) represented by (2.47), and (2.49)b the questioning of the reading
represented by (2.48).7
What the logical forms in (2.50) further show is that wh is the
maximally wide scope quantifier. Thus, by definition, wh has wider scope
than 'every' in (2.50)a and wider scope than 'some' in (2.50)b, since in
each case the wh-quantifier c-commands the other quantifier. Since
logical forms like those in (2.50) are the only ones generable from the
surface structures in (2.49), given our assumptions about QR and wh-
movement, it follows, as a consequence of the analysis, that wh is
the widest scope quantifier, vis-a-vis other quantifiers in the sentence.8
In the sentences which we have been discussing, the wh-phrase and
the quantified noun phrase do not form a single constituent, rather, they
are each simple noun phrases. When a wh-phrase and a quantified noun
phrase form a PP-complement construction, however, the range of possible
wh-constructions is significantly restricted, as examples (2.43) and (2.44),
pointed out above, show. These examples are repeated here, along with a
number of other cases exhibiting the same phenomena:
(2.51)a Which men in Cleveland did you meet?
b *Which men in some city did you meet?
(2.52)a Which car in the garage is Harry keeping?
b *Which car in a garage is Harry keeping?
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(2.53)a Which painting from John's collection do you want?
b *Which painting(s) from everyone's collection do you want?
(2.54)a Which pictures of my friends did John see?
b *Which pictures of many friends did John see?
The difference between the well-formed (a) sentences, and the ill-formed
(b) sentences is that the latter contain quantifiers in a position where
the former contain referring expressions. Therefore, in the (b) cases,
QR must apply in order to generate well-formed logical forms for these
sentences, since otherwise the Condition on Quantifier Binding would not
be satisfied. As an example of the generation of logical forms for the
(b) examples, consider (2.55), which is the surface structure of (2.51)b:
(2.55)
(2.55) is generated, from the structure in (2.46), by wh-movement applying
to NP.:
1
0
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(2.56) s
COMP S
NP VP
V NP.
DET N
N PP
P NP
you met which men in some city
In order to generate a logical form from the surface structure in (2.55),
QR must apply to the quantified noun phrase, 'some city', which is
embedded in COMP. As we noted above, there is only one S in this
structure, to which QR may adjoin this phrase, generating (2.57):
(2.57) [S[COMPwhich men in a]t 5.[some city]a [did you meet t]]]
3 i
(2.57), though, is not a well-formed logical form, since it violates the
Condition on Proper Binding. This is because the first branching node
dominating 'some city' is Sj, which does not dominate 'a'. Since 'a' is
not c-commanded by the quantified noun phrase which binds it, it is not
properly bound. (2.57), therefore, contains a variable which is not
properly bound, and, hence, violates the Condition on Proper Binding.
In contrast to this state of affairs, the logical forms associated
with the (a) examples in (2.51) - (2.54) are all well-formed. For example,
consider (2.58), which is the logical form associated with (2.51)a. Since
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(2.58) S[[COMPwhich men in Cleveland] t [Sdid you meet t]]
(2.51)a contains a referring expression in the position of the quantifier
phrase in (2.51)b, QR does not apply in the generation of its logical form.
Therefore, the structure of the logical form associated with the (a)
examples in (2.51) - (2.54) is essentially identical for their surface
structures. (2.53) is a well-formed logical form, since it satisfies both
the Condition on Quantifier Binding and the Condition on Proper Binding.
The former condition is satisfied because the only quantifier in (2.58),
which is wh, properly binds the variable 't', which it c-commands, while
the latter Condition is satisfied because 't', which is the only variable
in (2.58), is properly bound by the wh-quantifier.
The distribution of wh-constructions illustrated by the examples
in (2.51) - (2.54) is explained, then, by the fact that it is only the
logical forms associated with the (a) sentences, containing referential
expressions, which are well-formed; those associated with the (b) examples,
which contain quantifier phrases, though, are ill-formed, since the only
logical form which can be derived from their surface structure violates
the Condition on Proper Binding.10
In sentences (2.51)b - (2.54)b, the quantifier is embedded in
surface structure in the prepositional phrase complement to the head wh-
word. If the situation is reversed, though, with the wh-phrase embedded
as the object of the preposition, the result is no more acceptable."
(2.59)a *[S[COMPSOme people in which city]t [did you meet t]]*[TCom [di yumets]
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(2.59)b *[L[COMPsome people in which city]t [st voted for Debs]]
The reason for the ill-formedness of these sentences is identical to
the reason for the ill-formedness of those in (2.51)b - (2.54)b: It is
not possible to generate logical forms from their surface structures which
satisfy the well-formedness conditions on representations at Logical Form.
Thus, consider the structures in (2.60), which are generated from (2.59)a
and (2.59)b, respectively, by QR affecting the noun phrase 'some people in
which city':
(2.60)a *[[S COMPa]t [[some people in which city]a [Sdid you meet
t]ill
b *[S[COMPa]t [S[some people in which city]a [St voted for
Debs]]]
Neither of these structures is well-formed, since they both violate
the Condition on Quantifier Binding. This is because neither 'some',
(nor the wh-quantifier) in these structures properly binds a variable;
'some' does not c-command the variable, 'a', which it binds, and the wh-
quantifier simply no longer binds a variable in this structure. Notice
that the structures in (2.60) do not violate the Condition on Proper
Binding, since the only variable in an argument position, which is 't',
is properly bound, by the (now empty) noun phrase in COMP position. Notice
that the occurrence of 'a' in COMP does not violate this condition, since
COMP is not an argument position. The examples in (2.59), therefore,
are ill-formed because it is not possible to associate them with logical
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forms which are consistent with the Condition on Quantifier Binding.12
One of the most significant aspects of this explanation of the
gaps in wh-constructions typified by the examples in (2.51)b - (2.54)b
and (2.59), is that they are not a result of some defect in the functioning
of wh-movement. Rather, the explanation lies in the fact that the logical
forms which can be generated from the surface structures of these sentences
do not satisfy the well-formedness conditions on logical forms. This situation
is a function of the fact that wh-movement moves a wh-phrase, in these cases
containing a constituent quantified noun phrase, into COMP position.
Notice that this explanation allows us to construct an independent argument
for the existence of COMP. Consider the alternative, in which it is
assumed that wh-movement is an adjunction operation. Under this
assumption, the surface structure (2.51)b is (2.61), rather than (2.55):
(2.61) S.
NP S.
AUX NP VP
V NP
I IWhich men in some city did you meet t
In (2.61), as opposed to (2.55), there are two S's to which QR may adjoin
the noun phrase 'some city'. While we know that adjunction to S. will lead
to an ill-formed structure, adjunction to S. does not have the same affect:1
(2.62) is a well-formed logical form:
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(2.62) [S[some city] [S.[which men in a]t [Sdid you meet t]]]
1
Here, both of the variables, 'a' and 't', are properly bound: 'a' is c-
commanded by 'some city' and 't' is c-commanded by the wh-quantifier.
Assuming that wh-movement is an adjunction, and not a movement into COMP,
therefore, leads to an incorrect prediction, i.e., that sentences like
(2.51)b are well-formed. This is because (2.62) is a well-formed logical
form, consistent with the Condition on Proper Binding. This is in
marked contrast to holding that there is a phrase structure rule S +COMP - S,
14
which correctly predicts that such sentences are ill-formed. Given
this significant empirical difference, the analysis presented above of
the properties of sentences like (2.51) - (2.54) and (2.59) provides an
independent argument for the existence of the COMP node, into which wh-
phrases are moved by wh-movement.
The sorts of wh-constructions which have been considered up to
this point have been of essentially two types: those, like (2.49), in which
a wh-phrase and a quantifier phrase do not form a constituent in surface
structure, and those like (2.51)b - (2.54)b and (2.59), where they do.
Besides these constructions. there exist other cases, which are super-
ficially similar to structures of the latter type, but which are, in fact
parallel in structure to sentences of the former type. Examples of the
constructions I have in mind are (2.63) and (2.64):
(2.63)a [SrCOMPIn which city]t [Sdid some men vote for Debs t]]
b [w[COMPWhich city]t [Sdid some men vote for Debs in t]]
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(2.64)a [S[COMPin which city]t [Sdid you meet some men t]]
b [S[COMPwhich city]t [sdid you meet some men in t]]
The examples in (2.63) are derived from a structure, illustrated in (2.65),
in which the wh-phrase does not form a constituent with the noun phrase
(2.65) S
COMP S
NP VP
Q N V PP PP
P NP P NP.
DET N
I I
some men voted for Debs in which city
'some men'. (2.63)b is generated by movement of the wh-phrase, NP., into
COMP. Wh-movement in this structure may also affect the PP immediately
dominating NP i , generating (2.63)a.16 From either of these surface
structures generable from (2.65),it is possible to generate a well-formed
logical form, by adjoining the phrase 'some city' to S. Thus, for example,
the logical form associated with (2.63)b is (2.66), which satisfies the
Condition on Proper Binding:
(2.66) [-[COMPwhich city]t S[some men] [Sdid a vote for Debs
in t]]]
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The examples in (2.64) should be compared to example (2.59)a,
repeated here. Recall that in section 2.3 above it was pointed out that
(2.59)a *[S[COMPsome people in which city]t [sdid you meet t]]
sentences which may take PP-complement constructions as objects, can also
be associated with structures in which the noun phrase and the prepositional
phrase are non-constituent verbal complements. Thus, while (2.59)a is
derived from a structure in which 'some people in which city' is a PP-
complement, the sentences in (2.64) are derived from the latter sort of
construction, illustrated in (2.67), either by movement of NP. into COMP,
or of the PP which immediately dominates it. The former application
(2.67) S
COMP S
NP VP
V NP. PP
o N P NP.
DET NSI nI I
you met some men in which city
of wh-movement generates (2.64)b, while the latter generates (2.64)a.
From both of these surface structures it is possible to generate well-
formed logical forms, again by adjoining the quantified noun phrase,
'some men', to S, where it will c-command the variable which it binds. The
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logical form associated with (2.64)a is shown in (2.68):
(2.68) [S[COMPwhich city]t [S[some men]a [Syou met a in t]]]
In (2.68), as in (2.66), both of the variables, 'a' and 't' are properly
bound. This structure, therefore, satisfies the Condition on Proper
Binding, and is, hence, well-formed.
From a structure such as that in (2.67) it is possible to generate
another direct question, (2.69), where the wh-phrase is NP. rather than
(2.69) [S[COMIPwhich men]t [Sdid you meet t in every city]]
NP.. As in the other examples, a well-formed logical form can be
generated from this surface structure, by adjoining 'every city' to S.
This gives (2.70):
(2.70) [S[COMPwhich men]t [S[every city]B [Sdid you meet t in S]]]
In the examination of sentences containing both wh-phrases and
quantified noun phrases, we have seen, then, that when a quantified phrase
is contained in COMP in surface structure, it is not possible to generate
a well-formed logical form for that sentence. This is because in the
generation of these structures, QR performs a rightward movement, resulting
in a structure in which a variable is not properly bound. On the other
hand, if in surface structure, the quantified phrase is not a constituent
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of COMP, then it is possible to generate a well-formed logical form. Here,
QR performs a leftward movement, thus creating a structure in which all
of the variables are properly bound. The distribution of the wh-
constructions just discussed, therefore, is a result of the general
conditions bounding downward movements; in this case, rightward movement
of a nourn phrase by QR.
This concludes our discussion of the interrelationships of wh-
movement and QR. We have seen (i) that it follows as a consequence of this
theory that wh-quantifiers always have maximally wide scope; (ii),that a
number of gaps in the distribution of wh-constructions, which are other-
wise inexplicable on the usual assumptions concerning wh-movement, are
explained by the fact that their logical forms do not satisfy the
Condition on Proper Binding, and (iii), that this analysis of the gaps in
wh-constructions leads to an indirect argument for the existence of a
COMP node, into which wh-phrases are moved.
2.5 The marked cases. Up to this point, we have been considering the
unmarked interpretation of PP-complement constructions, in which they
are associated with logical forms which are inversely linked. This
interpretation is a general property of these constructions, and its
existence can be determined as function of the surface structure of
sentences containing this construction, independently of the semantic
contribution of the lexical items in a given sentence of this type.
As we saw in section 2.2,an inversely linked logical form is the only
logical form which can be assigned to PP-complement constructions by the
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rules of sentence grammar. There do exist sentences, though, which
contain such constructions, but which are not unambiguous; not only do
they have an inversely linked reading, but also a reading in which the
embedded quantifier has narrower scope than the head quantifier. Some
examples of sentences displaying this ambiguity are illustrated in (2.71):17
(2.71)a Every senator on a key congressional committee voted
for the amendment
b Some benefactor of every worthy cause is a happy man
c The head of every public authority in New York is a
powerful public figure
d Every patient with every non-contagious disease will
be released from care
e Every house near a large nuclear reactor was contaminated
after meltdown
In each of these cases, the latter interpretation is essentially parallel
to that of a relative clause; the examples in (2.71) can be paraphrased
as in (2.72):
(2.72)a Every senator who is on a key congressional committee
voted for the amendment
b Some person who is a benefactor of every worthy cause
is a happy man
c The person who is head of every public authority in
New York is a powerful public figure
d Every patient who has every non-contagious disease will
be released from care
e Every house which is near a large nuclear reactor was
contaminated after meltdown
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Given this parallelism between this reading of (2.71) and the paraphrases
in (2.72), we will refer to this interpretation as the relative, as
opposed to the inversely linked, interpretation.
The relative interpretation of sentences like (2.71) is, as
compared to their unmarked, inversely linked reading, highly irregular
and idiosyncratic. For instance, the existence of this interpretation is
dependent, in part, upon the particular preposition contained in the PP-
complement. For example, cases like those in (2.73), in which the pre-
position is 'in' are all unambiguous; they only have an inversely linked
(2.73)a Everybody in an Italian city met John
b Some toys in every store are defective
c Every family in every town south of L.A. faces
the threat of brush-fire
reading. The existence of the relative interpretation is also dependent
upon the particular quantifiers contained in the PP-complement. A
striking example comes from comparing (2.71)a, (repeated here as (2.74)a,
which is ambiguous between an inversely linked and relative reading, to
(2.74)a Every senator on a key congressional committee voted
for the amendment
b Each (of the) senator(s) on a key congressional committee
voted for the amendment
c All of the senators on a key congressional committee
voted for the amendment
(2.74)b and (2.74)c. The two latter sentences are unambiguous, having
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only an inversely linked interpretation. A similar situation also holds
in cases where the embedded quantifier is varied. Compare (2.75)a and
(2.75)b:
(2.75)a Every house near a large nuclear reactor was contaminated
after meltdown
b Every house near some large nuclear reactor was contaminated
after meltdown
Here (2.75)a is ambiguous, while (2.75)b in unambiguous, the latter only
having an inversely linked interpretation.
The occurrence of the relative interpretation for PP-complement
constructions is governed not only by factors brought to bear by the
particular lexical items contained in a sentence, but also by the depth
of embedding of prepositional phrases. Compare sentence (2.76),
which is ambiguous, to those in (2.77), which contain greater levels of
(2.76) Every exit from a freeway is badly constructed
(2.77)a Every exit from a freeway to some California city is
badly constructed
b Every exit from a freeway to some California city in
every county south of L.A. is badly constructed
embedding of prepositional phrases. Neither of these sentences has a
relative interpretation, as does (2.76); rather, they are unambiguous,
having only an inversely linked reading. Thus, it seems that while the
104
existence of the relative interpretation is dependent on the depth of
embedding, the inversely linked interpretation is always possible, regard-
less of the depth of embedding of prepositional phrases containing
quantifiers.
What these observation indicate is that while PP-complement con-
structions may always have an inversely linked interpretation, they can
only sometimes have a relative interpretation, and then only under highly
marked circumstances. Under the general approach to linguistic markedness
we are pursuing here, this is exactly the result we would expect, since an
inversely linked logical form is the only one generable, by the rules of
sentence grammar, from the surface structure of PP-complement constructions.
A logical form in which the embedded quantifier takes narrow, rather than
wide scope cannot be generated by these rules.18 Thus, this theory pre-
dicts that the inversely linked interpretation should hold universally in
this construction. Within sentence grammar, then, an explanation can be
provided for the nature of the unmarked case; an account of the marked,
relative interpretation, though, lies beyond the expressive power of
sentence grammar. This is not surprising, since the existence of this
interpretation is predicated upon factors, such as the nature of the
particular prepositions and quantifiers, and the depth of embedding of
prepositional phrases, which are beyond the scope of sentence grammar.
We return to the status of the marked cases of PP-complement constructions
in Chapter Four.
2.6 Relative Clause Constructions. Restrictive relative clauses suffer,
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in certain respects, from linguistic schizophrenia. Since they are noun
phrase modifiers, they share many features in common with other nominal con-
structions, such as the PP-complement constructions just discussed. They
differ from PP-complements, though, in that the complement to the head
noun is a sentence, rather than a prepositional phrase. Thus, they also
have properties in common with sentential matrix-complement constructions.
Because of this split personality, we will divide our discussion of
relative clauses into two parts. In this chapter, the discussion will
center on those aspects of relative clause constructions which they share
with other nominal constructions. In ChapterThree, we will turn our
attention to their sentential side.
In Section 2.2, it was shown that the particular assumptions one makes as
to the internal structure of PP-complements is not a relevant parameter in deter-
mining the range of possible interpretations of noun phrases containing such com-
plements, since the identical logical form is generable from each of the possibilities.
Thus, as far as quantification is concerned, for this construction matters of form
are independent of matters of interpretation.This result is mirrored by a parallel
situation in restrictive relative clauses. Thus, just as three different surface
structures have been suggested for PP-complements, three parallel
structures have also been suggested for restrictive relatives. The
difference between them is that relative constructions have an S node
in place of the PP node in their PP-complement counterparts. Thus,
parallel to (2.10), many authors (e.g., Ross (1967); Vergnaud (1974); Andrews
(1975) and Emonds (1976)) have argued in favor of the structure (2.78),
where the initial quantifier and head noun form a noun phrase constituent.
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(2.78) NP.
NP. S
Q N COMP S
every musician who t plays jazz
In the other two structures which have been suggested, these two elements
do not form a single noun phrase constituent. In (2.79), which is
structurally parallel to (2.11), the head noun forms an N constituent
(2.79) NP.1-
Q N
N S
COMP S
every musician who t plays jazz
with the clause. This structure has been advocated by Dean (1967),
Partee (1975) and Jackendoff (1976), among others. The third structure
is where, in surface structure, the initial quantifier, head noun and the
clause are independent, as in (2.80), the relative counterpart of (2.12);
(2.80) NP.
QN S
COMP S
every musician who t plays jazz
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This structure, proposed by Smith (1964) and Selkirk (1970), is derived
from a deep structure in which the relative clause is a constituent of
the specifier element, by a relative clause extraposition rule.
The significant point here is that, just as in the case of PP-
complement constructions, the same logical form is associated with each
of these structures. In each of them, by virtue of the Condition on
Analyzability, QR affects NPi, adjoining that noun phrase to the S of
which it is a constituent, since in each case this is the maximal NP
immediately dominating Q. Thus, QR generates for sentence (2.81) the
logical form (2.82), which is ultimately associated with a converted form
along the lines of (2.83), (on the assumption that wh functions as a
(2.81) Every musician who plays jazz likes Ellington
(2.82) [S[every musician who t plays jazz]a [So likes Ellington]]
conjunction in relative clause constructions):
(2.83) ["Va[S Sa is a musician & a plays jazz] + [Sc likes
Ellington]]]
Thus, as for the quantification in concerned, the question of the syntactic
constituency of relative clauses is independent of the question of their
interpretation, since the same logical form, and hence interpretation, is
associated with all three of the possible relative clause structures.
It is a consequence of this result that any argument for or against
these structures, which is based on the semantic properties of the head
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quantifier, is moot. Recently, though, an argument of this type has been
presented in Partee (1975), who argues in favor of an N type structure, as
in (2.79). She holds that:
If the syntactic and semantic rules are to
correspond in compositional structure, which
is a fundamental asstunption in Montague's
approach, then relative clauses must also
be syntactically combined with common noun
phrases, and the definite article [quantifier -
RCM] attached to the result.
(p. 231)
Thus, she claims that in the interpretation of 'the man who dates Mary',
there is "the proposition that one and only one object has the property
designated by the common noun phrase to which the is attached." (p. 230-1).
It has been argued, by Chomsky (1975b), that this analysis apparently
cannot be extended to the analysis of plural definite descriptions. This
is because in examples like 'the books which we ordered arrived', "taking
the complex class-denoting phrase to denote the intersection of the two
classes denoted by "books" and "we order x,", then applying the principle that
"one and only one object has the property designated by "this common
noun phrase,...will give us the same interpretation as derived for 'the
book we ordered", an incorrect conclusion." (p. 98). This argument is
telling upon the notion that there exists acompositional isomorphism
between syntactic and semantic rules, since the meaning of 'the', (viz.,
"one and only one object...") is not part of the meaning of the noun phrase
which results from combining 'the' with a plural common noun phrase. Thus,
given this argument, there are seemingly problems of descriptive adequacy
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which undermines Partee's contention that there is a one-one relation
between syntactic and semantic rules.
While Partee's argument is limited in this respect, it does raise
an interesting methodological point. The significance of her argument
lies in the assumption "that the syntactic rules which determine how a
sentence is built up out of smaller syntactic parts should correspond
one-to-one with the semantic rules that tell how the meanings of a
sentence is a function of its parts." (p. 203). It should be recognized,
though, that this assumption is not a necessary condition for an
adequate theory of natural language semantics. Indeed, given the
empirical adequacy of the theory being developed here, which does not
satisfy this condition, it does not appear to be necessary to assume
that there is a one-to-one relationship between those rules constructing
syntactic forms, and those constructing logical forms. But, even if such
a relationship could be established in this theory, it would not
necessarily support one analysis of relative clause structure over another,
since, as we have seen, the semantic issue, (i.e., the interpretation of
quantification in relative clause constructions) is independent of the
issue of the syntactic structure of relative clauses. Thus, regardless
of how this latter issue is resolved, it will not be possible to invoke
quantificational phenomena as evidence for the proper analysis of the
structure of relative clauses.
2.7 Possessives and Nominalizations. To begin, consider the interpre-
tation of sentences like (2.84), which contain a quantified possessive
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phrase:
(2.84) Every scholar's book is selling well this year
The interpretation of (2.84) differs from that of the parallel sentence
(2.85), in that in the former case, the quantifier 'every' ranges over
(2.85) Every scholarly book is selling well this year
the set of scholars, while in (2,85) the domain of 'every' is the set of
scholarly books. This distinction is highlighted by comparing the
direct questions in (2.86):
(2.86)a Which scholar's book is selling well this year?
b Which scholarly book is selling well this year?
Notice that an appropriate answer to (2.86)a is the name of a scholar,
but that the name of a book is not. This latter reply is appropriate to
(2.86)b. Thus, if asked (2.86)a, I could appropriately reply "Prof.
Halle's", but not "The Sound Pattern of Russian". This latter reply,
though, would be a perfectly natural answer to (2.86)b.19
What this shows is that the logical forms which are associated
with sentences containing possessive noun phrases, such as (2.84), differ
from the logical form (2.87), which is associated with (2.85). In
(2.87) the entire phrase 'every scholarly book' is construed as
the quantifier phrase. The contrasting properties of possessive structures,
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(2.87) [S[every scholarly book]a [Sa is selling well this year]]
on the other hand, follows if the possessive NP, 'every scholar' is
construed as the quantified phrase, i.e., as having the logical form (2.88):
(2.88) [S[every scholai l cSa 's book is selling well this year]]
This property of possessive noun phrase structures follows as a
consequence of the functioning of QR, constrained by the Condition on
Analyzability. Thus, it has long been assumed, for example by Lees (1963),
and more recently, by Chomsky (1970) and Siegel (1974), that possessive
noun phrases are generated as constituents of the noun phrase determiner.
The structure of (2.84), then, is essentially (2.89):20
(2 89) S
NP. VP
DET N
I
NP.
Q NI I-
every scholar's book is selling well this year
Possessive noun phrases, with the structure in (2.89), differ from the
PP-complement structures we have been considering, in that they contain
a quantified noun phrase embedded in the specifier of a noun, rather than
in a complement to a noun . What these constructions have in common, though, is that
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in each of them there is a non-nominal phrasal node intervening between a
quantified noun phrase and the NP in which it is embedded. Thus, in the
case of PP-complement constructions, there is a PP intervening, and in
possessives there is a DET intervening. The Condition on Analyzability
specifies that QR apply to the minimal NP dominating a Q, which is not
immediately dominated by another NP (or AP). In (2.89), this is NP.,
which is immediately dominated by DET, and not by NP.. QR applying in
1
this manner will then generate (2.88), by adjoining NP. (= 'every scholar')
to S.
This explanation of the type of logical form associated with possessive NP's
containing quantifiers can be extended to an explanation of the properties
of quantifiers in a broader class of nominalizations, whose "subjects"
are dominated by DET. In particular, consider the nominalization in
(2.90) and (2.91), which are adapted from examples in Chomsky (1970):
(2.90) Every city's destruction by some pestilence was
assured by their misdeeds
(2.91) Some company's refusal of every merger offer began a
panic.
Both of these sentences are ambiguous. For example, (2.90) may be
logically paraphrased as 'There is a pestilence, such that for each city,
its destruction by that pestilence was assured by their misdeeds',
or as 'For each city, there is some pestilence, such that the city's
destruction by the pestilence was assured by their misdeeds'.
Similarly, (2.91) may be paraphrased as 'For each merger offer,
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there is some company (or other), such that their refusal of it began a
panic of the floor of the exchange', or by 'There is a company, such
that for each merger offer, their refusal of it began a panic on the
floor of the exchange'. In each of these sentences, then, the ambiguity
charazterized by these paraphrases is an ambiguity of scope. IJ. the
former paraphrases, the embedded quantifier is construed as taking wider
scope, while in the latter paraphrases it is construed as having narrower
scope, vis-a-vis the quantifier embedded in the possessive structure.
This ambiguity is in marked contrast to PP-complement constructions,
which are normally unambiguous; cf. section 2.2. Its existence follows
immediately, once we consider the surface structure of (2.91):
(2.92) S
NP. VP
DET N
NP. N PP
Q N P NPk
Q N
Some company's refusal of every merger offer began a panic
We are employing (2.91) as an illustrative example, but the comments
which follow hold equally well of (2.90). In this structure, QR may apply
both to NP. and NPk . Both of these noun phrases are minimal noun phrases
dominating a quantifier, 'some' in the case of NP. and 'every' in the
case of NPk . In neither case is the noun phrase immediately dominated
L
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by another NP; NPj is immediately dominated by DET, and NPk by PP. This
circumstance allows for the generation of two distinct logical forms
from (2.92):
(2.93) [S[every merger offer] [S[some company]a
[Sa 's refusal of 8 began a panic]]]
(2.94) [S[some company]a [S[every merger offer]B
[S a 's refusal of B began a panic]]]
Notice, that in contrast to the PP-complement and relative clause con-
structions discussed above, the surface structure (2.92) is associated
with non-linked, rather than linked, logical forms. Since these two
non-linked logical forms are the only logical forms generable from the
surface structure (2.92), it follows that sentences containing multiply
quantified nominalizations should be ambiguous. 22
What these brief comments indicate is that the range of logical
forms which can be associated with sentences containing quantified
nominalizations and possessive noun phrases follows from the functioning
of QR to their surface structures, as constrained by the Condition on
Analyzability. Thus, the range of quantificational phenomena in sentences
containing complex noun phrases which is explained by the theory being
proposed here can be expanded to included possessives and nominalizations.
2.8 Partitive Constructions. Selkirk (1977) has noted a very curious
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phenomenon inpartitive constructions. She points out that the range of
elements which may occupy the embedded noun phrase specifier position in
this construction is highly restricted. Thus, as the examples in (2.95)
show, this position may be occupied by a possessive proper name, a
(2.95)a Each of John's friends
b Some of his flowers
c All of these proofs
d Many of the objections
possessive pronoun, a demonstrative pronoun, or the definite determiner,
but not, as the examples in (2.96) show, by a quantifier:
(2.96)a *Each of some friends
b *Some of every flower(s)
c *All of many proofs
d *Many of several objections
e *One of each collection
In order to account for this distribution, Selkirk suggests the following
constraint:
Partitive Recursion Constraint
Rule out as ungrammatical any parti-
tive construction containing some,
all, no, A(=indef), and so on, in the
lower noun phrase
What we wish to show in this section is that the fact captured by Selkirk's
constraint is a sub-case of a more general well-formedness condition on
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logical forms associated with sentences containing partitive noun phrases,
to the effect that names may not occupy the object position of 'of' in
this construction.
Consider first the generation of the logical forms associated with
a sentence containing one of the partitives in (2.95):
(2.97) [S[NP[Qeach] of [NPJohn's friends]] likes jazz]
(We are assuming that (2.97) minimally represents the structure which
would have to be represented in any adequate analysis of partitive con-
structions.) In (2.97), which contains only a single quantifier, QR
affects the noun phrase 'each of John's friends', generating the logical
form (2.98):
(2,98) [ 5 [each of John's friends]a [Sa likes jazz]]
(2.98) is a well-formed logical form, since it satisfies both the
Condition on Proper Binding and the Condition on Quantifier Binding.
(2.98) represents the interpretation characteristically associated with
partitive constructions, in which the quantifier is interpreted as
ranging over the members of the set denoted by the embedded noun phrase,
in this case, the set of John's friends.
Sentences containing phrases such as those in (2.96) differ from
those containing one of the phrases in (2.95), in that the former contain
two quantifiers. For example, consider (2.99):
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(2.99) *[S[Np Qeach] of [Np[Qsome] friends]] likes jazz]
From the surface structure (2.99), there are two structures which may be
generated by QR: (2.100) and (2.101):
(2.100) [S[each of 8] [S[some friends] [Sca likes jazz]]]
(2.101) [S[some friends]5 [S[each of 8]I [S likes jazz]]]
A derivation of (2.100) is illustrated in ( 2 .10 2 );one of (2.101) in (2.103):
(2.102) [S.[NP[Qeach] of [Np[Qsome] friends]] likes jazz] +
[S[each of [NP[Qsome] friends]] [S.a likes jazz]]
[S[each of ]c [S[some friends] [S.a likes jazz]]]
1
(2.103) [Si[NP[Qeach] of [Np[Qsome] friends]] likes jazz]] +
[S[some friends] [S. [NP[Qeach] of 8] likes jazz]] +
[S[some friends]5 [S[each of Bla [S. likes jazz]]]
1
Of these two logical forms, (2.100) is clearly ill-formed. It does not
satisfy the Condition on Proper Binding, since the variable '8' is not
c-commanded by 'some friends', the quantified phrase which binds it.
(2.101), on the other hand, does satisfy this condition: the 'some'-phrase
c-commands '5' and the 'each'-phrase c-commands 'c'. There are indepen-
dent reasons, however, for why (2.101) is not a well-formed logical form.
118
Notice that quantified phrases are not the only noun phrases which are
barred from the embedded position in partitives; so are proper names.
Thus, (2.104) is as ill-formed as (2.99):
(2.104) *Each of John likes jazz
In order to rule out (2.104),let us suppose the following condition on
well-formed structures at Logical Form:
(2.105) *...Q (of) NP..., where NP is a name.
(2. 105) accounts for the deviance of (2.104), because the logical form
associated with this sentence, which is (2 .106),contains the phrase
'each of John':
(2.106) *[S[each of John]a [S likes jazz]]
It also accounts for the deviance of (2.101), since if a proper name
cannot occupy the inner position of a partitive, then it follows that
neither can a variable, which is a special case of a name. (2.101) is ill-
formed, therefore, since it contains the phrase 'each of S', in violation
of (2.105). The reason for the deviance of (2.99), then, is that it is
not possible to associate it with a well-formed representation at the
level of Logical Form; both (2.100) and (2.101), the structures which can
be derived by QR from (2.109), violate conditions on well-formed logical
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forms.
While the ultimate motivation for the condition (2.105)resides
in the mode of interpretation of partitive quantifiers,23 what is of
interest to us is that it is only if we assume that there is a level of
linguistic representation at which quantifiers bind variables, i.e.,
Logical Form, is it possible to state a uniform constraint which accounts
for the types of noun phrases which may appear in the internal position
in partitives.
Notice that this account of the range of possible partitive con-
structions holds generally, regardless of the exact nature of the internal
structure of partitives; i.e., the range of possible interpretable
partitives is not dependent, in this regard, on any particular theory as
to their structure. Furthermore, it obviates the necessity of
stipulating what can be the internal noun phrase specifier in this con-
struction. Given the analysis being proposed here, we may simply assume
that this noun phrase is like any other noun phrase in English, and
thus its specifier may be freely generated as DET or Q, (or it may be
null). It is only in the case where the specifier is DET that it will
be possible to generate a well-formed logical form. Thus, it follows
from the Condition on Proper Binding, and the filter condition (2.105),
that the internal noun phrase in partitives is "immune" to quantification.
This explanation extends naturally to sentences which contain
more complex partitive constructions. For example, consider
the sentences in (2.107) and (2.108).
120
(2.107) *[S[NP [many] of [NP[Qeach] of [NP[DETthe] wards]]]
voted for Debs]
(2.108) [S[Np[Qmany] of [NP[NP[DETthe] voters][ppin [Np[Qeach]
ward]]]] cast their ballots for Debs]
The noun phrases in both (2.107) and (2.108) are base generable; the NP in
(2.107) is a partitive generated within a partitive, in (2.108) a PP.
complement structure is embedded within a partitive. (2.107) is ill-formed
for the same reason as is a sentence like (2.99) which contains a simple
partitive; both of the logical forms which may be associated with it
are ill-formed. (2.109)a violates the Condition on Proper Binding, while
(2.109)b contains an ill-formed quantifier phrase, violating condition
(2.105).
(2.109)a *[S[many of 8]a [S[each of the wards] [S voted for
Debs]]]
b *[S[each of the wards]a [S[many of S]a [Sa voted for
Debs]]]
From the surface structure (2. 108),on the other hand, it is possible to
generate a well-formed logical form, (2.110):
(2. 110) [S[each ward]8 [S[many of the voters in B]
[Sc cast their ballots for Debs]]]
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This structure satisfies the Condition on Proper Binding, and does not
contain any ill-formed quantified phrases, as does (2.109)b: :many of the
voters in (' is well-formed, just as the quantifier phrase 'many voters
in (' in (2.111) is:
(2.111) [S[each ward]8 [S[many voters in 8]a
[Sr cast their ballots for Debs]]]
(2.108) then, as opposed to (2.107), is well-formed because it is possible
to associate it with a well-formed logical form, (which is not possible
for (2.107)). 25
In section 2.4, a number of gaps in the distribution of wh-
constructions with PP-complements were discussed. These gaps are
mirrored by parallel gaps in wh-sentences containing partitives. For
example, just as a quantifier could not occur as the specifier of the
embedded NP in a PP-complement with a wh head, it is also not possible
for a quantifier to occupy this position in a parallel partitive
construction:
(2.112)a [-[COMPwhich of John's friends]t [Sdid Harry see t]]
b *[S-[COMPwhich of all friends]t [Sdid Harry see t]]
(2.112)b is ill-formed for the same reason as its PP-complement counter-
part; it is not possible to associate it with a well-formed logical
form. Thus, QR applying to the surface structure (2.112)b would generate
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(2.113),by adjoining the NP 'all friends' to S:
(2.113) *[S[COMPwhich of a!t [s[all friends]a [Sdid Harry see tl]]]
(2.113) violates the Conditon on Proper Binding, since the variable 'a'
is not c-commanded by the quantifier which binds it. In (2.112)a, on the
other hand, the only quantifier in the sentence, i.e., wh, properly binds
the variable 't', thus satisfying the Condition on Proper Binding.
Another parallelism to wh-headed PP-complements is the ill-
formedness of sentences like those in (2.114) and (2.115)
(2.114) *[S[COMPmany of whom]t [Sdid John see t]]
(2.115) *[S[COMPmany of whom]t [St voted for Debs]]]
Here, it is not possible to associate these surface structures with
logical forms which satisfy the Condition on Quantifier Binding. In
each of them, QR will function to adjoin the 'many' phrases to S,
generating the structures in (2.116):26
(2.116)a *[S[COMP a]U [Smany of whom]a [Sdid John see t]]]
b *[S[COMP a]t [Smany of whom]a [St voted for Debs]]]
Both of these structures are ill-formed, since they contain a quantified
phrase, 'many of whom' which does not properly bind a variable. Notice
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that they do not violate the Condition on Proper Binding, only the
Condition on Quantifier Binding. This is because COMP is not an argu-
ment position.
As in the case of PP-complement constructions, all of the ill-
formed cases, (2.112)b, (2.114) and (2.115) are generable, as far as wh-
movement is concerned. Their deviance does not follow from some property
of this rule. Rather, it is a function of the Conditions on Proper
Binding and Quantifier Binding, which are not satisfied by the structures
derived by QR when it applies to surface structures in which quantified
phrases are constituents of COMP.
In this chapter, we have seen that the same set of principles
which explained the range of possible interpretations of single clause
sentences containing simple noun phrases readily generalizes to provide an
explanation of the possible interpretations of sentences containing
complex nominal constructions. In particular, we have seen that it
follows, from the functioning of QR, and the Conditions on Analyzability,
Proper Binding and Quantifier Binding, that PP-complement constructions
are characteristically associated with inversely linked logical forms,
a situation which holds regardless of particular assumptions about their
structure. It has also been seen that these principles afford an
explanation for differences in interpretation in NP-PP sequences occurring
post-verbally as opposed to pre-verbally, as well as for a range of
properties of wh-constructions. Furthermore, we have seen that just as in
the case of PP-complement constructions, the question of relative clause
structure is independent of the question of their interpretation, as
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far as quantification is concerned.
Finally, we have seen that it is possible to explain, on the
basis of our general grammatical assumptions, the nature of the logical
forms which are associated with sentences containing quantified possessive
noun phrases, nominalizations and partitives, extending the explanation
which was developed for PP-complement constructions to a wider range of
nominal construct ions.
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Appendix: ON THE NON-EXTENDABILITY OF THE A/A CONDITION
In formulating the Condition on Analyzability, repeated here as
(Al), a clause which insures that rules like QR or wh-movement affect the
(Al) Condition on Analyzability
If a rule t mentions SPEC, then #
applies to the minimal [+N]-phrase
dominating SPEC, which is not im-
mediately dominated by another
[+N]-phrase
higher phrase, in a situation where a [+N]-phrase (dominating a specifier
element) is immediately dominated by another [+N]-phrase, is included.
In this chapter, it has been shown how this clause of the Condition on
Analyzability insures a general explanation of the properties of quanti-
fication in PP-Complement and Relative Clause constructions, independently
of assumptions about their internal structure. Thus, a central part of
the significance of the notion of immediate domination is that it is
extendable to explaining not only syntactic phenomena, (see Ross (1974),
Sag (1976), Woisetschlaeger (1976)), but also to a wide range of semantic
phenomena. Indeed, the generality of this notion provides strong
empirical confirmation for the Condition on Analyzability.
It has been held by many linguists that the empirical effects of
the immediate domination clause of the Condition on Analyzability is a
function of the A-over-A (A/A) Condition. This condition was first pro-
posed in Chomsky (1962), and has received further attention in Chomsky
(1968), (1973), Ross (1967), Kayne (1975), Bresnan (1976a), Sag (1976)
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and Woisetschlaeger (1976), among others. It has been utilized, for
example, to explain the impossibility of extraction from PP-complements
(*'Which city did some men in vote for Debs'), left branches of NP's and
AP's (*'Which men did in every city vote for Debs', *'How is Belli good
a lawyer') and coordinate structures (*'What did Bill eat ham and'),
among other phenomena.27 In this appendix, what we wish to show is that
the A/A Condition, in contrast to the Condition on Analyzability, cannot
be extended to provide an explanation of the semantic phenomena, which
follow, (in part) as a consequence of the Condition on Analyzability.
The A/A Condition is usually conceived of as a general convention
limiting the range of possible analyses satisfying the structural
description of a transformational rule, under which the structural change
of that rule may be effected. As an example, consider the formulation of
the A/A Condition proposed in Chomsky (1973):
(A2) If a transformation applies to a structure
of the form
where a is a cyclic node, then it must
be so interpreted as to apply to the maximal
phrase of type A.
The effect of this condition is to insure that if a phrase of type A
is embedded within another phrase of type A, a rule affecting an A-phrase
must affect the maximal (higher) A-phrase. Thus, consider the functioning
of QR, in a PP-complement structure like (A3):
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(A3) S
NP. VP
NP. PP
Q N P NP
I I I I
every body in Cleveland voted for Debs
In this structure, QR applies, by the A/A Condition, to NPi , since it is
maximal with respect to NP., generating the logical form (A4):
(A4) [S[everybody in Cleveland]a [Sa voted for Debs]]
The Condition on Analyzability has the same effect on the functioning of
QR, since it mandates that QR affects NPi , which immediately dominates
NP.. In this respect, then, these two conditions are equivalent. A
difference shows up though, when we consider PP-complements containing
two quantifiers, rather than one:
(AS) S
NP. VP
NP PP
Q N P NPk
Q NI
every body in some city voted for Debs
The problem here concerns the application of QR to NPk . By the A/A
Condition, it appears that QR may not apply to this noun phrase, since
i
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it only permits rules to affect the maximal quantified noun phrase in
structures like (AS). The noun phrase which meets this description is
NPi., since it contains, as constituents, both NP. and NPk . But, if
QR is prohibited from applying to NPk in (AS), then it is not possible
to generate a well-formed logical form from this structure. This is
because the structure generated, (A6), does not satisfy the Condition
(A6) [S[everybody in some city]a [Sc voted for Debs]]
on Quantifier Binding, since it contains a quantifier, 'some', which does
not properly bind a variable. This problem is not peculiar to the
structure in (AS). It is equally endemic to the alternatives, (A7) and
(A8):
(A7) S
NP. VP
Q N
N PP
P NPk
Q NI I
every body in some city voted for Debs
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(A8)
In both of these cases, NP. is maximal with respect to NPk , and, hence,
QR may not affect this latter noun phrases in either of these structures.
Therefore, the A/A Condition predicts that it is not possible to generate
a well-formed logical form for PP-complement constructions. This is
clearly a false prediction, since it if were true, all PP-complement
constructions containing more than a single, (head),quantifier should be
i ll-formed.
This result is in marked contrast to the Condition on Analyzability.
Since, in each of these structures, NPk is not immediately dominated by
another NP, but rather by a PP, it may be affected by QR. And, as we have
seen, QR applying to this noun phrase, as well as to NPi, generates an
inversely linked logical form, as in (A9), from any of these structures:
(A9) [S[some city]I [S[everybody in 8]a [Sa voted for Debs]]]
There exists, then, a clear empirical distinction between the A/A
Condition and the Condition on Analyzability. Under the former condition,
it is predicted that PP-complements with more than a single head quantifier
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are ungrammatical, while under the latter it is predicted that they are
well-formed, and, furthermore, that they are associated with inversely
linked logical forms.28
The formulation of the A/A Condition in (A2) is a relative formu-
lation, mandating that a rule affecting A-phrases apply to the maximal
phrase of type A. This interpretation may be contrasted to an absolute
interpretation, which has been principally employed by Kayne (1975).
Under this interpretation, the A/A Condition "...absolutely prohibit(s)
the extraction by a transformation of category A from within a larger
phrase of category A." The difference between these two formulations is
that in the former, it is relativized to rules which affect A-phrases,
in the latter, it holds absolutely for rules which affect any type of
phrases. This interpretation, though, leads to the same results as the
relative interpretation in the relevant cases. It explicitly prohibits
any rule from affecting NPk in (A5), (A7) or (A8), since in each case
NPk is contained in a more inclusive noun phrase, NPi.. Thus, regardless
of whether the A/A Condition is interpreted relatively or absolutely,
it still incorrectly predicts that PP-complement structures with more
than a single quantifier are ill-formed. T'nis version of the A/A
Condition, therefore, does not extend from rules mapping Deep onto Surface
Structure to those mapping from Surface Structure to Logical Form.
Recently, Bresnan (1976a) has presented a somewhat different
formulation of the A/A Condition, "The Relativized A-over-A Principle",
whose purpose is to allow rules to hpply to maximal phrases with respect
to "context" elements. In giving this formulation, Bresnan assumed
essentially the transformational formalism of Peters and Ritchie (1973),
131
in which transformations are given as n-term Boolean combinations
of categories C, where C ranges over the non-terminal vocabularly. Thus,
QR, which might be stated informally in this notation as (A10), is
strictly formalized in (All):
(A10) [SX [NPQ- Y] Z]
4 4 4(All) S -4 & NP 4- Q1-4 2-3 2-2
(All) states that QR is a 4-factor transformation, such that the 1st
through 4th factors are an S, the 2nd and 3rd factors an NP and the 2nd
factor a Q.
With respect to this formalism, Bresnan defines the notion "target"
predicate as essentially those predicates on which the structural change
of the rule is defined, i.e., those elements which are actually affected
by the rule. A "context" predicate " ..is any predicate 3 n " othert-u'
than a target predicate, whose term indices (t,u) are not included
within those of a target predicate...Context predicates describe things
"outside of" the target predicates." (p. 11).29
Given these definitions, the Relativized A-over-A Principle"
states that a "transformation r = (~'Z apply under a proper analysis
' that is maximal relative to all proper analyses that agree with w on
all context predicatesf." (p. 16), (where • is an n-term structural
condition andct is an n-term transformational mapping.)
Bresnan's formulation of the A/A Condition is intimately connected
to a Peters and Ritchie-type formalism, which is significantly less
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restrictive than the formalism outlined in Chapter One. One may raise
the issue whether in this less restrictive formalism it could be
shown that, assuming QR as stated in (All), the problem facing the A/A
Condition could be surmounted by the Relativized A-over-A Principle. To
see if this is the case, consider as an example (A12), which indicates
the three possible analyses of structure (AS):
(A12)
7r1 :
it.,:a
Since QR does not contain any relevant context predicates, (aside from
'S 41 '), the Relativized A-over-A Principle mandates that QR simply apply1-4
under the maximal analysis of (A12); that is, to the maximal noun phrase
which satisfies the predicate 'NP•,' in (All). This means that QR may
only apply to NPi, under analysis l, since NPi properly contains both
NPj and NPk . It therefore explicitly prohibits QR from applying to either
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of these noun phrases. But, if QR cannot apply to NPk, then it is not
possible to generate a well-formed logical form from (A12), since the
structure generated (which is (A6)), does not satisfy the Condition on
Quantifier Binding. This situation is not alleviated if we assume (A7)
or (A8) as the structure of PP-complements. In each of these, since NP.
is maximal vis-a-vis NPk , QR will only be applicable in these structures
under an analysis in which NP. is affected by the structural change of
the rule.
Thus, the same problem arises under Bresnan's Relativized A-over-
A Principle, as does under the A/A Condition: It incorrectly predicts
that PP-complement constructions, containing an embedded quantifier, should
be ill-formed. The significance of the failure of the Relativized A-over-A
Principle to account for the functioning of QR in PP-complement con-
structions is that, even if QR is stated in a more expressive formalism,
it is still not possible to correctly constrain its functioning in this
construction. Thus, enriching the expressive power of transformational
grammar, in this case, does not lead to a theory which is empirically
more adequate. Like the A/A Condition, then, the Relativized
A-over-A Principle is not extendable to rules mapping from Surface
Structure to Logical Form, which is in marked contrast to the generality
of the Condition on Analyzability.
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FOOTNOTES
Chapter Two
1 There are a number of arguments which can be made for and against
these structures. For example, Jackendoff (1971) argues in favor of
the N-structure (2.11)onthe basis of sentences like (i):
(i) I've seen one review of a book by three
authors, but I wouldn't want to see
another
((i) is from Akmajian (1974), who invokes Jackendoff's argument.)
Jackendoff holds that (i) is derived via deletion of 'a review of a
book by three authors' from the 'but' clause. On the assumption
that deletion rules affect constituents, 'a review of a book by three
authors' must form a constituent, presumably an N. On the other
hand, examples such as those in (ii) indicate the independent need
for the structure in (2.10),
(ii)a Walter Cronkite in New York reported on
another cease-fire in Beirut
b Jimmy Carter from Georgia was elected President
c Sy Hersh of the New York Times broke the CIA story
a position which receives further support from an argument presented
in Emonds (1976). He argues (pp. 170-1) that only an NP-PP structure
like (2.10) can account for the existence of sentences like (iii),
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since it allows; in contrast to an N structure, NP conjunction. The
(iii) The weather and the mode of dress in
most areas are compatible
structure of (iii) under this analysis is (iv):
(iv) [S[NP[NP[NPthe weather] and [Npthe mode of dress]]
[ppin most areas]][vpare compatible]]
The existence of (iii), though, should not be thought to preclude the
possibility of N conjunction, in addition to NP conjunction. The existence
of the former structure is illustrated by examples like (v):
(v) The rainy weather in the spring and sunny
weather in the summer leads to a bountiful
harvest
The indeterminancy of these arguments may simply indicate that
neither (2.10), (2.11) nor (2.12) is the structure of PP-complement con-
structions, i.e., all of them may be possible noun phrase structures in
English. For example, Sag (1976) has argued for just this, on the basis
of pied-pipping pheonomena in relative clauses. These differing structures
may also be correlated with differences in the semantic interpretation of
PP-complements. Thus, Joan Bresnan (personal communication) has suggested
that restrictive prepositional phrase modifiers occur in structure (2.10),
while complement prepositional phrase modifiers occur in the N-structure
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(2.11). As support for this claim, consider the examples in (vi):
(vi)a Every student in a class that he feels secure
in will contribute
b Every student of a subject that he enjoys
will contribute
In (vi)a the pronoun 'he' can be construed as a variable bound by the
quantifier 'every', but in (vi)b, this reading is not available. This
follows, presumably, from the fact that 'every student' forms a noun
phrase in (vi)a, (which is assigned structure (2.10)), which may serve
as the antecedent to 'he', but not in (vi)b, where 'every' and 'student'
do not form a constituent. However, this congrugence of syntactic form and
semantic interpretation apparently does not hold in all cases.
For example, the sentences in (vii) are parallel to (vi)b, and
(vii)a Every owner of a car which he has driven
for more than five years should sell it
b Every holder of a visa which he obtained
overseas may enter the country
presumably have an N-structure. But they both allow a bound
interpretation. Thus, it may be the case that the range of anaphoric
possibilities in sentences like (vi) and (vii) is dependent upon
more subtle considerations than simple differences in their putative
surface structures.
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2 Just as (2.11) above is not the only possible structure of PP-
complements in subject position, so (2.23) is not the only possible
structure for these constructions in object position. Thus, besides
(2.23), we have (i) and (ii) as possible verb phrases:
(i) [vp[vP " 'l[Np[Np...NP " PP]ll
(ii) [VPI[V " ] [NP.[Q " ""]N"""PP'' ] ]
In what follows, we will utilize an N-structure for illustrative
purposes, bearing in mind that the same logical form is generable
from either of the alternatives, as illustrated for PP-complements
in subject position in section 2.2.
3 (2.33) should not be confused with (i), which is the passive of (ii).
(i) John was met by everybody, in some Italian city
Notice that neither (i) nor (ii) has the interpretation represented
(ii) Everybody met John, in some Italian city
by (2.34). This is because it is not possible to generate a linked
logical form from the surface structure of either (i) or (ii), since
in neither case do the two quantifier phrases form a single nominal
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constituent. The only logical forms which are generable from their
surface structures are non-linked.
4 There are examples of sentences containing NP-PP sequences, containing
'for', which passivize:
(i) A cake for Mary was baked by Jack
Notice crucially, though, that (i) does not have a dative interpreta-
tion. Thus, compare (i) to (ii), whose surface structure may be
either (iii) or (iv):
(ii) Jack baked a cake for Mary
(iii) [SJack baked [Npa cake][ppfor Mary]]
(iv) [SJack baked [NPa cake [ppfor Mary]]]
(ii) is ambiguous between a dative reading, which corresponds to (iii),
and a non-dative reading, corresponding to (iv). On the dative
reading, (ii) essentially means Jack wanted to give Mary a present,
so he baked her a cake, while on the non-dative reading, it means that
Jack baked a cake intended for Mary, (e.g., Harry wanted to give
Mary a gift, so he asked Jack to bake him a cake; Jack himself may
have had no idea whom the cake was actually for). (i) has only the
latter reading, as we would expect, since it is derived from (iv).
On the dative interpretation of (ii), represented by (iii), 'a cake'
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and 'for Mary' do not form a noun phrase constituent. It therefore
has no passive comunterpart with the form of (i).
5 While the structure of (2.46) only yields an ambiguity, sentence (i)
(i) John recorded one song on every album
has a third ambiguity associated with it, in which it asserts that
for each album, there is one song on it which was recorded by John.
The remainder of the songs on each of the albums may have been
recorded by other artists. This reading is represented by the linked
logical form in (ii), which is generated from the surface structure
in (iii), in which the post-verbal noun phrase and prepositional
(ii) [S[every album]I [S[one song on B]a [SJohn recorded
(iii) [SJohn recorded [NP[NPone song][ppon every album]]]
phrase form a PP-complement construction. From the structure in (iii),
another instance of wh-movement can be generated:
(iv) *Which song on every album did John record?
(iv) is to be compared with (v), in which the quantified noun phrase
has been replaced by a referring expression. The paradigm illustrated
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by (iv) and (v) parallels that illustrated by (2.43) and (2.44), an
explanation for which is provided immediately below.
(v) Which song on the top ten did John record?
6 Note that the scope properties of these sentences are the same if we
substitute either 'all' or 'each' for 'every'. Thus, the sentence
in (i) displays the same ambiguity as (2.46), while the sentences
(i)a John recorded one song on each of the albums
b John recorded one song on all of the albums
in (ii) display the same lack of ambiguity of (2.49)a.
(ii)a Which song did John record on each of the albums?
b Which song did John record on all of the albums?
7 Notice that this
adjunction to S,
then the logical
respectively:
is an empirical argument for taking QR to be an
rather than S' If it were an adjunction to S,
forms of (2.49)a and (2.49)b would be (i) and (ii),
(i) [ [every album]a [[ COMPwhich song]t [sdid John
record t on a]]]
(ii) [§[one song]. [S[CoMPwhich album]t [did John
record a on t]]]
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Given these logical forms, it follows that (2.49)a should be the
question corresponding to (2.48), while (2.49)b is the question
corresponding to (2.47). But this is contrary to fact: (2.49)a is
the question corresponding to (2.47), while (2.49)b corresponds to
(2.48). Thus, assuming that QR is an adjunction to S cannot explain
the semantic relationship between the wh-question in (2.49), and (2.46)
from which they are derived. The explanation of this relationship
follows directly, though, from QR being an adjunction to S.
8 This property of wh-quantifiers, that they take maximally wide scope,
is not limited to their occurrence in single clause sentences; they
also take maximally wide scope in matrix complement constructions,
for example. Thus, notice that in (i), the wh-quantifier takes wider
scope than 'every', (since this question is an inquiry into the identity
(i) Who did everyone say that Bill saw?
of a specific person, of whom everyone said that Bill saw him). In a
comparable sentence, in which a quantifier appears in the underlying
position of the wh-word in (i), 'every' is construed as taking wider
scope:
(ii) Everyone said that Bill saw someone
In (ii), 'some' is normally construed as taking narrower scope than
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'every', since the sentence is true even if there is no person in particular,
of whom everyone said that Bill saw him. The scope relations in (i)
follow from the fact that 'who', which is in COMP position, c-commands
'everyone', which in logical form is adjoined to the matrix S. In
the logical form associated with (ii), as is shown in Chapter Three
below, 'some' is adjoined to the complement S, while the quantifier
'every' is still adjoined to the matrix S. Since 'every' c-commands
'some' in the logical form of this sentence, the former has wide
scope over the latter. The difference in the scope properties of the
sentences in (i) and (ii), therefore, follows from the notion of
'scope' being defined in terms of c-command at the level of Logical
Form.
9 It has been pointed out to me (by J. Bresnan) that there exist cases
like (i), whose structure is identical to the surface structure of
(i) [S[COMPhOw many representatives from each city]t
[St will vote for the amendment]]
sentences like (2.51)b - (2.54)b, viz., (2.55). (i), though, is
seemingly well-formed, as compared to (2.51)b - (2.55)b. Notice, however,
that the interpretation of (i) is somewhat different from that of the
latter sentences. In (2.51)b - (2.54)b, the intended interpretation
is one in which the wh is construed as having scope wider than the
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normal quantifier in the sentence. What we have seen though
is that it is not possible to generate a well-formed logical
form with these scope relations. On the natural interpretation of
(i), on the other hand, the wh-quantifier 'how' is construed
as having scope narrower than the normal quantifier, 'each'. Thus,
(i) may be logically paraphrased as 'For each city, how many
representatives from it will vote for the amendment'. It is possible
to generate a logical form which displays these scope relations if we
take literally the idea that interrogative wh-words are quantifiers. As such,
they may be affected by QR. Under this assumption, QR may apply in
(i) to the phrase 'how many representatives from each city', and ad-
join it to the S node. This generates (ii):
(ii) [§[COMpt]t [.[how many representatives from each
1
city]t [S.t will vote for the amendment]]]
In (ii), QR may affect the quantified phrase 'each city', and
adjoin it to Si , which is the S node which arises from the adjunction
of the wh-phrase. This gives (iii):
(iii) [S[COMPt]t [S[each city]a [.[how many representatives
1
from a]t [S.t will vote for the amendment]]]]
Notice that (iii) is a well-formed logical form, satisfying the
Condition on Proper Binding. This is because all of the variables
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which occur in argument positions are c-commanded, and hence properly
bound, by the phrases which bind them. (The variable 't', occuring
in the COMP position, does not constitute a violation of this
condition, since COMP is not an argument position.) Interestingly,
the structure generated under the assumption that QR may apply to
wh-phrases is an inversely linked logical form, structurally identical
to the logical forms associated with non-wh PP-complement constructions.
And, parallel to those structures, it is the quantifier which is
embedded as the object of the preposition in surface structure which
has wider scope in logical form.
Notice, that even under this extended assumption, it is still
not possible to generate a logical form in which the wh-quantifier
has wider scope. Thus, in (ii), if QR were to adjoin the phrase
'each city' to Sj rather than Si., the resulting structure, (iv), would
still violate the Condition on Proper Binding, since it contains an
(iv) *[ý[COMpt]t [S.[how many representatives from a]t
[s[each city]I [s.t will vote for the
amendment]]]]
unbound variable 'a', which is in an argument position.
The assumption that QR affects wh-phrases may also explain the
apparent ambiguity of the examples in (v):
(v)a [S-[COMPwhat]t [Sdid each senator say t]]
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(v)b [ SCOMPwhere]t [sdid everyone go t]]
If we allow QR to apply to wh-phrases, then it is possible to
generate from the surface structures in (v) two distinct logical forms.
To see this, consider (v)a. QR may apply in this structure to 'each
senator', adjoining it to S, deriving (vi):
(vi) [S[COMptlt [S[each senator]a [[what]t Sdid a
say t]]]]
Alternatively, a logical form could be derived by QR affecting both
the phrase 'each senator', and the wh-phlrase. QR applying to
both of these phrases generates (vii):
(vii) [SICOMPt] t [S[each senator] [S[what]t [Sdid a
say t]]]]
Both (vi) and (vii) are well-formed representations at the level
of Logical Form (note, once again, in regard to (vii), that COMP is
not an argument position). (vi) represents the reading in which the
wh-phrase has wider scope; an appropriate reply to (v)a under this
reading would be "That he would vote for the Canal treaty". (vii),
on the other hand, represents a reading in which the wih-phrase has
narrower scope. An appropriate reply here would be "Proxmire said
that he would vote for the treaty, Goldwater said he wouldn't..."
What these observations indicate is that in some (but not all)
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wh-constructions, it is possible to construe the wh-word has having
narrower scope than another (normal) quantifier in the sentence.
While the markedness conditions which govern the existence of this
reading are not clear, and remain a point for further inquiry, it is
possible on the assumption that wh is literally a quantifier, to
generate structures which represent this narrow scope reading of
wh. Notice that the significance of this result is that it shows that
in order to generate the appropriate range of logical forms for wh-
constructions, QR must apply to wh-phrases which are contained in
COMP. Since surface structure is the level at which wh-constructions
have this property, this analysis of wh-constructions is an argument
that rules mapping onto logical form apply to surface structures,
and not to some other level of linguistic representation.
10 This explanation of the unacceptability of the (b) examples in (2.51) -
(2.54) may also shed some light on the unacceptability of the sentences
in (i), as opposed to those in (ii):
(i)a *As for every girl, John likes her
b *As for a girl, John likes her
c *As for somebody, John likes her
(ii)a As for that girl, John likes her
b As for Zelda, John likes her
c As for her, John likes Mary better
An explanation for this difference between (i) and (ii) follows if we
assume that topic phrases like those in (i) and (ii) are constituents
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of a pre-sentential TOPIC node, which is introduced by the phrase
structure rule S + TOPIC - S. (This is essentially the position
suggested in Van Riemsdijk and Zwarts (1974), Chomsky (1977a) and
Koster (1977a)). The surface structure of these sentences is then as
in (iii):
(iii)
TOPIC
COMP S
As for every girl John likes her
In (iii), QR would apply to the noun phrase 'every girl', which is
a constituent of TOPIC, adjoining it to S, generating the logical
form (iv):
(iv) [ [TOPICaS for a][-[COMe][S[every girl] [S John
likes her]]]]
(iv), though, is ill-formed, since the variable 'a' is not properly
bound by the quantifier 'every'. The sentences in (i), therefore,
are ill-formed, in comparison to those in (ii), because it is not
possible to associate them with logical forms which satisfy the
Condition on Proper Binding.
11 This is with normal intonation, i.e., primary stress on the
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initial noun phrase, as in (i):
(i)a *Sofe people in which city did you meet?
b *Sole people in which city voted for Debs?
Notice that if (i)b is contrastively stressed, as in (ii)b, it
becomes acceptable, while (ii)a with the same stress pattern is
(ii)a *Sooe people in whfch city did you meet
b Some people in which city voted for Debs
still unacceptable. In the structure from which (i)a is derived, though,
the more deeply embedded noun phrase may be contrastively stressed:
(iii)a You met some people in which city
b *You met some people in which city
What these examples show is that sentences like (i)a and (i)b are
acceptable, with contrastive stress, if they have not undergone wh-
movement.
12 There is another sentence, (i), which is derived from the structure,
(i) *[§-[COMPwhich city]t [Sdid [NPsome men in t]
vote for Debs]]
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(ii), underlying (2.59)b.
(ii)
COMP S
VP
voted for Debs
(ii) is derived by wh-movement applying to NP.. But, as has been
pointed out by Chomsky (1977), this movement results in a violation of
the Subjacency Condition, because there are two bounding nodes, NP.1
and S, intervening between NP. and COMP. For more discussion of the
question of bounding nodes, see Chapter Three.
13 In defending the position that wh-movement is an adjunction to S,
one could seek to rule out (2.62) as ill-formed on the basis of a
special stipulation to the effect that a logical form containing a
wh-quantifier is well-formed only if that quantifier has maximally
wide scope. This stipulation would account for the facts at hand:
It would rule out (2.62) as ill-formed, since in that structure the
wider scope quantifier is 'some', not wh. Making this ad hoc
stipulation, though, would be an essentially regressive step, since
under the assumption that wh-phrases are moved into COMP, the fact
I
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that wh-quantifiers have maximally wide scope follows as a consequence
of the theory. Thus, under the assumption that wh-movement is an
adjunction to S, it is necessary to stipulate what is otherwise
explained by the theory.
14 Assuming this rule does not eliminate the possibility that wh-
movement is an adjunction. For example, Bresnan (1976a) suggests that
wh-phrases are adjoined to S, as in i):
(i) S
wh... S
(COMP)
It is clear that identical empirical results follow from assuming this
structure as from assuming that wh-phrases are moved into COMP, vis-a-vis
sentences in which quantified noun phrases are embedded in the wh-
phrase, (i.e., (2.51)b - (2.54)b and (2.59)). Thus, if (i), for
independent reasons, turned out to be a possible surface structure
for wh-construction, then our argument is weakened, from showing that
wh-phrases are moved into COMP, to showing that they cannot be
adjoined to S.
15 I have assumed in (2.65) that the prepositional phrase 'in which city'
is a constituent of VP. It may be the case that this PP is actually
adjoined to S. Regardless of which structure may be correct, the
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argument presented in the text follows. This is because in neither
structure does the noun phrase 'some men' and the prepositional
phrase 'in every city' form a PP-complement. For a discussion of the
constituency of sentence-final prepositional phrases, see Williams
(1974) and Reinhart (1976).
16 In the generation of (2.63)a and (2.64)a, we are assuming,along lines
originally suggested in Ross (1967), that there is a general con-
vention which (optionally) allows a PP dominating a wh-phrase to be
moved into COMP. This convention is quite general, and not limited
to cases where the PP immediately dominates the wh-phrase, as in
(2.63)a and (2.64)a, which is shown by examples like (i):
(i) After he heard which pianist did John buy
a Bosendorfer?
For recent discussion of the issue of pied-piping, see Woisetschlaeger
(1976), Sag (1976) and Bresnan (1976a).
Notice that it could be argued that (2.63)a,rather than being
generated from (2.65), is actually derived by extraction of the
embedded PP in (i):
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(i)
This argument, though, runs into serious difficulty upon consideration
of the interpretation of (2.63)a. Note that the interpretation of
this sentence is parallel to that of (ii), where the quantified
(ii) In which city did John and Harry vote for Debs
noun phrase has been replaced by proper names. (ii) must be derived
from a structure like (2.65), since as (iii) shows, proper names may
not serve as heads to quantified complement prepositional phrases.
(iii) *John and Harry in some city voted for Debs
This fact bears on the significance of the perceptually based
constraints suggested in Kuno (1973). According to this theory, the
unacceptability of example (i) in fn. 12, repeated here as (iv), is
a function of "The Incomplete Subject Constraint", given in (v), which
is a sub-case of the more general "Clause Non-final Incomplete
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(iv) *Which city did some men in vote for Debs
(v) The Incomplete Subject Constraint
It is not possible to move any element
of a subject noun phrase/clause if what
is left over constitutes an incomplete
noun phrase/clause
(p. 380)
Constituent Constraint", given in (vi):
(vi) The Clause Nonfinal Incomplete Constituent Constraint
It is not possible to move any element
of a phrase/clause A in the clause non-
final position out of A if what is left
over in A constitutes an incomplete
phrase/clause.
Under this analysis, it is predicted that (iv) is ill-formed, because
the phrase which remains after wh-movement is an incomplete prepositional
phrase; this prediction the Clause Nonfinal Incomplete Constituent Constraint
shares with the Subjacency Condition, (cf. fn. 12). Unlike the
Subjacency Condition, though, it allows the extraction of the entire
embedded PP in (i), 'in which city', since the resulting sentence,
(2.63)a, (repeated here as (vii)), does not contain an incomplete
(vii) In which city did some men vote for Debs
constituent. But, in (vii), the PP 'in which city' is not construed
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as underlyingly a constituent of the subject NP, an interpretation
which, according to Kuno's constraints, should be possible. Rather,
as we have just seen, this PP is interpreted as underlyingly clause-
final; i.e., (vii) is generated from (2.65), not (i). Kuno's con-
ditions, therefore, incorrectly predict that (vii) can be gene-
rated from (i). His analysis thus seems incapable of
accounting the possibilities of wh-movement from PP--complement con-
structions.
17 Examples of this type were first pointed out to me by J. Bresnan.
18 While in Chapter Four we will endeavor to sketch an account of the
marked (relative) interpretation of PP-complement constructions, it
should be noted here that the existence of this reading cannot be
accounted for by some modification of the theory of sentence
grammar, given our other assumptions. For example, one could hold
that a logical form, in which the embedded quantifier has narrower
scope than the head quantifier, could be generated by abandoning the
immediate domination clause in The Condition on Analyzability. This
would presumably allow the generation of (i) from (ii), by QR
affecting NP. and NPk•
(i) [s[every senator]a [S[a key cong. comm.]
[Sa on S voted for the amendment]]]
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(ii) S
NP. VP1
NP. pp
Q N P NP
k
Q A N
every senator on a key cong. comm. voted
the
amendment
While (i) is presumably a well-formed logical form, (it satisfies the
Condition on Proper Binding), it is not a logical form of sentence
(iii) :
(iii) Every senator on a key congressional committee voted
for the amendment
The reason for this concerns the properties of a quantifier 'a' in
this sentence, under the marked interpretation, where it has the
force of a universal (rather than existential) quantifier; in a
sense, it is interpreted like 'any'. This is a common feature
of relative clauses, (compare (iii) to (iv)), a fact which follows
(iv) Every senator who is on a key congressional
committee voted for the amendment
from 'a' in (iv) only having scope with respect to the embedded
relative clause. Thus, the converted logical
for
156
form for (iv) is something like (v):
(v) [SVa[S[Sl is a senator] & [S3B[S[S B is a key con-
gressional committee] 4 [Sa is on 8]]] ÷
[Sa voted for the amendement]]]
In (v), since the scope of the existential quantifier is only the
antecedent of the conditional, it is equivalent to (vi), where the
quantifiers are in prenex form:
(vi) [SVa[SB[S[Sl  is a senator] & [S[S B is a key con-
gressional committee] & [Sa is on 6]]] +
[S" voted for the amendment]]]
In Chapter Four, it will be argued that the logical form representing
the marked interpretation of (iii) is essentially identical to (v),
accounting for why 'a' has the force of a universal quantifier in this
case, caeteris paribus. This is in contrast to the sort of converted
logical form associated with (i), which is (vii):
(vii) [SVa[S[Sa is a senator] - [S3I[S[SB is a key
congressional committee] & [Sa on S voted
for the amendment]]]]]
(vii), though, is not equivalent to (viii), in which the quantifiers
are prenex, since the scope of existential quantifier in (vii) is not
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limited to the antecedent of the conditional; indeed, its scope is
the consequent. Therefore, the quantifier 'a' in (i) cannot have the
(viii) [SVC,[sV[S[Sa is a senator]- [S[S a is a key cong.
comm.] & [S on 6 voted for the amendment]]]
force of a universal quantifier, only that of an existential quantifier.
But, then, (i) cannot be the logical form of the "marked" inter-
pretation of (iii), since under that reading, the quantifier 'a' has
the force of a universal quantifier. Thnus, it is not enough to
simply be able to derivea logical form for (iii) in which the
embedded quantifier has narrower scope than the head quantifier, by
rejecting the Condition on Analyzability. Indeed, it is this
independent principle of grammar which explains why sentences like
(iii) never have the interpretation represented by (i). To reject
it would lead to a loss in both the descriptive and explanatory
adequacy of the theory. (This argument was brought to my attention
by S. Bromberger.)
It might be assumed that, while the marked case in PP-complement
constructions cannot be directly generated by modification of the
grammatical principles, perhaps it could be directly generated by
modification of some aspect of surface structure. For example, it
could be held that (iii) is ambiguous at Surface Structulre, being
associated not only with a structure such as (ii), but also with a
"reduced relative" structure, along the lines in (viii):
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(viii) S
NP VP
NP
every senator on a key cong. comm. voted for the
amendment
This structure, (which may be derived by deleteion of wh+be from the
structure underlying (iv)) would account for why in sentences like
(i) the marked interpretation is a relative interpretation; it is
because, when they have this structure, they are, in fact, relative
clauses.
This account of the ambiguity of sentences like (i), though,
cannot be correct, since there are sentences like those in (ix),
which are ambiguous, but which cannot be reduced relatives, viz., the
(ix)a Some benefactor of every worthy clause is a
happy man
b Every patient with every non-contagious
disease will be released from care
ill-formedness of the examples in (x), as compared to (iv):
(x)a *Some benefactor who is of every worthy cause
is a happy man
- I - -
I
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b *Every patient who is with every non-contagious
disease will be released from care
Thus, a theory which holds that the existence of the relative inter-
pretation is a function of a surface structure ambiguity cannot be
correct, since it would incorrectly predict that sentences like (ix)
are unambiguous.
It is apparent, therefore, that the marked interpretation is
not describable by making some adjustment either in the theory of
sentence grammar, or in the nature of the surface structures associated
with these sentences. Rather, it is necessary to look outside the
domain of sentence grammar to account for this interpretation of PP-
complement constructions, a task to which we will turn our attention
in Chapter Four.
19 Notice that this is a counter-argument to a suggestion in Chomsky
(1955) [p. 281 - (1975) edition], that possessive noun phrases are
constituents of the pre-nominal adjective phrase. This is because,
if this were the case, then we would expect that the interpretation
of possessives should be parallel to the interpretation of structures
like (2.85), containing real adjectives. But, as we have just seen,
there are significant differences in the interpretation of (2.84), as
compared to (2.85), which are not directly explicable if the possessive
phrase appeared in the pre-nominal adjective position.
20 In what follows, we will assume that the possessive morpheme is not
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present in surface structure, but that it is inserted by a rule
mapping from SS to PI, the level of phonological interpretation.
Thus, the surface structure (2.89) is more correctly represented as (i):
(i)
[+'
Q
every scholar i, - I I qq- *.t-IDOoK is selling well tnis year
Since the genitive case is, in surface structure, a feature of the
determiner, extraction of NP. by QR does not affect the possessive
marker. Thus, the logical form generated from (i), by QR affecting
NP., is (ii):3
(ii)
[every scholarj]
year
21 Just as the Condition on Analyzability permits the extraction of
L_
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wh-phrases from PP-complements, (cf. fn. 12), it also permits wh-
movement to affect a possessive NP, since it is not immediately
dominated by another [+N]-phrase in (2.89). This would have the effect
of deriving (i):
(i) *[S[COMPwhich author's]t [Sdid John like [Npt book]]]
But, just as in the case of the PP-complements discussed above, (i)
is ill-formed for other reasons: it violates the Subjacency Condition.
This is because there are two bounding nodes, S and NP, intervening
between the wh-phrase in COMP and the trace which it binds. For
further discussion of the issue of bounding nodes, see Chapter Three.
22 Notice, that in comparison to the derived nominals, a parallel
ambiguity exists in gerundive nominals like (i):
(i) Some company's refusing every merger offer
began a panic on the floor of the exchange
This indicates that the structure of gerundive nominals is parallel,
in the relevant respects, to that of derived nominals; in particular,
that their "subjects" are generated as constituents of DET. (This
has been suggested recently by Schacter (1976)).
23 The condition in (2.105) is a sub-case of a more general semantically
based condition governing the range of expressions which may occur
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embedded as the complement of a partitive quantifier. Thus, the
expressions which may occur in this position must, in some sense,
be "non-individual". That is, not only are individual variables and
proper names excluded, but so are singular noun phrases; compare the
examples in (i) to those in (2.95):
(i)a *Each of John's friend
b *Some of his flower
c *All of these proof
d *Many of the objection
Notice that it is not possible to account for the range of noun
phrases which may occur in the embedded position in partitives on
the basis of a distinction between singular and plural (and mass)
noun phrases. This is because, as the examples in (2.96) show, plural
(or mass) quantified noun phrases are barred from the embedded
position. Therefore, the condition governing the range of possible
partitive constructions must be stated at a level of linguistic
representation, which we hold to be Logical Form, at which an
appropriate notion of "non-individual" expression can be defined.
24 A number of possible surface structures for partitive constructions
have been suggested in the literature. One possibility is that in
(i), in which 'of' is Chomsky-adjcined to NP.. (A variant of this
structure, in which a rule of 'Of'-Insertion Chomsky-adjoins 'of' to
the head Q, has been suggested in Akmajian and Lehrer (1976).) An
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(i) NP.
Q NP
•"ýNP.
DET NI I
each of those musicians
alternative is suggested in Selkirk (1977), who argues for a theory
of noun phrase structure with greater hierarchial complexity than
tha.t presupposed by (i). The structure which she proposes for
partitives is essentially (ii):
(ii) NP.
Q N
NP.
DET NI I
each (of) those musicians
Another possibility is suggested in Jackendoff (1976), who holds, in
contrast to (i) and (ii), that the 'of' phrase is a surface
prepositional phrase:
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(iii) NP.1
Q PP
P NP.
DET N
each of those musicians
(This structure seems the syntactically most suspect, since it should
allow the extraposition of the prepositional phrase. The result of
this operation, though, is ill-formed:
(iv) *Each appeared on stage of those musicians
(iv) is not generable from either (i) or (ii), since neither of
these structures contains a constituent prepositional phrase.)
The characteristic which all of these structures share is that
they contain a noun phrase embedded as a complement to a quantifier
(and not to a noun, as in PP-complements). Since the argument in
the text rests solely on this minimal property of partitive structure,
it will hold regardless of which structure one assumes.
25 The arguments presented here support the position, held, for example,
by Selkirk (1977) and Akmajian and Lehrer (1976), that noun phrases
containing initial measure phrases are partitives:
(i) A number of the articles were censored
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This is because, under this assumption, it follows that sentences
such as (ii) should be unacceptable:
(ii) *A number of all articles were censored
The deviance of (ii) follows directly, if we assume that measure
phrases are quantifiers, and are, therefore, structurally identical
to partitives containing simple quantifier heads. The surface
structure of (i), therefore, is essentially (iii):
(iii) [S[NP[Q[NPa number]] of [Npthe articles]]
were censored]
Given that (iii) represents the structure of noun phrases like that
in (i), the ill-formedness of (ii) is simply a reflection of a general
property of partitives, that they may not contain an embedded quanti-
fied phrase. (For a somewhat different account of the structure of
measure phrases, which otherwise leads to the same result, see
Selkirk (1977).)
26 When a wh-word is embedded in a partitive phrase, it is not possible
to form a wh-question; neither (i) nor (ii) are well-formed:
(i) *[-[COMPwhom]t [Sdid John see [Npmany of t]]]
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(ii) *[S[CoMpOf whom]t [did John see [Npmany t]]]
These structures are ill-formed because they violate the Subjacency
Condition; in each case there are two bounding notes, NP and S,
intervening between the wh-phrase in COMP and the trace which it
binds.
27 Notice that if a formulation of the A/A Condition accounted for all
of these phenomena, it would be more general than the Condition on
Analyzability, which, at best, can only account for the latter two.
In the case of extraction of an embedded noun phrase from a PP-
complement construction, a PP immediately dominates the NP affected
by the rule. Thus, in principle, this NP should be extractable,
deriving the ill-formed (i):
(i) *Which city did some men in vote for Debs
But, as was pointed out in fn. 12, (i) is ruled out independently
by the Subjacency Condition. Thus, the Condition on Analyzability,
in conjunction with the (independently necessary) Subjacency
Condition accounts for the same range of syntactic phenomena as the
A/A Condition.
28 In fn. 12, it was noted that it is not possible to extract NPk from
structures like (A5), (A7) or (A8) by wh-movement, because of the
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Subjacency Condition. To generate (A9), though, QR must apply to
this noun phrase. In Chapter Three, it will be argued that the
bounding nodes for rules mapping from Deep to Surface Structure
are NP and S, while for those mapping from Surface Structure to
Logical Form, the only bounding node is S. Since in these structures
there is only a single bounding node, i.e., S, intervening between
NPk and the position to which it is moved, extraction of this NP by
QR is legitimate, as far as the Subjacency Condition is concerned.
For more discussion of the matter of the appropriate bounding nodes,
see Chomsky (1973), (1977) and Chapter Three, below.
29 Note crucially that under the Relativized A-over-A Principle,
maximality may only be judged with respect to external context
elements, and not with respect to internal context elements. Thus
in QR, as formulated in (All), the term 'Q2-2' cannot be a context
predicate, since the term indices of this predicate are included
within the term indices of the target predicate of the rule, which
is 'NP 4 "2-3
168
Chapter Three: QUANTIFIERS IN COMPLEX SENTENTIAL CONSTRUCTIONS
Up to this point, we have been considering the properties of
sentences consisting of a single clause, and we have seen that the nature
of the logical forms characteristically associated with such sentences,
containing both simple and complex quantified noun phrases, can be
explained on the basis of the principles of core grammar, in particular,
the Condition on Proper Binding and the Condition on Quantifier Binding.
In this chapter we wish to extend the explanation of the properties of
natural language quantification afforded by this theory beyond sentences
of a single clause to multi-clausal constructions, and examine the range of
possible logical forms associated with matrix-complement constructions,
(e.g., 'that' and 'for' complements, indirect questions, etc.), relative
clauses and subjectless complement constructions (e.g., rais'ng, equi and
control constructions). What we shall see is that this explanation
follows, in part, from the Subjacency Condition, construed, along with the
Predication Condition and the Condition on Quantifier Binding, as a condi-
tion on well-formed logical forms.
3.1 The Subjacency Condition. The Subjacency Condition was first formu-
lated in Chomsky (1973), as a generalization of the account of the "upward-
boundedness" of rightward movement rules presented in Ross (1967). It has
subsequently been defended in Chomsky (1975a), (1976), (1977a), Akmajian
(1975), Koster (1977b) and Van Reimsdijk (1977). Given our assumption that
transformations apply freely, (in accordance with the trace theory of
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movement rules), we will formulate the Subjacency Condition as a condition
on well-formedness at the level of Logical Form. In order to do so,
though, we need to define a preliminary notion, (where 'tm ' and 'tn,
represent distinct occurrences of the trace t):
A phrase Xt immediately binds a trace t m iff Xtt 
m nbinds t, and there is no t , such that X
c-commands tn and tn c-commands t m
Employing this concept, we define the Subjacency Condition as follows:
Subjacency Condition
A logical form with the structure
" xt.- · [•.S. 1" t]I .- ] ..jo]j eXt..-
(a,B bounding nodes), is ill-formed,
where Xt immediately binds t.
(We assume that one or the other occurrence of 'X t ' in this condition is
non-null, and that Xt is either lexically filled or is itself a trace,
i.e., lexically empty.) Thus, according to the Subjacency Condition, a
structure at the level of Logical Form is well-formed only if every trace
in that structure is subjacent to, and immediately bound by, a phrase
which binds it. In this respect, we may think of the Subjacency Condition
as applying pair-wise to co-indexed phrases (i.e., to a trace and its
antecedent) in a structure.
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Like the Condition on Proper Binding, the Subjacency Condition is
a general condition on the output of the rules of core grammar. Hence,
not only must the trace of a wh-phrase be subjacent to (and immediately
c-commanded by) the wh-phrase which binds it, but so must the trace
of a quantified noun phrase which has been affected by QR. The Sub-
jacency Condition, though, differs from the Condition on Proper Binding
in two significant respects. First, the former is less general than the
latter. Where the Condition on Proper Binding is a condition on all
elements which may ultimately be realized as bound variables (traces,
pronouns, PRO, etc.), the Subjacency Condition is a well-formedness condi-
tion solely pertaining to traces. Second, the Subjacency Condition picks
out, as ill-formed, a subset of these logical forms which otherwise
satisfy the Condition on Proper Binding. That is, of those logical forms
which satisfy the latter condition, only those in which traces are sub-
jacent to the elements which immediately bind them are well-formed. In
this sense, we may think of the Subjacency Condition as
determining the subset of those structures at Logical Form, which otherwise
satisfy the Conditions on Proper Binding and Quantifier Binding, which rep-
resent the unmarked cases of quantification. Given our theory of
markedness, then, we would expect the Subjacency Condition to correlate to
a significant empirical distinction, between the properties of quantifica-
tion which hold universally of the constructions under consideration
(i.e., those properties characterized by logical forms which are directly
generated by core grammar), and those properties which arise under idio-
syncratic conditions (i.e., those which are characterized by logical forms
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which are not directly generable by core grammar.) It is to this distinc-
tion, and the explanation for it provided by the Subjacency Condition,
that we now turn our attention.
3.2 Matrix-Complement Constructions. To begin, consider the sentences in
(3.1), all of which contain quantified noun phrases embedded in S-comple-
ments:
(3.1)a Jones hissed that Smith liked every painting in
the Metropolitan
b John quoted Bill as saying that someone had
left
c His mother said loudly that everyone had
to go
d Susan didn't forget that many people had
refused to contribute
e Helen grieved that each of the monkeys had
been experimented upon
f It is instructive for someone to play the
piece first
g It's impossible for The Kid to fight a
contender
h It's false that all the men left the party
i John asked whether he had bought some shuttle-
cocks at Abercrombie's
j Carol wondered why everyone was reading
Gravity's Rainbow
k Mark regretted Sam's having invited so few
people
In all of these sentences the quantifier embedded in the complement clause is
construed as having scope narrower than the matrix predicate. For
example, take (3.1)a, containing the opaque predicate 'hiss'. It does not
follow from (3.1)a (and 'Rembrandt's portrait of Aristotle is in the
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Metropolitan') that Jones hissed that Smith liked Rembrandt's portrait of
Aristotle; indeed, (3.1)a would be true even if Jones did not know of any
particular painting that it was one of the paintings that Smith liked.
Parallel observations could be made about all of the other examples, which
also contain opaque predicates; in each of them the quantified phrases
embedded in the complement clause is understood as having scope narrower
than the matrix predicate.
What we wish to show in this section is that this fact follows from
(and is hence explained by) the theory we are proposing here- in particu-
lar, from the Subjacency Condition. This is because the only type of
logical form generable from the surface structures of matrix-complement
constructions like those in (3.1), which satisfy this condition, is where
the embedded quantifier is adjoined to the complement S node, and thus it
has scope narrower than the matrix predicate. To see this, consider the
derivation of the logical form associated with (3.1)a, from its surface
structure, which is (3.2):
(3.2) [S John hissed [ that [S Smith liked [Np[Qevery painting]]]]
Since we are assuming that QR applies without constraint, the quantified
noun phrase 'every painting', may be adjoined either to Si or to S . The
former operation derives the structure in (3.3); the latter the structure
in (3.4):
(3.3) [S[every painting]a [S.John hissed [Sthat [s.Smith liked t]]]]
1 j
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(3.4) [S.John hissed [;that [S[every painting]a [S Smith liked a]]]]
Notice, crucially, that while (3.3) and (3.4) satisfy the Condition on
Proper Binding (in each case the variable is c-commanded by the quantifier
which binds it), it is only the latter structure which satisfies the Sub-
jacency Condition. This is because in this structure there is only a
single bounding node, namely Sj, intervening between the variable 'a'
and the phrase 'every painting' which binds it. (3.3), on the other hand,
does not satisfy the Subjacency Condition, since there are two bounding
nodes, Si and Sj, intervening between 'a' and 'every painting'. (3.3)
therefore, is ill-formed, leaving (3.4), where the quantified phrase has
narrower scope than an (opaque) matrix predicate, as the only logical form
associated with sentence (3.1)a. Thus, it follows from the Subjacency
Condition that in sentences like thoae in (3.1), with full S-complements
in surface structure, an opaque interpretation is always available. 1
It should be noted that this explanation, on the basis of the Sub-
jacency Condition, holds, regardless of whether we assume that a structure
in which the embedded quantifier takes wider scope is derived by a single
operation of QR (as in (3.3)), or by "successive cyclic" applications.
This latter mode of application derives (3.5):
(3.5) [S[every painting]a [Si John hissed [Sthat [Sa [ Smith
liked .])]]]
(3.5) still violates the Subjacency Condition, since there are also two
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bounding nodes, Si and Sk (the latter being the result of adjoining the
quantified noun phrase to S. by the first application of QR), intervening
between 'every painting' and the variable 'ai' which it immediately binds.
Thus, the fact that quantifiers embedded in S-complements always have an
interpretation in which they are construed as having narrow scope, follows
independently of whether or not QR applies cyclically. 2
Thus, given the principles of sentence grammar, the only well-
formed logical form which may be generated from the surface structure of
sentences like (3.1) by QR is one in which the quantified noun phrase is
adjoined to the S of which it is an immediate constituent. Thus, quanti-
fication is clause-bounded, in the unmarked case. 3 Semantically, the
significance of this result is that the unmarked interpretation of S-
complement constructions is the opaque interpretation, since, because of
the Subjacency Condition, structures like (3.3) and (3.5)) are ill-
formed. In other words, it is only a logical form corresponding to
the opaque interpretation of matrix-complement constructions which is
directly generable by the grammar. (We return to a discussion of trans-
parency in this construction below.)
There are a number of interesting results which follow from quan-
tification being clause-bounded. For example, it is possible to explain
why it is that in sentences which are parallel to those of (3.1) except
that the subject noun phrase contains a quantifier, the matrix quantifier
is interpreted as taking wider scope than the complement quantifier. A
number of examples are listed in (3.6):
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(3.6)a Someone hissed that Smith liked every painting
in the museum
b No one forgot that many people had refused to
contribute
c Everyone asked whether he had bought some
shuttlecocks at Abercrombie's
The interpretation of (3.6)a, for example, is parallel to that of (3.1)a;
it can only be taken as asserting that there is a person such that he
hissed that Smith liked every painting. It cannot be taken as asserting
that for each painting in the museum, there is someone (or other) who
hissed that Smith liked that painting. The reason for this state of
affairs is that the only logical form which is generable from the surface
structure of this sentence which satisfies both the Condition on Proper
Binding and the Subjacency Condition, is (3.7):
(3.7) [S[someone]S [S.B hissed that [S[every painting in
1
the museum]a [I Smith liked ac]]]]
In order for 'every' to be construed as having wider scope than 'some',
it would be necessary to be able to associate the surface structure of
(3.6)awith a logical form in which 'every painting' is adjoined to the S
dominating 'some'. But this structure, illustrated in (3.8), is ill-
(3.8) *[S[every painting in the museum] [S[someone]
[g e hissed that [s Smith liked a]]]]
formed, since the variable '~a' is not subjacent to 'every painting in the
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museum'. Thus, an explanation of the fact that matrix-clause quantifiers
generally take wider scope than complement-clause quantifiers follows from
quantification being clause-bounded, which, in turn, follows from the
Subjacency Condition.
Not only is a quantifier in an S-complement construed as having
scope narrower than any quantifiers in the matrix clause, it is also
generally construed as having scope narrower than negation in the matrix.
Consider in this regard sentence (3.9):
(3.9) S. John didn't believe [Ithat [S. Npeveryone] had leftI]]
1 3
(3.9) is unambiguous; its only reading is one in which it is held that it
is not the case that John believes that everyone had left. This reading
is captured by the logical form (3.10):
(3.10) [S[not] [S.John believes that [Severyone]a [S.0 had left]]]]
1 i
(3.10) is derived (under the assumption that the negation in (3.9) is
sentential negation, which is represented in logical form by adjoining the
negative particle to S), by QR adjoining the quantified noun phrase
'everyone' to Sj, of which it is an immediate constituent. This is the
only logical form which is generable from (3.9) which satisfies the Sub-
jacency Condition; to adjoin 'everyone' elsewhere would result in a
structure violating this condition.
In this section, then, we have seen that the nature of the logical
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form which can be associated with full S-complements is explained by the
Subjacency Condition,4 which only permits, as well-formed, logical forms
in which quantifiers take scope over the clauses of which they are
immediate constituents (in surface structure). That is, quantification
is clause-bounded, in the unmarked case. Given this property of quanti-
fication in these constructions, it follows immediately that any quan-
tifiers in an embedded complement clause have scope narrower than any
logical operators (viz., quantifiers or negation), which appear in the
matrix clause.
3.3 The Marked Case. As we have seen, a logical form in which a quan-
tified phrase, embedded in a complement clause in surface structure, has
narrower scope than the matrix predicate, represents the unmarked case in
matrix-complement constructions. That is, its existence is determinable
(by the principles of core grammar), solely from the structure of these
constructions, independently of any idiosyncratic properties of particular
sentences. This logical form is always possible, occurring as a general
property of S-complements containing embedded quantifiers. There do exist
cases, though, which contrast with the unambiguity of sentences like those
of (3.1), and display an ambiguity. In addition to an opaque interpre-
tation, they also have a "transparent" interpretation: 5
(3.11)a John believed that someone was at the door
b Harry wanted us to invite too many people
to the party
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c John realized that a picture had been stolen
Consider, as an example, (3.11)a. On the unmarked reading, (3.11)a
asserts that John believed that there was someone (or other) at the door,
although he may not have believed this of any person in particular. On
the other, transparent, reading, it is being asserted of some person, that
John believed that he was at the door. A similar ambiguity arises in the
other cases in (3.11). The significant aspect of the transparent reading
in these cases is that its occurrence is highly idiosyncratic, in compar-
ison to the opaque (narrow scope) reading, which is always available in
sentences of this construction. Thus, it has been argued in Quine (1955)
that the transparent, or relational, reading of sentences like (3.11) is
available where what Quine calls "exportation" is possible, i.e., where a
variable can be, so to speak, moved into a referentially transparent
position. Thus, the logical representation of (3.12) on the transparent
reading is (3.13), where the variable has been exported. According to
(3.12) Ralph believes that someone is a spy
(3.13) (3x)(Ralph believes z(z is a spy) of x)
Quine, (3.13) is "our new way of saying that there is someone whom John
believes to be a spy." (p. 187). It has been pointed out in Kaplan
(1969) that the condition under which a name is a candidate for exporta-
tion, in Quine's sense, is when it is sufficiently "vivid". Kaplan
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characterizes the notion of a vivid name as follows:
The notion of a vivid name is intended to go to purely
internal aspects of individuation. Consider typical
cases in which we would be likely to say that Ralph
knows x or is acquainted ith x. Then look only at
the conglomeration of images, names, and partial
descriptions which Ralph employs to bring x before
his mind. Such a conglomeration, when suitably
arranged and regimented, is what I call a vivid name.
(p. 229)
A name may be exported, then, just in case it is vivid. The possibility
of transparency, therefore, is dependent upon the nature of the cognitive
representations which a speaker has of the entity whom the name is of,
for a particular instance of use of that name. These sort of factors,
though, cannot be captured in a core grammar; the notion of vividness,
which governs the possibility of transparency,is fundamentally beyond the
expressive power of the theory of core grammar.6
What these observations show is that in matrix-complement construc-
tion containing a quantified noun phrase as a constituent of the comple-
ment to an opaque predicate, it is always possible to have a referentially
opaque reading, but only sometimes a transparent reading. As in the other
marked cases discussed above, this empirical distinction correlates with a
formal distinction: it is only a structure representing the universally
available opaque reading which can be directly generated by core grammar.
The theory of core grammar therefore explains the properties of the
unmarked case, while an account of the marked transparent reading lies
beyond its scope. This is a welcome result, since it shows that Universal
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Grammar distinguishes those properties of quantification which are
universal (i.e., determinable solely as a function of sentential structure),
and those which are idiosyncratic- in this case, to particular utterances
of sentences.
3.4 Relative-Clause Constructions. When we began our discussion of
restrictive relative clauses in Chapter Two, we noted that this construc-
tion has a dual personality. On the one hand, relative clauses have
properties in common with other complex nominal constructions, like
PP-complements. On the other hand, since they contain embedded sentential
complements, they also have properties in common with other sentences
containing embedded clauses, such as matrix-complement constructions of
the type just discussed. It is on this latter side of relative clauses
that we wish to focus our attention in this section.
It has been noted in the literature that the interpretation
characteristically associated with relative clauses like those in (3.14)
is where the head quantifier is construed
(3.14)a Everyone who bought an Edsel got a lemon
b John defeated some politician who runs in
every election
as having scope wider than the quantifier embedded in the relative clause.
The generality of this property of the logical forms associated with
relative clauses is pointed out by Rodman (1976), who observes that:
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In a relative clause, the element that is
relativized always has wider scope than
any other element in that relative clause
(p. 168)
This property of the interpretation of relative clauses is highlighted by
comparing (3.14)a, for example, to (3.15):
(3.15) Everyone bought an Edsel, which is a lemon
(3.15) is ambiguous. On one reading, it asserts that for each person who
bought an Edsel, the car he bought is a lemon, while on the other reading,
it asserts that there is a particular Edsel, which everyone bought, and
which is a lemon. In contrast, (3.14)a is unambiguous. It only has an
interpretation parallel to the former reading of (3.15), i.e., a reading
where 'every' is construed as having scope wider than 'a'.
What we wish to show in this section is that the generalization
above follows as a consequence of the fact that the only logical form
which can be generated from the surface structure of relative clauses,
and which satisfies the well-formedness conditions on logical forms, is,
in our terms, naturally linked, with the "head" quantifier binding a
variable in the main predicate. Thus, the only logical form which may be
associated with (3.14)a is (3.16):
(3.16) [S[everyone who [S[an Edsel]B [St bought s]]]2
[S" got a lemon]]
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which is ultimately converted into a structure like (3.17) (on the
assumption that the wh-word in relative clauses is realized as a conjunc-
tion in logical form):8
(3.17) [SVca[s[sa is a person] [6 [ S[SB is an Edsel] S [La bought B]]]+
[a got a lemon]l]
The pertinent feature of (3.17) is that it contains a quantifier, here
'a', whose scope is limited to the embedded relative clause, as well as a
quantifier, 'every', whose scope is the entire complex sentence.8
(3.17) is derived, from the surface structure (3.18), by
(3.18) S.
1.
NP. VP
NP S
0 N COMP S
NP VP
V NP.
Q N
, I
every one who t bought an Edsel got a lemon
QR adjoining NP. to S. and NPi to Si. An example of this derivation is
given in (3.19):
I
12
I I I
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(3.19) [S [NP [NP[Qevery] one][Swho [S.t bought [NP. [an] Edsel]]]]i ijjNPQ Q
got a lemon]
[S[everyone [Swho [S.t bught [NP. Qan] Edsel]]]]
[S . got a lemon]] 
-
1
[S[everyone [Swho [s[an Edsel]B [St bought B]]]]
[S. got a lemon]]
1
The structure generated by the derivation in (3.19) [=(3.16)] is a well-
formed logical form, since both of the variables 'a' and '6' are properly
bound by, and subjacent to, the quantified noun phrases which bind them.
Indeed, (3.16) is the only logical form which can be generated
from the surface structure in (3.18), which meets the conditions
on well-formed representations at Logical Form. To see this, note that
the only other structure which may be derived from (3.18) by QR (which
satisfies the Condition on Proper Binding) is (3.20):
(3.20) *[S[an Edsel] B [S[everyone [ who [St bought B]]]
[S .a got a lemon]]]1
(3.20) is derived by adjoining NP. in (3.18), 'an Edsel', to Sk, which
arises from the adjunction of NP. to S.. (3.20), as compared to (3.16),
is ill-formed. This is because there are two bounding nodes, Sk and Sj,
intervening between 'an Edsel' and the variable, 's', which it binds.
(3.20), therefore, is a violation of the Subjacency Condition, arid is thus
ill-formed. Thus, (3.16) is the only logical form which may be generated
from the surface structure of relative clauses, and as such, it represents
the unmarked interpretation of relative clause constructions. 9
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The significance of this result is that it provides us with an
explanation of Rodman's observation, since this observation now follows as
a consequence of the theory. That is, in a relative clause, the embedded
quantifier is construed as taking narrower scope than the head quantifier,
because the only well-formed logical form generable from the surface
structure of relative clauses, in accordance with the principles of
core grammar, is naturally linked, as in (3.16). Other logical forms,
such as (3.20), where the embedded quantifier takes wider scope, are ill-
formed, since they violate the Subjacency Condition.
In light of this explanation of the nature of the logical forms
associated with relative clauses, which is based on the Subjacency Condi-
tion, it is of interest to consider the following commentary by Chomsky
(1975b):
The quantificational property that Rodman noted
is a special case of a much more general prin-
ciple, and the impossibility of relativization
within a relative, I believe, also falls under
a far more general, but quite different prin-
ciple, namely, that all transformational rules
are restricted to adjacent cyclic nodes [i.e.,
by the Subjacency Condition - RCM]
(p. 105)
Chomsky is wrong here, but for the right reasons. Under the analysis pre-
sented here, both the impossibility of relativization within a relative and
the quantificational property noted by Rodman fall under the same general
principle, but this principle is just that which Chomsky has argued explains
the impossibility of relativization, viz., the Subjacency Condition. That
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is, it is just those principles which explain the impossibility of extrac-
tion from relative clauses, which also explain why the logical form
associated with restrictive relatives clauses, like those in (3.14), have
the property described by Rodman's observation. That this should be the
case follows from the theory of core grammar we are assuming here, in
which the Subjacency Condition involves S, rather than S.
Of the constructions that have been examined, relative clauses are
the only one, aside from PP-complement constructions, which are associated
with linked logical forms.1 0 That is, in the logical forms associated with
these constructions, only one of the quantifiers binds a variable in the
main predicate; compare (3.16) to (3.21), which is the logical form
associated with the sentence 'Some people in every city voted for Debs':
(3.16) [S[everyone who [S[an Edsel] [St bought fs]]]
[Sa got a lemon]]
(3.21) [S[every city]a [S[some people in a] [S B voted for Debs]]]
The primary feature which these logical forms have in common is that in
both cases, 'every' has wider scope, since it c-commiands 'some'. Besides
this common feature, there are other points of comparison between them:
A.) In a relative clause, the head quantifier in surface structure
('every' - cf. ex. (3.18)) has wider scope in logical form than the quan-
tifier 'a', which is embedded in the complement in surface structure. In
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PP-complements the situation is reversed. Here, as (3.21) shows, the head
quantifier in surface structure, 'some', has narrower scope in logical
form than the quantifier 'every', which is embedded in the complement in
surface structure. Thus, relative clauses are associated with naturally
linked logical forms, and PP-complements with inversely linked logical
forms, vis-a-vis their surface structures.
B.) In the logical form associated with relative clauses, it is the
quantifier which has widest scope which binds a variable in the main
predicate, but in PP-complements, it is the quantifier with narrowest scope
which binds a variable in the main predicate. Thus, in (3.16), 'every'
has wider scope, and binds a variable, 'a' in the main predicate, 'a got
a lemon'. In (3.21), on the other hand, 'some', which has scope narrower
than 'every', binds the variable '8' in the main predicate, 'a voted for
Debs'.
C.) In the logical forms associated with relative clauses and
PP-complements, the quantifier which is embedded in the complement in
surface structure ('a' in (3.16), 'every' in (3.21)) does not bind a
variable in the main predicate in logical form. Rather, it is the head
quantifier in surface structure which, in both cases, binds a variable
in the main predicate.
What is of great interest in making this comparison of the logical
forms represented by (3.16) and (3.21) is that they exhaust, by enumera-
tion, the possibilities of linked structures for logical forms. That is,
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they are the only linked structures which satisfy the general well-
formedness conditions (e.g., the Conditions on Proper Binding and Quan-
tifier Binding) on structures generated by QR from surface structures con-
taining noun complements constructions. Thus, the theory of grammar makes
a very strong empirical claim in this regard: it predicts universally
that if a natural language has linked logical forms, then they will be of
the type illustrated by (3.16) and (3.21), and have the properties just
described. This observation is not limited solely to those logical forms
which represent the unmarked interpretation of a particular construction;
rather, it is an explanation of the range of possible linked structures
regardless of whether they represent marked or unmarked interpretations.
Thus, in Chapter Four, we will see that the logical structure which
c-epresents the marked interpretations of PP-complement constructions
is essentially the same structure as that representing the unmarked
interpretation of relative clauses; both the marked and unmarked cases
are represented by naturally linked logical forms, with properties (A) -
(C).11 Given the principles of core grammar, therefore, it is possible
to explain two deep properties of natural language quantifiers: What
are possible logical forms for sentences containing quantified phrases,
and, of those possible logical forms, which constitute the marked and
unmarked cases. We return to these matters briefly in Chapter Four.
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3.5 Subjectless Complement Constructions. In the discussion above of
matrix-complement constructions, we were concerned with the properties of
quantifiers which occurred in complex sentences with full S-complements --
i.e., 'that' and 'for' clauses, indirect question complements, etc. What
we have not yet examined are constructions in which the complement clause
does not contain an overt subject noun phrase; e.g., raising, equi and
control ('promise' - 'persuade') constructions. It is these latter
constructions which are the topic of this section. In particular, our
interest is centered around explaining the contrast in the range of
possible interpretations of the sentences in (3.22) - (3.24):
(3.22)a Every musician believes that Bird lives
b Someone is anxious for Monk to play Epistrophy
(3.23)a Everyone seems to like Cecil's playing
b Some politician is likely to address John's
constituency
c Many people were thought to have sold IBM
shares
(3.24)a Every musician wants to play like Bird
b Some senator promised to address John's
constituency
Both of the sentences in (3.22) are unambiguous. In both cases the quan-
tifier which appears in the matrix subject can only be construed as having
scope over the entire complex sentence, i.e., as having wide scope over the
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matrix predicate. The sentences in (3.23), by way of comparison, are
ambiguous. In these examples the quantifier may be understood as having
either wider or narrower scope than the matrix predicate. Thus (3.23)b
may be taken as asserting either (i) that there is a politician, e.g.,
Rockefeller, who is likely to address John's constituency, or (ii) that
it is likely that there is some politician (or other) who will address
John's constituency. In contrast to the sentences in (3.23), those in
(3.24), which also contain an overtly subjectless complement clause, are
unambiguous. They lack a narrow scope reading parallel to that described
by (ii) for (3.23)b. Their interpretation is parallel to that of the
sentences in (3.22), i.e., the quantifier in the matrix clause can only be
understood as having wide scope over the matrix predicate.
What the examples in (3.22) - (3.24) indicate is that there is a
difference in the range of possible interpretations available in raising
constructions - i.e., sentences containing infintival complements to predi-
cates like 'be certain', 'seems', 'be likely', 'be believed', etc. - than in
full S-complements constructions (cf. (3.22)), or in equi and control construc-
tions (cf.(3.24)). In this section, we will see that the explanation of these
differences follows from the general well-formedness conditions on rep-
resentations at the level of Logical Form; in particular, from the
Condition on Proper Binding. That is, the reason that sentences like
(3.23), containing raising predicates, are ambiguous is that they can be
associated with two distinct logical forms, each of which satisfies the
Condition on Proper Binding. This is in contrast, as we shall see, to
sentences containing non-raising predicates, like those in (3.22) and
190
(3.24), which can only be associated with a single well-formed logical
form.
*k *t * * I k * k -k * * * *
We begin by examining the range of logical forms which may be
associated with full S-complement constructions, like those in (3.22).
For example, consider (3.25), which is the surface structure of (3.22)a:
(3.25) [S[NPEvery musician] believes [gthat [SBird lives]]]
The only well-formed logical form which can be generated from this
structure is (3.26), in which the quantified noun phrase 'every musician'
is adjoined to the matrix S:
(3.26) [J[every musician]a [S believes [;that [SBird lives]]]]
(3.26) is well-formed since the variable 'a' is properly bound and sub-
jacent to the noun phrase which binds it. Since QR applies freely, (3.26)
is not the only structure derivable from (3.25) by QR; it can also adjoin
the quantified phrase to the complements as well, deriving (3.27):
(3.27) *[Sc believes [gthat [S[every musician]a SBird lives]]]]
In (3.27), the quantifier 'every' has scope narrower than the matrix
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predicate 'believe', in contrast to (3.26), where it has scope wider than
'believe'. (3.27) is not a well-formed structure; it violates the Con-
dition on Proper Binding, since it contains a variable, 'a', which is not
c-commanded by the phrase which binds it. Therefore, sentences like
those in (3.22) are unambiguous because it is possible to associate them
with only one well-formed logical form, viz., (3.26).
Compare this to the situation with raising structures, such as
those illustrated by the sentences in (3.23). The surface structure of
these constructions is generated by NP-movement raising the underlying
subject of the complement clause into the sentence-initial noun phrase
position. This results in a surface structure like that in (3.29), which
is derived from the underlying structure in (3.28) by NP-movement.12
(3.28) [S[NPe] is likely [gfor [S[Npsome politician]
to address John's constituency]]]
(3.29) [S[Npsome politician]t is likely [;[St to address
John's constituency]]]
In the surface structure (3.29) the noun phrase 'some politician'
(properly) binds the trace in the complement subject position. Thus, just
as it is possible to derive, via QR, two logical forms from (3.25), it is
also possible to derive two logical forms from (3.29): one by adjoining
the quantified noun phrase 'some politician' to the matrix S, the other
by adjoining it to the complement S:
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(3.30) [S[some politician] [Sa is likely [g[St to address
John's constituency]]]]
(3.31) [Sa is likely [S[S[some politician]a St to address
John's constituency]]]]
(NOB. In (3.30) and (3.31) 'a' and 't' represent occurrences of the same
variable, since they both aiise from movement of the same
noun phrase; hence they are both bound by this phrase.) The structure
in (3.30) is parallel to (3.26), and is also well-formed, since both 'a'
and 't' are properly bound. In this logical form, the quantifier 'some'
has scope wider than the matrix predicate 'likely'; it corresponds to the
(i) reading of this sentence as described above. In (3.31), on the other
hand, the quantifier has scope narrower than 'likely'; this logical form
corresponds to the (ii) reading above. Ostensibly, (3.31) is an ill-
formed structure, just as (3.27) is: it contains a variable, 'a', which
apparently is not properly bound. But, if this is not a logical form of
(3.29), why isn't this sentence unambiguous, just as (3.25), containing
'believe', is?
The answer to this question lies in a somewhat closer look at the
properties of predicates such as 'be likely', 'be certain', etc. It has
been pointed out in the literature (e.g., by Freidin (1977) and Chomsky
and Lasnik (1977)), that, of the predicates which take S-complements,
there is a sub-set which are construed essentially as "sentence operators"
These predicates are, on the whole, copulative verbs, and are character-
193
ized by the fact that 'it' may appear as their subjects, as, for
example, in (3.32):
(3.32)a It is necessary for students to learn Koko
by heart
b It is possible that the Benedetti tapes
will be found
c It is true that Hayes was faster than Owens
d It is likely that some politician will
address John's constituency
e It is certain that Mr. Smith swindled
our computer
These examples contrast with those in (3.33), where 'it' may not occur
in the matrix subject:13
(3.33)a *It hoped for students to learn Koko by
heart
b *It believes that the Benedetti tapes
will be found
c *It wants to play like Bird
d *It promised to use his influence
The significance of this difference becomes apparent once we recall the
Predication Condition, which was discussed in Chapter One, and is repeated
here:
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Predication Condition
Every argument place of a predicate must be
either a referring expression or a properly
bound variable
As in the case of the other conditions being assumed here, the Predication
Condition is a condition on well-formed representations at the level of
Logical Form. Notice that it follows from this condition that since 'it'
is neither a referring expression nor a properly bound variable, it
may only occur in an NP position which is not an argument place of a
predicate. Therefore, the initial noun phrase position in sentences like
(3.32) is not an argument position of the matrix predicate, though in
sentences like those in (3.33), where 'it' is impossible in the initial
NP position, it is. In particular, this means, as examples (3.32)d and
(3.32)e show, that the initial NP position in sentences containing raising
predicates like 'be certain' or 'be likely' is not an argument position.
Return now to the status of structures (3.27) and (3.31), vis-a-vis
the Condition on Proper Binding:
Condition on Proper Binding
Every variable in an argument position of a
predicate must be properly bound
(3.27) *[Sa believes [sthat [S[every musician] SBird lives]]]]
(3.31) a is likely [;[S[some politician [S a to address
John's constituency]]]]
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(This condition, as was pointed out in Chapter One, is a corollary of
the Predication Condition. Note that the variable 't' in (3.31) has been
changed to 'Q' in this reproduction. cf. the comments on p. 192.) In
the case of (3.27), as (3.33)b shows, the subject of 'believe' is an
argument position. (3.27), therefore, violates the Condition on Proper
Binding, since it contains a variable which is not c-commanded by the
phrase which binds it. In (3.31), on the other hand, the initial noun
phrase is not an argument position, and therefore variables occurring in
it are not subject to the Condition on Proper Binding. The only variable
which occurs in an argument position in (3.31) is the variable in S.
(e.g 0 , *'It addressed John's constituency'). This variable, though, is
properly bound, since it is c-commanded by the noun phrase, 'some
politician' which binds it. Since (3.31) satisfies the Condition on
Proper Binding (all variables in argument positions are properly bound),
it is a well-formed logical form.
What this shows, then, is that given the Condition on Proper
Binding, sentences containing raising predicates like those in
(3.23), should be ambiguous, as opposed to sentences with full
S-complements, as in (3.22). This is because sentences of the former type
can be associated with two well-formed logical forms; one in which the
quantified phrase which occurs in the initial NP position in surface
structure has wider scope than the matrix predicate (viz., (3.30)), and
one in which it has narrower scope, (viz., (3.31)). Sentences like those
in (3.22), on the other hand, are unambiguous, having only a reading in
which the matrix quantifier is construed as having wide scope, since it is
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possible to generate from its surface structure only the logical
form (3.26). A logical form in which this quantifier has narrower scope
than the matrix predicate is not generable; (3.27), as opposed to (3.31),
violates the Condition on Proper Binding.
Consider now the equi and control constructions illustrated by
the sentences in (3.24). In certain respects, these constructions are
identical to the raising structures in (3.23); in all of these cases the
embedded subject is a (properly) bound variable. They differ, though,
in that while sentences like (3.23) are ambiguous, the equi and control
constructions in (3.24) are not. They only have a reading in which the
quantifier is understood as having scope wider than the matrix predicate,
as in full ;-complement constructions. Why is it, then, that these
constructions can only be associated with a logical form in which the
subject quantifier takes wider scope than the matrix predicate?
To answer this question, let us first consider "equi" construc-
tions, like (3.24)a. In discussing these sentences, we will be following
(3.24)a Every musician wants to play like Bird
suggestions in Chomsky (1974) and Chomsky and Lasnik (1977) that equi is
a deletion of a bound reflexive anaphor in the complement subject position
of predicates like 'want', 'be anxious', etc. As is argued in the latter
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reference this deletion is independent of the operations of sentence
grammar, per se; Surface Structure, and hence Logical Form, may therefore
contain elements which are not phonologically realized. Under these
assumptions, the surface structure of (3.24)a is (3.34).15
(3.34) [S[NPEvery musician]a wants [S(for)[S[NPa's self]
to play like Bird]]]
(3.34) is parallel to the surface structure (3.29), containing 'likely',
in that the complement subject in-both cases is a bound variable; in
(3.29) it is a trace, in (3.34) a bound reflexive anaphor. As in the
case of the surface structures (3.25) and (3.29), it is possible to derive
two structures from (3.34) by QR: (3.36), which results from adjunction
of the phrase 'every musician' to the matrix S, and (3.37), which results
from adjunction to the complement S:
(3.35) [S[every musician] [S a wants [&[S [NPa's self]
to play like Bird]]]
(3.36) *[Sia wants [;[S[every musician]a [S. NPa's self]
to play like Bird]]]]
(3.35) is a well-formed logical form; both of the variables are properly
bound by the phrase 'every musician', thereby satisfying the Condition
on Proper Binding. The structure in (3.36), on the other hand, violates
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this condition, since the variable in the subject position of 'want',
which is an argument position, (e.., *'It wants for every musician to
play like Bird'), is not c-commanded by 'every musician' which binds it.
(3.36) is therefore ill-formed. Thus, the only well-formed logical form
which can be generated from the surface structure of equi constructions
which contain quantified noun phrases in the matrix object position is
one in which the quantifier has scope wider than the matrix predicate.
This fact explains the unambiguous nature of sentences of this construc-
16
tion.
The situation in control constructions, illustrated in (3.37), is
parallel to that in equi constructions. Thus, it has been argued in
(3.37)a Some politician promised to address John's
constituency
b Jones persuaded some politician to address
John's constituency
Chomsky (1973) and Chomsky and Lasnik (1977), among other places,17 that
the subject of the complement clause in this construction must be a
variable, usually represented by PRO, which is controlled (i.e., bound)
by either the matrix subject or the matrix object, depending upon the
predicate: 'promise' requires subject control, 'persuade' object control.
Thus, the surface structures of (3.37)a and (3.37)b are (3.38) and (3.39),
respectively:
(3.38) [S[NPSOme politician]a promised [;[S[NpPRaI] to
address John's constituency]]]
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(3.39) [SJones persuaded [Npsome politician]a [ [S[NPROa]
to address John's constituency]]]
As in (3.29) and (3.34), it is possible to derive two structures from
(3.38) by QR:
(3.40) [s[some politician] [Sa promised [[S [NPROa] to
address John's constituency]]]]
(3.41) * [ apromnised [;[S[some politician] [S[PPROa] to
address John's coiistituency]]]]
(3.40) is a well-formed logical form, since it satisfies the Condition on
Proper Binding. (3.41), on the other hand, does not satisfy this con-
dition. This is because che subject of 'promise' is an argument
position; e.g., *'It promised to address John's constituency'. If this
subject NP contains a variable, then it must be properly bound. But in
(3.41), the variable 'a' is not properly bound, since it is not c-
commanded by the phrase 'some politician', which binds it. In this
respect, (3.41) is like (3.31) and (3.36), and, therefore, the explanation
of the unambiguity of sentences like (3.37)a is the same as that for the
sentences in (3.22) and (3.24)a: in the only well-formed logical form
which may be generated from its surface structure, the quantifier has
wider scope than the matrix predicate.
A sentence like (3.37)b with 'persuade' (whose surface structure
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is (3.39)), is parallel to raising, equi anLd 'promise' constructions in
that the subject of its complement is a bound variable in surface struc-
ture. Where it differs is that the variable is bound by the matrix object
in this construction, and not by the subject, as in the others. Given
this, once we notice that the object of 'persuade' is an argument position
(*'John persuaded it to address John's constituency'), we can see that the
explanation of its unambiguity also resides in the Condition on Proper
Binding. Thus, as in the other cases, it is possible to derive two
structures from the surface structure (3.39):
(3.42) [S[some politician]a [SJones persuaded a[;[S[NPPRO]
to address John's constituency]]]]
(3.43) *[sJohn persuaded a[S g[some politician]a [S[NpPROt]
to address John's constituency]]]]
(3.42) is well-formed; both variables are properly bound. (3.43)
violates the Condition on Proper Binding, since the object position of
'persuade' contains a variable which is not properly bound. Thus, in
control constructions with object control, as in those with subject
control, there is only one logical form which may be generated from the
surface structure, which explains why the quantifier in the matrix object
in surface structure is understood as having scope wider than the matrix
predicate 'persuade'.
Thus, the fundamental difference which distinguishes equi and
201
control constructions, on the one hand, from raising constructions on the
other, is that in the latter the subject of the matrix predicate is
not an argument position. It thus follows, from the Condition on
Proper Binding, that sentences of the former construction are unambiguous,
as opposed to sentences of the latter construction, which are ambiguous.
A difference in the range of possible interpretations in these
constructions is also evident in examples containing more than one
quantifier. Thus, compare the example in (3.44) with those in (3.45):
(3.44) Some politician is likely to address every
rally in John's district
(3.45)a Every musician wants to play in an orchestra
b Some politician promised to address every
rally in John's district
c John persuaded some politician to address
every rally in John's district
The examples in (3.45) are all unambiguous; in each case the matrix
quantifier is construed as having scope wider than the quantifier in the
complement clause. (3.44), on the other hand, is three-ways ambiguous.
It may be understood as asserting either (i) that there is a politician,
eog., Rockefeller, who will address all of the rallies in John's
district; (ii) that it is likely that there is some politician (or other)
who will address all of the rallies; or (iii) that it is likely that for
each of the rallies, there is some politician who will address it (i.e.,
there may be a different politician for each rally).
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The unambiguity of the examples in (3.45) follows
immediately from the Condition on Proper Binding and the Subjacency
Condition. Thus, it is only possible to generate a single logical formn
from their surface structures. For example, from the surface structure
of (3.45)a, which is (3.46), it is only possible to generate the logical
form (3.47):
(3.46) [S NPEvery musician], wants [S[Sa's self to play
in an orchestra]]]]
(3.47) [S[every musician] [So wants [S[S[an orchestra]
[SCa's self to play in 8]]]]
(3.47) is derived by adjoining the noun phrase 'every musician' to the
matrix S, and 'an orchestra' to the complement S. This is the only
logical form generable from (3.46) because to adjoin the matrix quantified
noun phrase to the complement S would violate the Condition on Proper
Binding(cf. e.g. (3.36)), while adjoining the quantified phrase in the
complement to the matrix S would violate the Subjacency Condition
(cf. p. 172 ff.). The same situation arises in control constructions as
does in equi constructions. Thus, from the surface structures of
(3.45)b and (3.45)c (= (3.48)a and (3.48)b),it is only possible to
generate (3.49)a and (3.49)b, respectively; any other structures which
could be derived by QR would violate either the Condition on Proper
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(3.48)a [S[NPsome politician]a promised [[S PRO to
address [Npevery rally in John's district]]]]
b [SJohn persuaded [NPsome politician]a [ PRO to
address [Npevery rally in John's district]]]]
(3.49)a [S[some politician]a [Sa promised [S[S[every rally
in John's district]R [SPROa to address s]]]]]
b [S[some politician]a [SJohn persuaded ac[[S[every
rally in John's district]I [SPROa to address 8]]]]]
Binding or the Subjacency Condition. In all of the sentences in (3.45),
then, the reason that they only have a reading in which the matrix
quantifier has wider scope in logical form than the complement quantifier
is that it is only possible to generate a logical form from their surface
structures with these scope relations. Others would violate the well-
formedness conditions on logical forms.
The difference, recall, between raising constructions, like
(3.44), and the equi and control constructions illustrated in (3.45), is
that in the former case, adjunction by QR of a quantified noun phrase in
the matrix clause to the complement S does not violate the Condition on
Proper Binding. This fact allows for the derivation of three distinct,
well-formed logical forms from the surface structure of (3.44), which is
(3.50). One, (3.51)a, is generated in the same manner as (3.47), (3.49)a,
(3.50) [S[NPSome politician]t is likely [s[St to address
[Npevery rally in John's district]]]]
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and (3.49)b; i.e., by adjunction of the quantified phrase in the matrix
(3.51)a [S[some politician]a [Sa is likely [g[S[every
rally in John's district]B [Sa to address B]]]]]
b [S(it) is likely [;[S[some politician]a [S[every
rally in John's district]B [Sa to address B]]]]]
c [S(it) is likely [S[S[every rally in John's district]6
[S[some politician] [Sy to address 8]]]]]
clause to the matrix S, and the quantified phrase in the complement to
the complement S. The other two, (3.51)b and (3.51)c are both generated
by adjunction of both of these phrases to the complement S (cf. p. 191 ff.).
Notice that all three of the structures in (3.51) are well-formed, since
in each of them both the Condition on Proper Binding and the Subjacency
Condition are satisfied. (3.51)a is the logical form representing the
(i) reading of (3.44) described above, (3.51)b represents the (ii) read-
ing, and (3
.
51)c the (iii) reading.
Thus, the difference in the range of interpretations of raising
constructions like (3.44) from theequi aAd control constructions in (3.45)
follows from the Condition on Proper Binding and the Subjacency Condition.
In the former case it is possible to generate three distinct logical forms
consistent with these conditions, but in the latter cases only a single
well-formed logical form is generable.
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Appendix: ON THE TENSED-S AND SPECIFIED SUBJECT CONDITIONS
Up to this point, we have been considering the following conditions
on well-formed representations at the level of Logical Form: The Predi-
cation Condition, its corrollary, The Condition on Proper Binding; The
Condition on Quantifier Binding, and The Subjacency Condition. Aside from
these conditions, there are two other conditions which we take to be well-
formedness conditions on logical forms. Those are the Tensed-S and Specified
Subject Conditions, discussed in detail in Chomsky (1973), (1975a), (1976),
(1977a), Kayne (1975) and Quicoli (1977a), (1977b). We will assume the
formulation of these conditions in (A1): 18
(Al) A logical form with the structure
S...Xeie 1;..**Vi.*** *X*i*
is ill-formed,
where: V. is c-commanded by eitherL
tense or a subject.
As in the case of the Predication Condition, we take V i here to be a
variable, in the general sense of being either a trace, an anaphoric
pronoun, a reciprocal or PRO. The effect of this condition can be seen
by comparing the (a) and (b) examples in (A2) and (A3), all of which are
derived by NP-movement:
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(A2)a [S[NPDe Gaulle]t seemed [ [St to be a great statesman]]]
b *[NpDeGaulle]t seemed [g[St is a great statesman]]]
(A3)a [S[NPKennedy]t seemed [SgSt to like DeGaulle]]]
b *[S[NpKennedy]t seemed [[sSDe Gaulle to like t]]]
In (A2)b, the complement clause contains tense, while in (A3)b it con-
tains a subject. Since the complement clause in each case contains a
variable, these structures violate the Tensed-S and Specified Subject
Conditions. The examples in (A2)a and (A3)a, on the other hand, do not
violate these conditions, since the complement clause in each does not con-
tain either tense or a subject. They are, therefore, well-formed structures.
The effect of these conditions is quite parallel with regard to
the principles of bound anaphora. Consider the examples in (A4):
(A4)a [SKennedy expected [§[Shimself to be a great statesman]]]
b *[SKennedy expected [SrShimself was a great statesman]]]
c *[SKennedy expected [[S SMrs. Gandhi to like himself]]]
The sentences in (A4) show that the Tensed-S and Specified Subject Con-
ditions also restrict the possibilities of bound anaphora. They have the
effect of allowing a reflexive pronoun inan infintival complement clause
to have an antecedent in the matrix clause only if the reflexive pronoun is the
subject of the infinitive. Thus, in (A4)a, the reflexive pronoun is construed
as bound by 'Kennedy'. In (A4)b and (A4)c, however, the complement clauses contain
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tense and a subject, respectively. Hence these structures violate the
Tensed-S and Specified Subject Conditions, and are therefore ill-formed.
In general, then, the effect of these conditions is to mandate
that the subject of an infinitive is the only position open to anaphoric
control by an element in another clause.
Since the Tensed-S and Specified Subject Conditions are conditions
on well-formed logical forms, we would expect them to also effect the
well-formedness of logical forms derived by QR. This issue, though, is
actually moot, since the Subjacency Condition limits quantification to
being clause bounded (in the unmarked case). Recall, that for a variable
to be properly bound by a quantified phrase, it must be subjacent to that
phrase, where subjacency in this case is determined with respect to
S as the bounding node. The effect of the Subjacency Condition, thus,
is to bound the scope of quantifiers to the clauses of which they are
immediate constituents in surface structure. The Tensed-S and Specified
Subject Conditions, however, are violated only when a variable is bound
by an element which is a constituent of a higher clause than the clause
of which the variable is an immediate constituent. The Subjacency Con-
dition therefore guarantees that the logical forms which are generated by
QR will always satisfy the Tensed-S and Specified Subject Conditions.
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FOOTNOTES
Chapter Three
1 The formulation of the Subjacency Condition above is not quite
correct, since it would have the unwanted effect of marking as
ill-formed the logical form associated with such simple sentences
as 'everyone loves someone', whose logical form (on one of its
readings) is (i):
(i) [S.[everyone]ac [jsomeone]B [,Sa loves 8]]]
1 Ik
(i) should be ill-formed, since there are two bounding nodes, S.
and Sk, intervening between the variable 'a', and the phrase
'everyone' which binds it. This problem is avoided by reformulating
the Subjacency Condition as in (ii):
(ii) Subjacency Condition
A logical form with the structure
...xt..o [a"" [ ""6 o t].". ]...] ...xt...
(a,B bounding nodes), is ill-formed
where (1) Xt immediately binds t
(2) if a=B, then a does not
immediately dominate S
The effect of the additional clause (2) is that a chain of immediately
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dominating S's, (or NP's) count as a single bounding node. Under
this version of the Subjacency Condition, (i) is well-formed,
since now 'a' is subjacent to the noun phrase 'everyone'. This
is because S. immediately dominates Sk . Notice that this re-
formulation of the Subjacency Condition does not affect the
explanation in the text of the nature of the logical forms which
may be associated with matrix-complement constructions. In this
case, there is still a violation of the Subjacency Condition,
since, as (3.3) shows, S. does not immediately dominate S., as
there is an intervening S node.
2 This issue is not insignificant in the case of wh-movement. Thus,
it is only by a derivation in which wh-movement applies cyclically
that it is possible to generate a structure which satisfies the
Subjacency Condition. Consider the structures in (i):
(i)a *[S[COMPWhich person]t [S. does Harry believe
1
[ [S.John saw t]]]]
3
b [S[COMPWhich person]t [S does Harry believe
1
[str [Sj John saw tj]]]]
(i)a is generated by a single operation of wh-movement, moving the
wh-phrase from its underlying position as object of 'saw', to the matrix
COMP position. This structure, though, violates the Subjacency Condition,
since there are two bounding nodes, Si and S., intervening between the1 j'
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wh-phrase in COMP, and the trace which it binds. (i)b, on the
other hand, does not violate this condition, on the assumption
that the wh-phrase binds ti, which appears in the embedded COMP,
and which in turn binds t j Here, there is only a single bounding
node, Si, intervening between the wh-phrase and the trace, ti,
which it immediately binds; furthermore, there is only a single
bounding node intervening between ti and the trace, tj, which it
immediately binds. Since neither of the binding phrase-trace
relations in (i)b violates the Subjacency Condition, (i)b is a
well-formed structure, generatod by wh-movement into COMP.
Thus, in the case of wh-movement, as opposed to QR, a cyclic
derivation generates a structure which satisfies the Subjacency
Condition. The fundamental reason for this difference is that QR
is an adjunction to S, while wh-movement is a movement into COMP.
3 This property of natural language quantification was pointed out in
Chomsky (1975b). For some of the implications of this property
for the analysis of anaphora, see Chomsky (1976).
4 In the discussion of the Subjacency Condition up to this point, we
have been assuming that S is the universal bounding node. There is
further independent reason to hold that for rules mapping from Deep
to Surface Structure, NP is also a bounding node. Chomsky (1977)
has shown that by making this assumption a number of constraints
which have been proposed in the literature can be subsumed under
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the Subjacency Condition, e.g., The Complex Noun Phrase and
Sentential Subject Constraints (Ross (1967)), The Subject Condition
(Chomsky (1973)) and The NP Constraint (Bach and Horn (1976)).
Thus, by assuming that NP and S are the bounding nodes for rules
like NP-movement and wh-movement, which map from Deep to Surface
Structure, it is possible to explain, on the basis of the Sub-
jacency Condition, the impossibility of extraction from complex
noun phrases, as, for example, in the cases in (i) and (ii):
(i)a *[fr COMWhich city]t [sdid[NPsome men in t] vote
for Debs]]
b *[S[COMPWhich author's]t [Sdid John like
[Npt book]]]
c *[ [COMpOf Whom] t [Sdid John see [Npmany t]]]
d *[g[CONMPlWhat]t [Sdid John detest [NPHarry's refusal
to buy t]]]
e *[ [COMPWho]t [Sdid John believe [Npthe claim
[S(t) that [SHarry saw t]l]]]
f *[ [COMPWhich class]t Sd i d [NP e v e r yone [COMP t who]C [PdId NPv o COMP
[Stook tl]]] like the teacher]]
(ii)a *[S[NpEvery city]t is likely [4for [S[NpSome men
in t] to enjoy jazz]]]
b *[S[NpSome author's]t is likely [ for
[S[Npt book] to be published]]]
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c *[S[NPThe musicians]t seem [Sfor [S[NPman y of t]
to play well]]]
d *[S[NPTh e book]t is likely [rfor [S[NPHarry's
refusal to buy t] to be a problem]]]
e *[S[ pBill]t is certain [Sfor [S[Npthe claim
[Sthat [SHarry saw t]]] to sway the jury]]]
f *[S[NPSmith 's class]t seems [Sfor [S[NPe v e r y on e
[iwho [stook t]]] to pass]]]
The examples in (i) and (ii) illustrate a range of complex nominal
constructions from which neither wh-movement (in the former case),
nor NP-movement (in the latter case) are possible. The (a)
examples contain a PP-complement, the (b) examples a possessive
NP, (c) a partitive, (d) a nominalization, (e) a noun complement
and (f) a relative clause. All of the structures in (i) and (ii)
violate the Subjacency Condition, since in each of them there are
(at least) two bounding nodes, S and NP, intervening between either
the wh-phrase (in (i)), or the NP (in (ii)), and the trace which
it binds. Thus, the Subjacency Condition explains the impossibility
of extracting a noun phrase from complex nominal constructions, on
the assumption that for these rules, NP, as well as S, is a
bounding node.
(Notice that if we were to hold that the range of possible
wh-constructions is not limited (at least in part), by the Sub-
jacency Condition, then it would no longer be possible to provide
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a general explanation of the phenomena illustrated in (i).
Indeed, examples like (i)a - (i)d, where a wh-phrase has been
extracted from a noun phrase which does not contain an internal
clause, are particularly recalcitrant to analysis in a theory
rejecting the Subjacency Condition (or some equivalent analogue).
One could perhaps attempt to account for the phenomena illustrated
by these examples by assuming some version of the NP Constraint
(Bach and Horn (1976) - but cf. Chomsky (1977a) for a discussion
of problems with this constraint concerning Extraposition of PP),
or the Absolute A/A Condition (Kayne (1975)), whichby stipulation
pronibits movement from a complex nominal construction. But, while
this maneuver would account for the facts in (i) and (ii), it would
be an unwelcome move, since it would now be necessary to stipulate
ad hoc what is otherwise explained by the theory, i.e., by the
Subjacency Condition.
(Also notice that if S and not S were a bounding node, then it
would also not be possible to explain the phenomena in (i)a - (i)d.
This is because there would then only be a single bounding node,
namely NP, intervening between the wh-phrase in COMP and the trace
which it binds. For discussion of this matter, see Chomsky (1977a).)
The reason for NP, as well as S, being a bounding node for
rules mapping from Deep to Surface Structure, may perhaps be a
reflection of the fact that NP, as well as S, is a natural domain
for the functioning of syntactic rules. For example, beside passive sen-
tences like 'Rome was destroyed byCarthage', there arealso passive nominals:
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'Rome's destruction by Carthage'. In the case of QR, though, which
maps from Surface Structure to Logical Form, NP is not a natural
domain of functioning; QR is an adjunction to S, not NP. Thus,
there would seem to be little basis for extending the bounding nodes
for QR to include NP.
In order to account for the fact that, for the rules mapping
from Deep to Surface Structure, (i.e., wh-movement and NP-movement),
NP, as well as S, is a bounding node, we will reformulate the
Subjacency Condition as in (iii), adding clause (3) to the formula-
tion in fn. 1, above:
(iii) Subjacency Condition
A logical form with the structure
x" t" e [a'"ee [B''e [yt]... ]...]...xto..
(a,B bounding nodes), is ill-formed
where (1) Xt immediately binds t
(2) If a=B, then a does not immediately
dominate 6
(3) If X = [Q N1, then a, a NP
5 Notice that this ambiguity appears not only in sentences containing
'that' or 'for' complementi.zers, but also in 0-complementizer construc-
tions as well:
(i) [ John believed [; [S[Npsomeone] to be at the door]]]
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Besides having the unmarked,opaque interpretation, where 'some'
is construed as having scope narrower than 'believe', (i) also has
a transparent reading, where 'some' is construed as having scope
wider than 'believe'.
That sentences like (i) are ambiguous has been disputed recently
by Postal (1974a - pp. 222-5). He claims that sentences like (i)
are unambiguous, having only a transparent reading. But, if this
were the case, then (i) should be false in any situation where there
is no person in particular whom John believes to be at the door.
Clearly, though, (i) may be true under such circumstances, indicat-
ing that it has an opaque, as well as transparent, reading.
Notice that the fact that (i) is ambiguous shows that 'someone'
in (i) cannot be the direct object of 'believe' in surface structure,
as was originally suggested in Rosenbaum (1967), and has been
argued for in Postal (1974a). Under this analysis, the surface
structure of 'John believed someone to be at the door' is (ii):
(ii) [S.John believed [NPsomeone]l[SS.to be at the door]]]
In order to generate a structure which represents the opaque reading
of this sentence from (ii), QR would have to adjoin the quantified
noun phrase to S.. This derives (iii):
(iii) *[S. John believes a [ [jsomeone]a [S.to be at
S the door]]]] 3
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In (iii), the quantified phrase 'someone' has narrower scope than
'believe'. This structure, however, is not a well-formed logical
form; it contains a variable 'a', which is not c-commanded by the
phrase which binds it, in violation of the Condition on Proper Binding.
Under the assumption, then, that the noun phrase 'someone' is the
surface object of 'believe', it is not possible to explain why
sentences like these have an opaque interpretation.
From the surface structure (i), on the other hand, it is
possible to generate a well-formed logical form representing the
opaque reading by adjoining 'someone' to the complement S:
(iv) [SJohn believes [~[S[someone] [Sy to be at
the door]]]]
In (iv), the variable 'a' is properly bound, and thus, it is a
well-formed structure.
For more discussion of the properties of 0-complement con-
structions, see Chomsky (1973) and Chomsky and Lasnik (1977). For
telling criticisms of Postal's arguments for a structure
like (ii), see Bresnan (1976c).
6 The possibility of exportation is apparently not only dependent on
the vividness of the embedded noun phrase, but also on the properties
of other noun phrases contained in the sentence. For example,
consider the sentences in (i):
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(i)a John confirmed that every investor was bankrupt
b The stock market crash confirmed that every
investor was bankrupt
There is a marked difference in the interpretation of these two
sentences. While (i)a is ambiguous, (i)b is unambiguous, only
having an interpretation where 'every' is construed as having
narrower scope than the predicate 'confirmed'. Thus, these examples
indicate that the nature of the entities denoted by the subject
noun phrase, e.g., whether they are animate or inanimate, is a
significant factor in determining whether a transparent reading, in
addition to an opaque reading, is possible.
The semantic properties of other lexical items contained in
matrix-complement constructions are also significant in determining
the possibility of a transparent reading. For example, consider
verbs of saying. While sentences simply containing the verb 'say',
like (ii), are apparently ambiguous, changing the predicate to a
(ii) John said that everyone had left
verb of this class which more physically describes the actual
speech act, e.g., 'hiss' or 'mumble', precludes a transparent reading:
(iii)a John hissed that everyone had left
b John mumbled that everyone had left
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The same semantic effect can be achieved by the addition of manner
adverbs to sentences like (ii). Thus, like (iii), and unlike (ii),
(iv) only has an opaque reading:
(iv) John said loudly that everyone had left
Other logical operators besides adverbs also prevent exportation;
negation in many cases has the same effect, as can be seen by
comparing (ii) with its negated counterpart (v):
(v) John didn't say that everyone had left
(Notice that the sort of circumstances just noted governing the
possibility of transparency are striking in their resemblance to
the bridge conditions on wh-movement, discussed in Erteschlick (1973).
Thus, we find that those cases which do not permit transparent
reading apparently also do not permit wh-movement: Compare the
examples in (vi) to those in (3.1):
(vi)a *What did Jones hiss that Smith liked?
b *Who did John quote Bill as saying had left?
c *What did Helen grieve had been experimented oiL?
d *Wlho is it instructive to play the piece first?
e *Which shuttlecocks did John ask whether he had
bought at Abercrombie's
f *How many people did Mark regret Sam's having
invited?
Those cases which do permit a transparent reading, in contrast,
219
regularly permit wh-movement:
(vii)a Who did John believe was at the door?
b How many people does Harry want us to invite
to the party?
c Which picture did John realize had been stolen?
d Who did John say had left?
The direct questions in (vii) are all unambiguous, in contrast to
their ambiguous sources; they only have a transparent reading.
(vii)a, for example, is an inquiry into the identity of the specific
individual whom John believed was at the door (cf. Chapter Two,
fn. 8). These observations indicate that the conditions governing
the possibility of transparency overlap with the bridge conditions
on wh-extraction in these constructions.)
The possibility of a transparent reading is not governed solely
by factors brought to bear by the particular lexical items, but
also, like the marked interpretation of PP-complement constructions, by
the depth of embedding of the quantified noun phrase. Thus, the
sentences in (viii), in comparison to (3.11)a, are unambiguous; they
each apparently have only an opaque reading:
(viii)a The Duke realized that John believed that
someone was at the door
b Archie said that The Duke realized that John
believed that someone was at the door
Thus, an opaque reading is always possible for full S-complement
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constructions, regardless of how deeply embedded a quantified noun
phrase is in surface structure. The possibility of transparency,
though, decreases as the quantified noun phrase is more deeply
embedded.
7 As in the case of the marked reading of PP-complement constructions
(cf. Chapter Two, fn. 18 ), it is not possible to account for
the marked interpretation of matrix-complement constructions by a
simple modification of the principles of core grammar. For
instance, one might assume that the Subjacency Condition was not a
principle of core grammar, allowing for the direct generation of a
logical form in which a quantified phrase embedded in a complement
clause has wide scope. Under this assumption, it would be possible
to generate (i) as a well-formed logical form from the surface
structure of 'John believed that someone was at the door':
(i) [S[someone]a [SJohn believed that [S was at the
door]]]
Even though (i) represents the appropriate scope relations, it is
not a representation of the transparent reading of this sentence,
since the variable 'a' has not been exported. Thus, eliminating
the Subjacency Condition would lead, in this case, not only to a
theory with a lower level of explanatory adequacy (since it does
not distinguish the unmarked from the marked cases), but to a
theory which is at a lower level of descriptive adequacy as well.
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This is because it allows for the generation of (i), which does not
correspond to any interpretation of the sentence 'John believed
that someone was at the door'.
8 It is generally the case that pronouns (which are not marked
otherwise) may be construed as variables bound by antecedent
quantifiers. For example, in (i), 'him' may be understood as a
iU) Everyone expected that John would bring
him Chateau Palmer
variable bound by the quantifier 'every', which follows from its
being within the scope of 'every' in (ii):
(ii) [S[everyone]a [S o expected that John would
bring a Chateau Palmer]]
It has been pointed out, originally in Geach (1962), that there
are sentences, containing relative clauses, in which a quantifier
is anaphorically related to a pronoun which is not literally within
its scope, as in (iii):
(iii) Everyone who owns a donkey likes it
Here, the scope of the quantifier 'a' is limited to the relative
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clause. This phenomenon, though, is apparently a reflection of
more general principles of anaphoric interpretation, since pronouns
may be "bound" by quantifiers which do not occur in the same
sentence, but occur elsewhere in the discourse:
(iv) A: Everyone owns a donkey in this town
B: Does he feed it hay or alfalfa?
Given the sort of anaphoric properties illustrated by (iv), the
fact that the pronoun 'it' may be construed anaphorically in (iii)
is not pertinent to the clause-bounded nature of quantification,
in our sense.
9 There also appears to be a marked interpretation of relative clauses.
For example, Geach (1962) has pointed out examples like those in (i):
(i)a The woman who every Englishman loves best is the Queen
b The woman who every Englishman loves best is his mother
In (i)a, the quantifier 'every' is construed as having narrow scope
with respect to 'the', but in (i)b it may be construed as having
wider scope. On this reading, (i)b asserts that for each Englishman,
there is one (and only one) woman whom he loves best, and that
woman is his mother. (Notice that a reading where 'every' has narrow
scope is also possible in (i)b, for instance, when the pronoun 'his'
is construed deictically, rather than anaphorically.) Partee (1975)
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notices the same type of ambiguity in sentence (ii):
(ii) Every man who loves a woman loses her
She states that "There appears to be one interpretation in which
there is one woman such that every man who loves her loses her, and
another reading on which every man who loves any woman loses which-
ever womanhe loves." (p. 232). A parallel ambiguity seemingly
also exists in examples like (iii) (pointed out by G. Ioup):
(iii) A book which every prisoner left surprised
the warden
(iii) can seemingly be taken as asserting either (a) that for each
prisoner, there is some book which he left, which surprised the
warden, or (b) that there is some book which all of the prisoners
left, and it surprised the warden.
Besides the unmarked reading, represented by a naturaly linked
logical form, these sentences apparently also have a reading in
which the embedded quantifier is understood as having scope wider
than the head quantifier. Insofar as this reading exists, it
constitutes the marked interpretation of relative clauses, a
representation of which is not directly generable by core grammar.
The property of the marked interpretation of relative clauses
which is of central significance here is that it is essentially
parallel to the unmarked interpretation of PP-complement construc-
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tions, discussed in Chapter Two. Thus, under the marked reading,
the quantifiers in sentences like (i) - (iii), containing relative
clauses, are construed as being inversely linked. With respect
to markedness, then, relative clauses are the mirror image of
PP-complement constructions: Relative clauses, on their marked
interpretation, are construed as if they were PP-complements,
while PP-complements, on their marked interpretation, are under-
stood as if they were relative clauses. We briefly return to this
relationship in Chapter Four.
10 There is one other construction in English which is associated
with a linked logical form: the comparative construction. With
respect to the scope possibilities of quantifiers the constructions
are identical to relative clauses, in that a quantifier which is
embedded in the compared clause is understood as having scope
narrower than the head quantifier. This is illustrated by the
examples in (i) and (ii):
(i) John is healthier than someone who eats
caviar all day is.
(ii) Smith eats more caviar yearly than everyone
in Russia does in a decade.
This parallelism of comparative clauses and relative clauses follows
immediately from the functioning of QR, since the structure of com-
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paratives is essentially the same as the structure of relatives,
except that adjectives (as well as nouns) may be compared, but
not relativized. Thus, the structure of the comparative clause
in (i) is (iii):
(iii) AP
AP S
COMP S
healthier than someone who eats caviar is t
(We are assuming here, following Bresnan (1973), that the heads of
comparative clauses are most fruitfully analyzed as containing
quantifier elements, albeit of a complex nature.) The structure
of (ii) is identical to (iv), except that NP's stand in place of
the AP's, as in (iv):
(iv) NP.
COMP S
more caviar than everyone in Russia does t
Recall that the Condition on Analyzability, as formulated in
Chapter One, determines that QR applies to a [+N]-phrase. Under
the theory of linguistic categories developed originally in
Chomsky (1970) (see also Jackendoff (1974)), the categories which
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have the feature [+NJ are noun phrases and adjective phrases.
Thus, QR functions identically in comparative constructions like
(iii) and (iv) as it does in relative clauses, affecting not only
the quantifier embedded in the compared clauses, but also AP. and1
NP. in (iii) and (iv), respectively. This generates (v) and (vi)
as the logical forms of (i) and (ii) (where -er is the head
quantifier in (i)):
(v) [S[healthier than [Ssorneone who eats caviar]l
[SI is t]]] [SJohn is B]]
(vi) [S[more caviar yearly than [S[everyone in Russia]B
[SS does t]]]a [SJohn eats a]]
Structurally, (v) and (vi) are identical to the logical form, (3.16),
which is associated with relative clauses - i.e., they are naturally
linked. Since relative clauses and comparative clauses are
associated with logical forms which are, in the relevant respects,
structurally identical, it follows that in comparatives like (i)
and (ii), the quantifier in the embedded clause is construed as
having narrower scope than the head quantifier, as is also the case
in relative clauses.
11 Cf. footnote 9, where it is pointed out that both the unmarked inter-
pretation of PP-complements and the marked interpretation of relative
clauses are represented by inversely linked logical forms.
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12 Following Chomsky and Lasnik (1977), we will hold that there is a
rule of "Free Complementizer Deletion", which in the derivation of
(3.29) deletes the complementizer 'for'. We assume that this rule
is not a rule of sentence grammar, but rather a rule of phonological
interpretation, applying to surface structures. Cf. Chomsky and
Lasnik for discussion of the significance of this rule.
13 Notice that 'it' here is the expletive 'it', and not the pronominal
'it' occurring in sentences like (i):
(i)a John said that Harry bought it at the
hardware store
b Everyone who owns a donkey beats it
In (i)a, 'it' functions as a deictic pronoun, in (ii)a as a bound
variable. In the sentences in (3.32), though, it serves neither of
these functions; rather, it is a marker, so to speak, of indefinite
reference.
14 We presume that 'it' in these structures is inserted by a lexicali-
zation rule which replaces an unindexed empty node in surface
structure by the formative 'it':
(i) [Npe] ÷ [NPit]
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Parallel to free complementizer deletion discussed in fn. 12, we
take 'it'-insertion to be a rule mapping from Surface Structure
onto PI, the level of phonological interpretation. See Chomsky
and Lasnik (1977), p. 448 ff., for discussion of the structural
conditions governing the functioning of this rule.
15 In (3.34), as in (3.29), the complementizer 'for' is deleted by
free complementizer deletion. Cf. fn. 12.
16 The analysis being presented here naturally explains the differences
in interpretation in the pairs of sentences in (i) and (ii), pointed
out in loup (1975):
(i)a Everyone seems to admire the Duke of York
b The Duke of York seems to be admired by everyone
(ii)a Everyone is anxious to admire the Duke of York
b The Duke of York is anxious to be admired by
everyone
The sentences in (i) share an interpretation, in which the quantifier
'every' is construed as having scope narrower than the matrix
predicate 'seem'. In (ii), on the other hand, the sentences do not
share an interpretation. The reason for this becomes clear as soon
as we notice that the sentence in (i) contains a raising predicate,
those in (ii) an equi predicate. In the former case, as we have
just seen, a quantifier which is the subject of the matrix predicate
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may have scope narrower than that predicate, since the subject
position of raising predicates is not an argument position. There-
fore, both (i)a and (i)b are associated with logical forms in which
the quantifier 'every' has narrow scope; in (i)b, this is a function
of the fact that 'everyone' is an immediate constituent of the
complement clause.
In the sentences in (ii), which contain the equi predicate
'be anxious', the subject quantified phrase cannot be adjoined to
the complement S, since to do so would violate the Condition on
Proper Binding. Thus, since in (ii)a 'everyone' is in the matrix
clause, and in (ii)b in the complement clause, it follows that they
do not share an interpretation, since quantification, in this case,
is clause bounded.
17 For some discussion of the relationship of PRO and trace, see
Lightfoot (1977).
18 It has been suggested that in addition to S, NP may also constitute a
relevant domain for these conditions. Cf. Chomsky (1977b) for dis-
cussion of this question, centering around the constituency of
'picture'-noun phrases. Notice that the issue of the nodes deter-
mining the domain of the Tensed-S and Specified Subject Conditions is
independent of the issue of the bounding nodes which determine the
domain of the Subjacency Condition. This is because the former
conditions are not, in contrast to the Subjacency Condition, bounding
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conditions; rather, they are general conditions determining the
range of anaphoric possibilities for variables.
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Chapter Four: PROLEGOMENA TO AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKED CASES
In this thesis, we have examined the empirical consequences of the
assumption that there exists a linguistic level of Logical Form, which we
interpret as the interface between the theory of linguistic form and a
more general theory of the semantics and pragmatics of natural languages.
What we have shown is that those structures which are generable at this
level by core grammar represent the unmarked interpretations of sentences
containing quantified phrases. As we have proceeded, however, we have
also noted the existence of "marked" cases, representations of which are
not directly generable by core grammar. Among the marked cases have been
the opaque interpretation of simple transitive constructions (Chapter One),
the relative interpretation of sentences containing PP-complements
(Chapter Two) and the transparent interpretation of matrix-complement
constructions (Chapter Three). Empirically, these marked cases are
characterized by an idiosyncratic dependence upon factors which manifestly
lie beyond the expressive power of the theory of core grammar which has
been developed here, (e.g., properties of particular lexical items, depth
of embedding, the cognitive representations of a speaker of a given
utterance of a sentence, etc.). In this concluding chapter, we wish to
sketch a number of suggestions as to the nature of a more comprehensive
theory of the form and interpretation of natural languages. These sug-
gestions may ultimately lead to an account of the range of possible
marked interpretations of quantified sentences.
The central claim of this thesis is that the existence of the
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unmarked interpretations of a given construction is predictable, given
our theory, solely from the constituency of surface structure, while the
existence of the marked interpretations is not. In this respect, the
structural properties of surface structure are, in themselves, inadequate
to account for the marked cases. As an example fo the sort of inadequacies
we have in mind, consider for a moment the opaque reading of simple
transitive constructions like (4.1) :
(4.1) [ Jones [Vpseeks [NPa unicorn]]]
It has been suggested in a number of places (e.g., Quine (1960), sec. 32;
Montague (1968)), that in order to account for the opaque interpretation
of this construction, it is necessary to "build-up" structure in the
object position of verbs like 'seek', 'want', etc. With regard to the
particular case we are discussing, it has been held that 'seek' should be
taken as meaning 'try to find'. In order to capture this, let us assume
that there is a lexically dependent rule, outside of core grammar, which
turns a structure like (4.1) into (4.2):
(4.2) [ Jones [ Vtries [sto find [Npa unicorn]]]]
Given (4.2) we could now apply QR, generating (4.3):
(4.3) [SJones [vptries [S[a unicorn]a [sto find c]]]]
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by adjoining the quantified phrase 'a unicorn' to the S node which arises
from the operation mapping (4.1) onto (4.2). (4.3) is presumably a well-
formed logical form (it satisfies the Condition on Proper Binding and the
Subjacency Condition), which represents the marked,opaque interpretation
of (4.1). However, there is a problem inherent in this account: QP, under
our assumptions to this point, cannot apply to (4.2) in order to generate
(4.3). This is because (4.2) is not a representation at any level of
core grammar, specifically not at Surface Structure, since it is generated
by a rule which is crucially dependent upon the nature of a particular
lexical item, and hence is not a rule of core grammar. The issue which
faces us, therefore, is to construct a general theory of linguistic form
and interpretation which is expressively rich enough to account for the
generation of (4.2) from (4.1). This more comprehensive theory must be
wide enough to encompass, in the relevant respect, the sorts of idio-
syncratic factors which we mentioned above as governing the occurrence of
the marked interpretations. Furthermore, it must be wide enough to allow
for the building up of structures from which may be determined the range
of possible structures representing marked cases. This wider theory, then,
contrasts with the theory of core grammar, which explains on the basis of
surface structure constituency both the conditions under which the unmarked
cases may occur, as well as their structure,
In order to bring to fruition the project just outlined, i.e., the
construction of a theory of the marked cases of quantification, we would
need at least another volume to fully weigh the syntactic and semantic
issues which bear on the correct analysis. It is possible, however, to
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very briefly sketch the sort of comprehensive theory we have in mind, and
point out an example of the sort of results which follow from it. Recall
that in Chapter One, we argued for the existence of a level of linguistic
representation, distinct from Logical Form, at which both the marked and
unmarked interpretations of sentences are represented. The rationale
behind postulating the existence of this level, LF', was in order for a
theory of meaning for natural language to be defined over a single
level of linguistic representation. We have, therefore, been taking LF' to
be an interpretive level of the grammar, parallel to other interpretive
levels such as PI (phonological interpretation). Thus, the general structure
of an overall theory of form and interpretation we are assuming is as in
(4.4):
(4.4) DS - SS - LF
PI LF'
We assume that the general properties of these levels are determined by
linguistic theory, and that Universal Grammar fixes formal parameters
which specify the domain and nature of the rules mapping onto these
interpretive levels. Given these basic assumptions, three closely inter-
related questions pose themselves. First, what is the formal nature of
representations at LF'?; second, what is the nature of the rules mapping
onto this level?; and, tutird, what is the nature of the principles deter-
mining well-formedness at this level?
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While providing full answers to these questions remains a topic of
future research, it is possible to outline the sorts of answers we have in
mind. In answer to the first question, we wish to hold that structures at
LF' involve the standard logical representation of quantifier and variables,
(as well as the logical connectives). Thus, as we noted in Chapter One,
we are taking as the "converted forms" of logical forms such as those in
(4.5), for example, to be something like the structure in (4.6):
(4.5)a [S[every scale]a [SCecil played z]]
b [S[somebody]a [Sa saw Dexter]]
(4.6)a [SVa[S[Sa is a scale] ÷ [SCecil played a]]]
b [Sra[SS a is a person] 5 [Sc saw Dexter]]]
In order to answer the second question, we need note that the rules
mapping onto LF' are not rules of core grammar, and therefore, are not
subject to the narrow restrictions on expressibility imposed on possible
transformational rules of core grammars. These rules mapping onto LF',
therefore, may be stated in a richer formalism, whose formal parameters are
wide enough to allow for the formulation of what we shall refer to as
"conversion rules". Among the conversion rules we have in mind are rules
of quantifier interpretation, which carry structures like (4.5)a and (4.5)b
onto (4.6)a and (4.6)b, respectively, and rules of lexical conversion, which
map structures like (4.1) onto (4.2). Presumably, the set of possible rules
allowed under a formalism rich enough to allow the statement of conversion
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rules will be a superset of the possible rules of core grammar. This
feature of the theory we are outlining permits the formulation of rules
mapping from LF onto LF' which are functionally identical to the rules of
core grammar. Thus, we may assume that there exists a rule analogous to
QR, which we shall refer to as QR', which maps from LF onto LF'. We have
already observed an example of the functioning of QR' in the generation of
(4.3) (which in turn is mapped by quantifier conversion rules into a
representation in the notation of logical quantifiers and variables,
as displayed in (4.6)). The major difference between QR and
QR' (aside from the fact that the former maps from Surface Structure to
Logical Form, and the latter from Logical Form to LF') is that there may
be added conditions, aside from whether its structural description is
satisfied, which govern the functioning of QR'. For example, QR' may be
governed by the occurrence of particular lexical items, by properties of
discourses, intonational properties of sentences, as well as extra-
grammatical factors such as the beliefs, expectations and other cognitive
representations of a speaker uttering a sentence. I  (This aspect of the
rules mapping from Logical Form onto LF' is a developement of suggestions
in Chomsky (1975a), (1976).)
In answering the third question posed above, we minimally assume
that analogues of the Predication Condition and the Condition on Quantifier
Binding are also defined over representations at LF'.2 This is quite a
natural assumption to make, since the purpose of these conditions is to
generally characterize those structures which are interpretable by the
rules of quantifier interpretation for natural languages, which are defined
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over representations at LF'.
The answers we are proposing to these questions are by no means
uncontroversial. For instance, it is not immediately clear that the use of
unrestricted quantification assumed in (4.6) can serve generally to represent
the converted forms of quantified sentences, in light of considerations of
the role of presupposition in a semantics of natural language (cf. Soames
(1976) for a discussion of this issue). It should be pointed out, however,
that the question of the correct logical notation for representations at
LF' is an empirical issue, the answer to which is intimately related to
a wide range of issues in the semantics of natural language
quantification. Apart from these considerations, however, there may also
be arguments of a somewhat different nature bearing on the character of
representations at LF', and hence on the rules which map onto, and the
constraints defined over, that level. In particular, we wish to justify
the assumptions outlined above by showing that on the basis of these
assumptions it is possible to provide an account of the range of marked
interpretations of sentences containing quantifiers. Insofar as this task
can be carried out for a significant range of marked cases, it will provide
evidence for the proper nature of representations over which inter-
pretations of natural language quantified sentences are defined.
As an indication of the scope of the extended theory we are proposing,
and some of the results which follow from it, consider the analysis of the
marked interpretation of sentences containing PP-complement constructions.
It was pointed out in Chapter Two that sentences like (4.7) are ambiguous;
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(4.7) Every senator on a key congressional committee
voted for the amendment
it has a reading in which the quantifiers are understood as inversely
linked, and a reading which is parallel to the reading associated
with (4.8):
(4.8) Every senator who is on a key congressional
committee voted for the amendment
The generation of a representation at LF' of the former, unmarked reading
of (4.7) is effected by applying the appropriate conversion rules to the
logical form (4.9);
(4.9) [S[a key congressional committee]a [S[every senator
on l]B [SB voted for the amendment]]]
deriving essentially the converted form (4.10):
(4.10) [S ! ca[S[Sca is a key congressional committee] &
[SV 8 [S[SB is a senator on a] ÷ [IS voted
for the amendement]]]]]
In order to account for the derivation of a converted form representing
the marked reading, it is important to notice that, since QR applies
optionally, structures such as (4.11) may exist at Logical Form;
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(4.11) [S[every senator on [qpa key congressional committee]]
[S voted for the amendment]]
(although it is not a well-formed representation at that level, since it
violates the Condition on Quantifier Binding). Presumably though, this
structure does satisfy the conversion rule turning 'every' into a universal
quantifier. This would derive a structure along the lines of (4.12):
(4.12) [SVS[[S.B is a senator on [NPa key congressional
committee]] + [SB voted for the amendment]]]
To this structure, given our extended assumptions concerning rules mapping
onto LF', the rule of QR' may apply, adjoining the quantified noun phrase
'a key congressional committee' to Si, (which is the S which arises from
the functioning of the rule converting 'every'). This operation derives
(4.13):4
(4.13) [SVB[S[S[a key congressional committee]a [S.A is a senator
1
on al] + [S S voted for the amendment]]]
To (4.13), the rule of quantifier conversion for 'a' applies, turning it
into an existential quantifier in this context: 5
(4.14) [SV S [ S S[aa[ S[ Sc is a key congressional committee] -
[SiB is a senator on a ]]] +- [SB voted for the
amendment] ]]
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In the converted form (4.14), the existential quantifier corresponding
to 'a' in (4.7) has scope narrower than the universal quantifier which
corresponds to 'every'. This is in contrast to the converted form (4.10),
which represents the unmarked interpretation of (4.7). In this latter
structure the quantifier corresponding to 'a' has wider scope than the
quantifier corresponding to 'every'. The relation between the marked
interpretation represented by (4.14), and the reading of the relative clause
construction (4.8), is highlighted by comparing (4.14) to (4.16), which is
the converted form generated from the logical form (4.15):
(4.15) [S[every senator who [S[a key congressional committee]
[St is on ac]] [SS voted for the amendment]]
(4.16) [S Vs [ S[ S  is a senator] S [ Ha[S[sa is a key congressional
committee] & [S$ is on a]]] ÷ [SS voted for the
amendment]]]
(Here, as above, we are assuming that in the generation of converted forms
for relative clauses there is another conversion rule involved, which has
the effect of rewriting a wh-word as a conjunction.) Notice that (4.16) is
equivalent to (4.14), as the antecedent of the conditionals in each of
these structures is true under the same condition; viz., if Proxmire is a
senator and the Foreign Relations committee is a key congressional committee
and Proxmire is on the Foreign Relations committee, then it is also the
case that the Foreign Relations committee is a key congressional committee
and Proxmire is a senator on the Foreign Relations Committee, and vice
241
versa. Thus, since the antecedents of the conditional are the only parts of
these structures which differ, and since they are equivalent, it follows
that (4.14) and (4.16) are themselves equivalent.
Given an analysis along these lines, then, it is possible to
account for the fact that the marked interpretation of sentences containing
PP-complements is essentially identical to the unmarked interpretation of
sentences containing relative clauses. This is because the type of logical
structures associated with these cases at LF' are equivalent. Indeed, in-
sofar as the theory being proposed here can be sustained,(4.14) is the only
well-formed structure at LF' which can be associated with (4.7), aside from
(4.10), which represents the unmarked case, (cf. fn. 4). This is a
significant result, since it means that it is possible to give
a full explanation of the general properties of quantification in sentences
containing PP-complement constructions; i.e., what constitutes the marked,
as well as the unmarked case.
We are suggesting, therefore, that a general theory of linguistic
form and interpretation may be developed which explains not only the range
of possible unmarked interpretations, but also the range of possible marked
interpretations of a given construction. While we have barely sketched
the details of this theory, we have attempted to present a number of
suggestive ideas as to the formal parameters demarcating the range of the
theory. We have also pointed to some of the types of phenomena which
follow from it. It remains for future research to clarify the full range
of syntactic and semantic factors bearing on the ultimate empirical status
of such theory.
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FOOTNOTES
Chapter Four
1 It should be kept clear that our goal here is to point out some ideas
bearing on +he construction of a theory of the possible structures which
may represent marked interpretations, an issue which is distinct from
determining the circumstances under which a marked interpretation may
occur in a particular sentence. Notice, that while some of the factors
which determine the occurrence of a marked interpretation are more or
less apparent (e.g., semantic properties of lexical items), it may well
be the case that there are no general principles which predict all the
conditions under which a marked case can occur. That is, the existence
of a marked interpretation in a given sentence may be truly idio-
syncratic, not merely to a given sentence, but perhaps even to utterences
of that sentence (cf. section 3.3).
2 Assuming that c-command, (or some appropriate analogous notion), can be
defined over representations at LF'.
3 We have not mentioned here the status of the Subjacency Condition in the
extended theory we are developing. The central case which bears on its
status is the transparent interpretation of matrix-complement con-
structions, and the exact nature of exportation in these constructions.
If the effect of exportation is to "raise" a variable into a transparent
position out of the complement clause, then the structures derived at
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LF' representing the marked,transparent interpretaticn of matrix-
complement constructions may indeed satisfy the Subjacency Condition.
Thus, we could assume that the structure derived by exportation (and
QR) is something like (i):
(i) [S[someone]a [ SiRalph believes a [ [Sis a spy]]]
Here, there is only a single bounding node, Si, intervening between
'c', and the quantified phrase, 'someone', which (immediately) binds
it. If an analysis along these lines turns out to be correct, we could
then assume that the Subjacency Condition, (as well as the Predication
Condition and The Condition on Proper Binding), is defined over represen-
tations at LF', in addition to being defined over representations at
Logical Form.
4 Notice that the central property of the rules generating converted forms
which is of concern to us here is that they have the effect of building-
up sentential structure. The assumption that the structures generated
by these rules involve the logical connectives, on the other hand, does
not have this central significance. Indeed, representations of
converted forms which do not involve the logical connectives, (say for
reasons having to do with the presuppositions in universal quantifica-
tions), would be equally satisfactory for our purposes, as long as the
rules generating these structures at LF' have the effect of building
up the appropriate sort of sentential structure.
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5 Notice that (4.10) and (4.14) are the only structures generable, unaer
our extended assumptions, from structures at Logical Form, which are,
in turn, generated from the surface structure of (4.7). (4.10) repre-
sents the conversion of the logical form in which QR has applied to
both of the quantifiers; (4.14), is the converted form derivable from
a structure to which QR has applied only to 'every'. Notice that the
structure derivable from a structure in which QR has only applied to
'a' is identical to the converted form derived from a logical form in
which QR has applied to both quantifiers. This is true because, in the
derivation of a converted form from (i), QR' must apply:
(i) [S[a key congressional committee]a [S[NPevery
senator on a] voted for the amendment]]
If this rule were to apply the quantified phrase 'every senator on c',
deriving a structure in which it has wider scope than 'a key congres-
sional committee', the result would not be well-formed, since it would
violate the Condition on Proper Binding, viz., (ii):
(ii) *[S[every senator on a]I [S[a key congressional
committee]a [S B voted for the amendment]]]
In order to generate a well-formed structure from (i), QR must
adjoin the 'every'-phrase to Si, generating from (iii):
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(iii) [S[a key congressional committee]a [S [every
senator on a]B [S B voted for the amendment]]]
(iii), though, is identical to (4.9), whose converted form is (4.10).
What this shows, then, is that (4.10) and (4.14) are the only
well-formed converted forms which can be associated with (4.7), given
our extended assumptions. We comment on the significance of this
result below.
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